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The UK Commission for Employment and Skills is a social partnership, led by 
Commissioners from large and small employers, trade unions and the voluntary sector. 
Our mission is to raise skill levels to help drive enterprise, create more and better jobs 
and promote economic growth. Our strategic objectives are to: 
 Provide outstanding labour market intelligence which helps businesses and people 
make the best choices for them; 
 
 Work with businesses to develop the best market solutions which leverage greater 
investment in skills; 
  
 Maximise the impact of employment and skills policies and employer behaviour to 
support jobs and growth and secure an internationally competitive skills base. 
These strategic objectives are supported by a research programme that provides a robust 
evidence base for our insights and actions and which draws on good practice and the 
most innovative thinking.  The research programme is underpinned by a number of core 
principles including the importance of: ensuring ‗relevance‘ to our most pressing strategic 
priorities; ‗salience‘ and effectively translating and sharing the key insights we find; 
international benchmarking and drawing insights from good practice abroad; high 
quality analysis which is leading edge, robust and action orientated; being responsive to 
immediate needs as well as taking a longer term perspective. We also work closely with 
key partners to ensure a co ordinated approach to research. 
In the UK Commission‘s 2010 Employer Perspectives Survey, 40 per cent of UK 
employers did not provide training for their staff in the last 12 months. Although 
exacerbated by the worst economic recession in living memory, it is the case that a 
significant proportion of employers do not provide any training for their staff whatsoever. 
Businesses which employ few people, as well as establishments in certain sectors, are 
least likely to fund or arrange training and these patterns have been evident for a number 
of years.  
Through our earlier work, notably the Collective Measures study series, the UK 
Commission has identified a number of policy levers, each of which have the potential to 
address this challenge and encourage employers to raise workforce skill levels on a 
collective basis. This is a challenge worth meeting. For those employers that do train 
there is evidence that they enjoy benefits relating to survival, productivity, employee job 
satisfaction and lower absentee rates.  
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This Evidence Report, undertaken by the National Institute of Economic and Social 
Research, provides further understanding into one of these policy levers, occupational 
regulation. This umbrella term covers those mechanisms, both voluntary and mandatory, 
through which minimum skill standards can be applied within occupations. In the right 
circumstances occupational regulation has the potential to raise levels of employer 
provided training. The right circumstances here revolve around the chosen occupation, 
the type of occupational regulation applied and its subsequent design, implementation 
and governance.  
Importantly, occupational regulation is just one of a number of policy levers which can 
stimulate employer investment in skills on a collective basis. Known as Best Market 
Solutions, the UK Commission has set out a range of different tools that employers might 
want to use to raise their skills ambitions to compete on a world stage, both at an 
individual business level and for their sector as a whole. These include inter employer 
networks, levies, tax incentives, human capital reporting and tools for high performance 
working.  
This Evidence Report will further contribute to our understanding of such levers. This is 
particularly the case for an area which has been sorely under researched. It provides a 
greater appreciation of the nature and impact of occupational regulation in the UK and, in 
so doing, helps to build the evidence base on the conditions and circumstances required 
to use such a lever in the pursuit of investing in skills.  
Sharing the findings of our research and engaging with our audience is important to 
further develop the evidence on which we base our work. Evidence Reports are our chief 
means of reporting our detailed analytical work. Each Evidence Report is accompanied 
by an executive summary. All of our outputs can be accessed on the UK Commission‘s 
website at www.ukces.org.uk  
But these outputs are only the beginning of the process and we will be continually looking 
for mechanisms to share our findings, debate the issues they raise and we can extend 
their reach and impact. 
We hope you find this report useful and informative. If you would like to provide any 
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The use of occupational licensing as a mechanism for increasing the demand for, and 
supply of, skills was considered – alongside other measures such as training levies – as 
part of the UK Commission‘s recent Review of Employer Collective Measures (Stanfield 
et al., 2009). However, that Review acknowledged that the general topic of occupational 
regulation remains severely under researched in the UK. It went on to recommend that a 
further, more detailed investigation of the issue should be carried out. This report 
presents the findings from that investigation.  
The overall aims of the research were to:  
 map the current pattern of occupational regulation in the UK;  
 review the theory regarding the operation and impact of occupational regulation; 
 examine the existing evidence on the impacts of occupational regulation in the UK 
and abroad; 
 provide initial estimates of the impact of occupational regulation on labour market 
outcomes such as skill levels, wages and employment in the UK. 
The focus of the report 
The report focuses on three forms of legal regulation (licensing, certification and 
registration) and one form of voluntary regulation (accreditation) that has no legal backing 
or state involvement.  
 Licensing: This refers to situations in which it is unlawful to carry out a specified 
range of activities for pay without first having obtained a licence which confirms that 
the licence holder meets prescribed standards of competence. Workers who require 
such licences to practice in the UK include doctors, solicitors, veterinary nurses, 
private security guards, gas installers, taxi drivers and heavy goods vehicle drivers.  
 Certification: This refers to situations in which there are no restrictions on the right to 
practice in an occupation, but job holders may voluntarily apply to be certified as 
competent by a state appointed regulatory body.  Workers in the UK who may apply 
for certification include fitness instructors (who may apply to be certified by the 
Register of Exercise Professionals) and hairdressers (who may apply to be certified 
by the Hairdressing Council). 
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 Registration: This refers to situations in which it is unlawful to practice without having 
first registered one‘s name and address with the appropriate regulatory body. 
Registration thus provides some form of legal barrier to entry, but an explicit skill 
standard is not provided. An example in the UK is the requirement for estate agents to 
register with the Office of Fair Trading under regulations designed to prevent money 
laundering.  
 Accreditation: We use this term to refer to situations in which an individual may 
apply to be accredited as competent by a recognised professional body or industry 
association. Accreditation is distinct from certification in that the criteria governing 
accreditation and the procedures regarding enforcement are entirely the responsibility 
of the accrediting body rather than the state. An example in the UK is the 
accreditation scheme for accountants, who may apply to the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants in England and Wales for accreditation as a Chartered Accountant. 
In this report, we use the term ‗occupational regulation‘ as a broad heading for these 
various forms of standard setting mechanisms. Occupations which are not regulated in 
any of these ways are termed ‗unregulated‘. 
Theoretical perspectives on occupational regulation 
A simple theory of licensing (the strictest form of occupational regulation) indicates that 
the imposition of a universal, skills based entry requirement through licensing can be 
expected to raise average skill levels in the occupation, since low quality workers who 
cannot meet the new entry requirement are forced out whilst other low quality workers 
must engage in job related training in order to increase their human capital to the new 
minimum standard. If the stock of human capital in the occupation rises because of the 
new entry requirement, then one may also expect the quality of the product or service to 
increase. Yet if prices and wages are free to respond to changes in quality or supply of 
qualified practitioners, then any restriction of the number of workers in the occupation 
may also drive prices upwards and allow wages to rise.  
Employment levels within the occupation – and the availability of the associated product 
or service to consumers – may fall in the short term, as low quality workers who cannot 
meet the new minimum standard are barred from engaging in the now regulated activity. 
If their numbers are sufficient, their unemployment may drive down wages in the wider 
labour market. Consequently, there are potentially important spillover effects in the labour 
market, at least in the short term. In the medium to long term, however, any rise in 
average wages in the occupation may attract higher quality workers who now see the 
possibility of a return on their human capital investments. This could increase average 
skill levels further, whilst also depressing any negative employment effect.  
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Less restrictive forms of regulation such as certification and accreditation offer the 
possibility of ensuring quality for consumers and of providing practitioners with higher 
incomes and labour market status. However, they have the disadvantage of providing 
weaker incentives for upskilling since, in the absence of a universal entry barrier, the 
strength of any incentives for human capital investments will ultimately depend upon the 
degree of demand for certified/accredited workers in the product market.  
Given that the theorised effects of occupational regulation are complex empirical studies 
are critical in understanding the effects of occupational regulation under different 
scenarios. 
Existing evidence 
As noted above, evidence of the impact of occupational regulation is limited, and that 
which is available tends to focus only on licensing, the strictest form of occupational 
regulation. The existing evidence is also heavily dominated by US studies.  
The available evidence suggests that licensing is less common in the UK than it is in the 
US. The overall conclusions from the US studies on the impact of licensing are that, in 
general, occupational licensing increases the wage of licensed workers, reduces 
employment growth and raises the price of goods or services but without overall 
improvements in the quality of service or product offered. The magnitude of the effects 
vary by occupation and location. Notwithstanding this, there is very limited evidence on 
the impact on skill levels or the propensity to engage in job related training, as licensing 
tends not to have been introduced for these explicit purposes.  
In relation to many EU countries it appears that the UK is less restrictive in its approach 
to regulating some professions, but that it is more restrictive than many in its approach to 
regulating lower skilled occupations. The available evidence on the operation of 
occupational regulation within countries such as Germany, France and Italy is extremely 
limited. However, wage premia do seem lower in some EU countries such as Germany 
than they are in the US. Post entry controls on the level of professionals‘ fees and, by 
implication, earnings have been offered as one potential explanation. This serves to 
indicate the importance of the broader regulatory framework (particularly competition law) 
in shaping the effects of occupational licensing.  
In the UK, there is some evidence that the training requirements recommended or 
imposed in lower skilled occupations, through licensing, have had some effect in 
increasing the level of training and qualifications (e.g. among care workers). In other 
cases, however, (e.g. security guards) the existing evidence suggests that the new skill 
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standards have been too low (or the barriers to access them have been too high) to result 
in any substantial up skilling of the workforce in question. Existing research also indicates 
licensing is associated with a wage premium in the UK and that this is higher for the more 
skilled and better paid occupations. However, firm evidence on the employment effects of 
licensing is currently missing, as is evidence on the impact of regulation on product 
markets. 
Mapping occupational regulation in the UK  
In order to address the absence of any comprehensive information on the prevalence or 
nature of occupational regulation in the UK, we draw up a map of occupational regulation 
in the UK. The map has been compiled at SOC(2000) Unit Group level and classifies the 
type of occupational regulation that applies within each Unit Group, as well as providing a 
range of details about the characteristics and enforcement of these regulations. Among 
the 353 Unit Groups in the SOC(2000) Classification, some 82 contain jobs require 
licences to practice, 19 contain jobs for which there is a state based certification scheme, 
whilst 20 contain jobs that are subject to registration requirements. A further 67 Unit 
Groups contain jobs for which there exists a recognised, non-governmental accreditation 
scheme. This leaves 165 Unit Groups that are classified as being ‗unregulated‘.  
The prevalence of occupational regulation in the UK  
Estimates of the prevalence of occupational regulation are derived using data from the 
UK‘s Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLFS). By matching the mapping spreadsheet to 
the QLFS one is able to classify each job in the economy according to the regulatory 
characteristics of the Unit Group to which it belongs. The estimates indicate that at least 
14 per cent of all jobs in the UK are subject to licensing. At least three per cent have the 
option of certification, whilst at least 10 per cent have the option of accreditation. At least 
two per cent are subject to registration requirements. The true figures are likely to be 
higher, as precise estimates cannot be obtained for jobs belonging to Unit Groups where 
only some tasks are regulated. In total, at least 28 per cent of all jobs in the UK are 
covered by one of the four types of regulation, although the true figure is likely to be at 
least one third and may be as high as fifty per cent. The share of all jobs that are subject 
to regulation has risen over the period 2001-2010 through the combined effect of 
employment growth in occupations that were regulated in 2001 and the extension of 
regulation to occupations which were unregulated in 2001.  
Professional occupations are the most likely to be regulated followed by Process, plant 
and machine operatives. Sales occupations, Skilled trades, Personal service occupations 
and Elementary occupations are the least likely to be regulated. Regulated jobs are more 
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likely to be held by men than by women. Those in the licensing and accreditation groups 
tend to be older, on average, than other groups, which may be related to the time 
investment that is sometimes needed in order to gain the qualifications or work 
experience that is required under a licence to practice or an accreditation. 
The impact of regulation on qualification levels, training and wages in the UK 
In order to provide new evidence on the labour market outcomes of occupational 
regulation in the UK, qualification levels, training receipt and wages among groups of 
employees who are subject to different forms of occupational regulation (including those 
in occupations which are unregulated) were compared using data from the QLFS.  
Cross-sectional analysis was used to examine the extent to which any raw differences in 
wage levels, qualifications and the take up of job related training between workers in 
regulated and unregulated occupations persist after controlling for demographic and other 
job characteristics. Among Professional occupations and Associate Professional and 
Technical occupations, qualifications, wages and the take up of job related training were 
found to be higher among workers in licensed jobs than among workers in unregulated 
jobs, as the theory would predict. However, no consistent patterns are identified among 
other occupational groups or for other types of regulation. This suggests that 
unobservable factors may be at work which we were unable to account for in this cross-
sectional framework with the data available from the QLFS. Such unobservable factors 
would confound any attempts to identify a causal effect of occupational regulation through 
cross-sectional analysis.  
A difference-in-differences (DiD) approach was employed in an attempt to identify the 
causal relationship between occupational regulation and labour market outcomes. The 
analysis examined the wage differential (say) between the workers in a soon to be 
regulated occupation (the treatment group) and the workers in similar unregulated 
occupation (the comparison group). It then examined whether the magnitude of that 
differential changes after the treatment group becomes regulated.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
The analysis focused on five occupations which saw either the introduction of regulation 
or a change in the type of regulation over the period 2001-2010, namely: security guards; 
care workers; social care managers; childcare workers; and automotive technicians. It 
identified some effects which could plausibly be attributed to the introduction of 
occupational regulation. These included a rise in wages among security guards following 
the introduction of a licensing system in 2003 and a rise in qualification levels and job 
related training among care workers as a result of the introduction of a organisation level 
licensing system in 2005.  
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Elsewhere, in the case of childcare workers and automotive technicians, we found no 
evidence that the introduction of occupational regulation had affected qualification levels, 
the take up of job related training or the level of wages. This may be because the 
regulations were somewhat weaker in these instances, placing qualifications 
requirements only on a minority of workers (in the case of childcare) or comprising only of 
a voluntary scheme (in the case of vehicle repairers). It is difficult to make generalisations 
from these few cases, but the evidence provided by the DiD analysis does suggest, quite 
plausibly, that the effects of occupational regulation can be expected to be stronger when 
the entry requirements are either higher or are more extensively applied.  
Implications for action by policymakers and employers  
This Evidence Report helps inform the implementation of policy in this area in England. 
The coalition government‘s skills strategy, Skills for Sustainable Growth (Department for 
Business, Innovation and Skills, 2010), expresses an intention to work with employers in 
introducing forms of occupational regulation, not just for consumer protection or for the 
public interest, but also to assist industry in becoming more competitive by raising skill 
levels. In working with employers to do this, the government has indicated that there is 
not a ―one-size-fits-all solution‖. Indeed, in encouraging the design and establishment of 
new occupational regulation schemes to raise skills, the skills strategy requires industry 
itself to determine what would fit best for an occupation or sector.  
Forms of occupational regulation, such as licensing, certification and accreditation, clearly 
have the potential to raise average skill levels in an occupation. They do so by providing 
new incentives for workers or firms to invest in occupation specific human capital. The 
incentives are clearly strongest – and more equally felt by both workers and firms – in the 
case of licensing.  
The limited pre-existing evidence on the impact of occupational regulation in the UK 
indicated that such upskilling has occurred in some specific cases, and our analysis 
found further empirical support for this. However, our analysis also supported the notion 
that the effects on skill levels can also sometimes be limited. We find no widespread and 
consistent effects on skill levels. The effects appear to be heavily contingent upon the 
prevailing circumstances within a particular occupation (such as existing levels of 
training), the nature of the regulatory regime (e.g. the stringency of the new skill 
requirement) and the characteristics of the occupation‘s wider labour and product market.  
At the heart of any policy on whether or not to regulate an occupation is a trade off 
between the potential benefits of occupational regulation and its potential costs. 
Economic theory tells us that the benefits of occupational regulation can include a more 
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highly skilled labour force, at least in the regulated sector, improvements in quality of 
goods or services provided in the regulated sector, and welfare benefits for the regulated 
sector in terms of wages and profits. It also tells us that the potential downsides include 
possible negative spillovers into the unregulated sector of the labour market, such as the 
depression of wages in adjacent labour markets due to labour supply shocks, and a 
diminution in the number of providers. 
Our research has found some evidence of wage increases among regulated occupations, 
but the results were not consistent across all of the occupations that we have studied. We 
found no evidence of negative effects on employment. The potential downsides of 
occupational regulation were thus not prominent in our findings. However we were able to 
look at employment effects for only a small number of occupations and we were unable to 
look at price/quality effects. The evidence base on these issues thus remains relatively 
limited for the UK.  
If policymakers or employers believe there is a strong prima facie case for regulation of a 
particular occupation, the other issue they face is how to regulate that occupation. This 
raises questions about: 
 the design of the regulation (e.g. should a skill standard be mandatory or voluntary? 
At what level should the skill standard be set? Is this imposed on the employer or the 
individual? Is it a one-off enhancement or will there be a requirement to impose 
continuing professional development to continue to raise skills?);  
 its implementation (e.g. should grandfathering be allowed for occupational 
incumbents?); and  
 its governance (e.g. who is empowered to regulate the scheme? How and how often 
will standards be monitored to ensure these remain fit for purpose?).  
These major design factors can be crucial in determining the actual effects of regulation, 
although there remains little research evidence on their relative impact.  
Two policy considerations emerge from the discussion above. The first is whether there is 
a prima facie case for regulating a particular occupation. The second consideration is 
how to go about creating, enforcing and monitoring the regulation. One would expect the 
latter to be just as important as the former in determining ultimate labour market and 
product market outcomes.  
There may be analogies with the policy making considerations which surrounded the 
introduction and enforcement of the statutory national minimum wage. The costs and 
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benefits of the regulation of prices for labour were central in that instance, as were 
alternative models for setting a wage and enforcing it. If anything, occupational regulation 
is liable to be more complicated since it must cover a variety of different policy 
instruments relating to different occupations. The design of such policies therefore 
requires extensive knowledge of labour market and product markets, and of the 
incentives and constraints which apply to the various actors within them. The analysis 
conducted in this research project has identified considerable heterogeneity, both in the 
design of occupational regulations within the UK and in the apparent impact of regulation 
across different occupations. This indicates that the detailed outcomes of regulation – 
and thus the case for regulating – can only be determined on a case by case basis. 
However, the research also serves to indicate the wide range of factors which should be 
taken into account in that determination. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 The origins of the report 
This report uses the term ‗occupational regulation‘ as a broad heading for various 
mechanisms through which minimum skill standards are applied within occupations. Such 
mechanisms provide incentives for workers and employers to invest in skills by 
establishing a framework of rewards which are contingent upon successful attainment of 
a specified skill level. As such, they are considered to be one possible means by which 
the skills base in the UK can be improved, so as to help it develop a world class skills 
base (see Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, 2010).  
The use of occupational regulation as a mechanism for increasing the demand for, and 
supply of, skills was considered – alongside other measures such as training levies – as 
part of the UK Commission for Employment and Skills‘ recent Review of Employer 
Collective Measures (Stanfield et al., 2009).1 However, that Review acknowledged that 
the general topic of occupational regulation remains under researched in the UK. It went 
on to recommend that a further, more detailed investigation of the issue should be carried 
out in order to provide a more extensive and fully informed platform for policy making in 
this area. This report presents the findings from that investigation.  
1.2 The scope of the research 
The research is concerned with forms of regulation (whether mandatory or voluntary) 
which introduce minimum skill standards within certain occupations. The existing 
research literature in the area of occupational regulation, by contrast, is centrally 
concerned with legal barriers to entry. The two intersect in the case of ‗occupational 
licensing‘, which Kleiner (2000) defines as "a process whereby entry into an occupation 
requires the permission of the government, and the state requires some demonstration of 
a minimum degree of competency" (see Figure 1.1). The project has such ‗licences to 
practice‘ as a central focus. However, the boundaries of the project have been drawn 
more broadly so as to include the other forms of state based and voluntary occupational 
regulation.  
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State certification schemes are a common counterpoint to mandatory licensing schemes 
in the research literature. Run by state appointed regulatory bodies, certification schemes 
place no barriers on entry to an occupation but provide a means by which practitioners 
may voluntarily be certified by the state as meeting a prescribed skill standard. They are 
thus in scope to the research as a form of non-mandatory, state based regulation.  
Voluntary schemes which require an applicant to demonstrate a minimum degree of 
competence are also in scope. These schemes – which we refer to as ‗voluntary 
accreditation schemes‘ – are typically run by bodies representing the members of a 
particular occupation or the employers within a particular industry. They provide an 
important comparator to otherwise equivalent state based certification schemes. In order 
to be considered as a form of ‗regulation‘, and to maintain equivalence, we focus on 
recognised accreditation schemes which constitute some form of occupation or industry 
wide standard. Situations in which firms have their own individual accreditation schemes 
are considered to be out of scope. Equally, we consider as out of scope simple 
conventions, whereby the various employers for a particular occupation may typically 
require a certain qualification but where there is no coordination mechanism for either 
determining or upholding the standard.  
Finally, we also include state based registration schemes, in order to maintain a direct 
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primarily concerned with standards based entry barriers rather than skills per se.2 
Registration schemes introduce a legal barrier to entry which requires a person to register 
their details with the state in order lawfully to practice in an occupation; unlike licensing 
and certification, registration does not require a person to demonstrate a minimum level 
of competence. 
We therefore focus on three forms of legal regulation (licensing, certification and 
registration) and one form of regulation (accreditation) that has no legal backing or state 
involvement. From another perspective, we focus on three forms of regulation that involve 
prescribed skill standards (licensing, certification and accreditation) and one which does 
not (registration). A more detailed description of each form of regulation is provided 
below.  
 Licensing: This refers to situations in which it is unlawful to carry out a specified 
range of activities for pay without first having obtained a licence which confirms that 
the licence holder meets prescribed standards of competence. The award of the 
licence to practice is typically conditional upon the job holder: (i) being able to prove 
that they hold specified qualifications: (ii) possessing a prescribed amount of relevant 
work experience; (iii) obtaining a pass in a licensing examination; or, occasionally, all 
three. Workers who require such licences to practice in the UK include doctors, 
solicitors, veterinary nurses, private security guards, gas installers, taxi drivers and 
heavy goods vehicle drivers.  
 Certification: This refers to situations in which there are no restrictions on the right to 
practice in an occupation, but job holders may voluntarily apply to be certified as 
competent by a state appointed regulatory body. Again, certification may depend on 
possession of appropriate qualifications, possession of relevant work experience or 
successfully passing a certification examination. Workers in the UK who may apply for 
certification include fitness instructors (who may apply to be certified by the Register 
of Exercise Professionals) and hairdressers (who may apply to be certified by the 
Hairdressing Council). Certification is a weaker form of regulation than licensing 
because it does not prohibit those without a licence from carrying out the activities. 
 Accreditation: We use this term to refer to situations in which an individual may 
apply to be accredited as competent by a recognised professional body or industry 
association. Accreditation is analogous to certification, in that it confers a mark of 
competence which is recognised as such by other practitioners or consumers. In 
common with certification, accreditation may also bring with it a specific title or label; 
for example, only those personnel managers accredited by the Chartered Institute for 
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Personnel and Development may use the letters MCIPD.3 However, accreditation is 
distinct from certification in that the accreditation process has no involvement from the 
state. The criteria governing accreditation and the procedures regarding enforcement 
are thus entirely the responsibility of the accrediting body.  
 Registration: This refers to situations in which it is unlawful to practice without having 
first registered one‘s name and address with the appropriate regulatory body. Other 
conditions are sometimes also imposed, such as the requirement to hold a clean 
criminal record or to have never previously been declared bankrupt. However, 
registration does not involve any explicit test of competence. Registration thus 
provides some form of legal barrier to entry, but its impact on skill levels within an 
occupation can be expected to be small when compared with licensing. An example 
in the UK is the requirement for estate agents to register with the Office for Fair 
Trading under regulations designed to prevent money laundering.  
In this report, we use the term ‗occupational regulation‘ as a broad heading for these 
various forms of standard setting mechanisms. Occupations which are not regulated in 
any of these ways are termed ‗unregulated‘. 
1.3 Some further comments 
The scope of occupational regulation in the UK is broad in nature. Regulations apply to 
individual occupations within the managerial, professional and non-professional sections 
of the occupational hierarchy. Licensing schemes, for example, are in operation for the 
managers of residential care homes, for social workers and for private security guards.  
Occupational regulation in the UK can occur at a local level, although the overwhelming 
majority of regulation is applied and managed nationally. For example, the regulations 
applying to market traders or taxi drivers are administered locally, with local authorities 
determining who should be issued with a licence, whereas the regulations applying to 
doctors are administered nationally by the General Medical Council.   
Some forms of regulation do not apply directly to individual workers but, instead, apply 
indirectly via requirements which are placed on the firms that employ those workers. For 
example, it is required under the Food Hygiene Regulation EC 852/2004 that kitchen 
workers who handle food are supervised by someone that possesses a current Food 
Hygiene and Safety Certificate. Similarly, between 2005 and 2010 there was a 
requirement for all residential care homes to have at least fifty per cent of their care 
workers trained to NVQ Level 2. Such regulations – which make the award or retention of 
a workplace‘s licences to practice dependent upon the attainment of a skills quota within 
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its workforce – are likely to affect the demand for skills among workers within the relevant 
sector, although the effects can be expected to be smaller than if the regulation were to 
apply directly to all workers in that occupation. Regulations which impose a skill quota 
upon workplaces as a condition of the award or retention of workplaces‘ licence to 
practice are in scope to the research. We refer to them as ‗organisation level licensing 
schemes‘ 
However, where firms run their own individual training or accreditation schemes these are 
deemed to be out of scope to the research since, in such cases, there is no occupation or 
industry wide co-coordinating mechanism for establishing or maintaining occupational 
entry standards. Likewise, industry codes of practice are also out of scope if they do not 
incorporate specific requirements about the skill standards to be met by those working 
under such a code.4 Furthermore, skills passports initiatives, administered by Sector 
Skills Councils and industry bodies, are also out of scope to the research because they 
merely provide a record of an individual‘s skills rather than placing requirements on the 
skills they must possess.  
1.4 Aims and content  
The principal aims of the research project are as follows: 
 to provide a discussion of the existing theory on occupational regulation; 
 to provide a detailed review of the existing evidence on occupational regulation in the 
UK, Europe and North America; 
 to provide a comprehensive map of occupational regulation in the UK; 
 to produce estimates of the labour market impact of occupational regulation in the UK.  
The outputs are presented in subsequent chapters of the report, which are organised as 
follows:  
 Chapter Two presents a detailed discussion of the theory of occupational regulation. 
The aim of this chapter is to indicate the range of direct and indirect effects of 
occupational regulation on labour and product markets.  
 Chapter Three presents a review of the existing evidence on the prevalence, labour 
market impact and product market effects of occupational regulation. The chapter 
begins with a discussion of the United States, where the evidence is most extensive, 
and Canada. It then goes on to discuss the limited existing evidence for the UK, 
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before moving on to discuss the regulation of occupations within the European Union 
more broadly.  
 Chapter Four describes the results of a mapping exercise whereby the extent and 
nature of occupational regulation has been charted in managerial, professional and 
non-professional occupations in the UK. The mapping has been undertaken at the 
Unit Group level of the Standard Occupational Classification (2000).   
 Chapter Five uses the information obtained in the mapping exercise on the regulation 
status of each Unit Group to derive estimates of the prevalence of each form of 
occupational regulation in the UK. These estimates are based upon Unit Group data 
obtained from the Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLFS). 
 Chapter Six presents further analysis of the QLFS in which multivariate methods are 
used to compare levels of qualifications, training and wages among groups of 
employees who are subject to different forms of occupational regulation (including 
those in occupations which are unregulated). A ‗difference-in-differences‘ approach is 
taken among a subset of recently regulated occupations in order to estimate the 
independent causal impact of regulation on such labour market outcomes.  
 Finally, Chapter Eight provides a summary of the findings of the research project and 
presents some conclusions. 
The research project also included a feasibility study to explore the possible alternatives 
to a SOC based approach to the measurement of occupational regulation in the UK. The 
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The contention that the current level of investment in skills in the UK is sub-optimal is a 
prominent element which underpins much of the policy discourse (see, for example: 
Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, 2010). The hypothesis is that there are 
failures in the market for investment in skills, caused by (among other things): a lack of 
reliable information for workers or employers on the likely benefits that may accrue for 
skills investments; problems in obtaining funding to invest in skills; or employers‘ inability 
Chapter Summary 
 Occupational regulation has the potential to serve as a strong incentive for 
employers and workers to invest more heavily in the acquisition of skills. It can 
therefore contribute to efforts to address the failures which are considered to 
exist in the market for skills investment in the UK. 
 Licensing is the most restrictive form of such regulation. It restricts entry to an 
occupation to those who are able to meet a prescribed skill standard.  
 The mandatory nature of this requirement can be used as a lever to raise the 
stock of human capital in the occupation. The quality of the product or service 
that is provided may increase as a consequence, whilst low-quality producers 
are driven out of the market.  
 Licensing, however, is expected to have some broader effects on labour and 
product markets. First, it is likely to restrict the supply of labour to the licensed 
occupation and thus to enable practitioners to raise the price of goods and 
services. Such monopoly rents may be apparent in wage increases for 
incumbents. Second, it will force those who cannot meet the licensing 
requirements to migrate to similar non licensed occupations, thus putting 
downward pressure on the wages in these occupations.  
 The scale of any product and labour market effects which arise from alternative 
modes of regulation (namely certification, accreditation and registration) are 
expected to depend on the demand for such practitioners in the market and the 
extent to which consumers are prepared to pay a premium for such services. 
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to recoup investments in skills because of poaching (see Keep, 2006, for a broader 
discussion).  
It is argued that there is a case for state intervention to address these market failures, 
with a variety of policy levers being available. These include mandatory training levies 
and loan guarantees. The introduction of skill based entry barriers, through the imposition 
of a requirement for workers to possess a licence to practice in their chosen occupation, 
is another such lever. Licensing systems require a worker to demonstrate a particular 
level of competence (usually through the possession of a relevant qualification) before 
they are legally permitted to carry out the activities of a specified occupation. As such, 
they provide an ―absolute incentive‖ for skill investments, and so are expected to provide 
a stronger motivation than many other incentives to engage in training (such as 
observation of the likely wage returns) (Keep and James, 2010).  
However, the UK Commission‘s Review of Collective Measures (Stanfield et al., 2009) 
noted that the introduction of licensing brings costs as well as benefits, and that there are 
risks of unintended consequences for both labour and product markets. A fuller 
understanding of these potential consequences can be obtained through a detailed 
discussion of the theory of licensing. Such an overview is presented in this chapter. 
The theoretical overview initially presents the development of the theory on occupational 
licensing. It then goes on to discuss the rationale for the introduction of licensing, followed 
by an overview of the role of quality and restriction of supply when governmental 
regulation is introduced. The theory of occupational licensing is then discussed within a 
supply and demand framework. The implications of governmental standardisation of 
policies for practitioners and consumers are also highlighted.  
Later sections of the chapter move on from licensing to discuss the theorised effects of 
other forms of regulation, namely certification, accreditation and registration. The 
theoretical literature is much less developed in these areas. However, we provide some 
discussion of the possible implications for skill levels, as well as pointing to some of 
broader possible effects on labour and product markets.  
2.2 Evolution of theories on occupational licensing 
In this section we review the evolution of theories of occupational licensing from 
mechanistic ones to those that utilise human capital theory. Within this context, we note 
the role they might have in workforce development. We begin the discussion by outlining 
the simplest theory of occupational licensing, which draws more on administrative 
procedures than on economics. We then bring in insights from more complex theoretical 
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models which challenge some of the straightforward assumptions of the simple theory 
and which thereby provide richer insights into the operation and effects of regulation. 
2.2.1 An administrative theory of licensing 
A simple theory of licensing envisions an essentially costless supply of unbiased, capable 
gatekeepers and enforcers. The gatekeepers screen entrants to the occupation, barring 
those whose skills or character suggest a tendency toward low quality output. The 
enforcers monitor incumbents and discipline those whose performance is below standard 
with punishments that may include revocation of the licence needed to practice. 
Assuming that entry and ongoing performance are controlled in these ways, the quality of 
service in the profession will almost automatically be maintained at or above standards 
that are typically set by the profession. Within this approach only those who have the 
funds to invest in training and the ability to do the work are able to enter the occupation.  
We can add some economics to this otherwise mechanical model by noting that a key 
discipline on incumbents — the threat of loss of licence — may not mean much if 
incumbents can easily re-enter the profession, such as by moving to a new firm, or can 
shift to an alternative occupation with little loss of income. Since grandfathering (i.e. 
allowing current workers to bypass the new requirements) is the norm when occupations 
seek to become licensed, incumbent workers are usually supportive of the regulation 
process. In the absence of grandfathering, lower skilled workers in the occupation may 
have to seek alternative employment. For example, if sales skills are the key to both 
providing licensed financial services and the non-licensed selling of shoes or cars, then 
individuals may shift between these lines of work with little loss of income.  
Under these circumstances, meaningful discipline for licence holders may require 
deliberate steps to ensure that loss of licence entails significant financial loss. Such 
additional steps could include imposition of fines, improved screening to prevent expelled 
practitioners from re-entering the occupation, or requiring all incumbents to put up capital 
that would be forfeited upon loss of licence. To offset the possibility that incumbents could 
shift to other occupations with little loss of income, entry requirements could be tightened 
to limit supply and create monopoly rents within the licensed occupation. The threat of 
losing these monopoly rents could, in principle, give incentives to incumbents to maintain 
standards. This may also result in some increases in human capital investments in order 
to attain the additional requirements. The rents also could motivate potential entrants to 
invest in high levels of training in order to gain admittance. This suggests that licensing 
can raise quality within an industry by restricting supply and raising prices. Increasing 
prices may signal either enhanced quality due to perceived or actual skill enhancements 
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or restrictions on the supply of regulated workers. Workforce development of the skills of 
licensed workers may gain at the cost of consumer prices.  
State regulated occupations can use political institutions to restrict supply and raise the 
wages of licensed practitioners. There is assumed to be a once and for all income gain 
that accrues to current members of the occupation who are ―grandparented‖ in, and do 
not have to meet the newly established standard (Perloff, 1980). Generally, workers who 
are ―grandparented‖ are not required to ever meet the standards of the new entrants. 
Individuals who attempt to enter the occupation in the future will need to balance the 
economic rents of the field‘s increased monopoly power against the greater difficulty of 
meeting the entrance requirements.  
Once an occupation is regulated, members of that occupation in a geographic or political 
jurisdiction can implement tougher statutes or examination pass rates and may gain 
relative to those who have easier requirements by further restricting the supply of labour 
and obtaining economic rents for incumbents. Restrictions would include lowering the 
pass rate on licensing exams, imposing higher general and specific requirements, and 
implementing tougher residency requirements that limit new arrivals in the area from 
qualifying for a licence. Moreover, individuals who have finished schooling in the 
occupation may decide not to go to a particular political jurisdiction where the pass rate is 
low because both the economic and shame costs may be high.  
One additional effect of licensing is that individuals who are not allowed to practice at all 
in an occupation as a consequence of regulation may then enter a non-licensed 
occupation, shifting the supply curve outward and driving down wages in these 
unregulated occupations. If licensing requirements contain elements of general human 
capital, then it is possible that these workers may raise the average level of skills in their 
new occupation. On the other hand, if the requirements for licensing are highly specific to 
the occupation, then skills in the alternative occupation are unlikely to improve.  
2.2.2 More complex theories of licensing 
Friedman (1962) questioned the assumption of unbiased gatekeepers and enforcers and 
viewed licensing‘s entry restrictions and monopoly rents as negative. He argued that 
licensing systems are almost always run by and for incumbents, so that gatekeepers and 
enforcers are in reality self-interested. Their vested interests lead them to not only create 
monopoly rents through restrictions on entry but also to stifle complaints and disciplinary 
procedures against most incumbents. Weak discipline on incumbents, along with 
artificially high client provider ratios, lead to a decrease in the overall quality of service 
that consumers receive. In other words, Friedman predicts that licensing reduces the size 
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of an occupation and leads to a combination of higher fees for providers and lower quality 
for consumers. The argument is that consumers will have only high quality services or 
none at all, and this would price low and middle income workers out of the service. Such 
employment losses would occur because consumers would purchase services from 
workers in adjacent unregulated occupations, and an underground market would develop 
for lower priced but unregulated services, or they would delay or go without these 
services. Therefore, overall consumer welfare would decline.  
Friedman also stresses that the proper measure of quality is the overall quality of 
services received by consumers, not the average quality of services provided by licensed 
providers, because licensing, by raising prices within the licensed occupation, may cause 
consumers to seek substitute services from unlicensed occupations that provide lower 
quality output. Friedman‘s analysis led him to conclude that licensing had no useful role, 
except possibly in very limited circumstances involving externalities. In these conditions 
one could imagine lower quality or unlicensed boilermakers, whose poor quality might 
result in a building being set ablaze, or a worker who does the work of a doctor but who 
fails to detect a communicable disease. Licensing could set a standard where 
unregulated competition would result in too low a standard, so that the worse outcomes 
of service providers might be avoided.  
The development of further theories of licensing was spurred subsequently by Akerlof‘s 
(1970) analysis of how information asymmetries about the quality of goods could lead to 
adverse selection and the predominance of low quality goods in unregulated markets. 
These more recent models ignore Friedman‘s concerns about self-interest and also 
largely disregard the disciplining of incumbents in order to focus on more realistic 
modelling of the capabilities of gatekeepers.5 In particular, they assume that neither 
regulators nor consumers can directly observe the quality of producers ex-ante. These 
models then explore how the theory of licensing changes when entry barriers depend 
only on information that might realistically be observed. The newer models include not 
only unobserved heterogeneity in quality among producers, but also heterogeneous 
tastes for quality among consumers. The newer models yield a mixed perspective on the 
effects of licensing: licensing can increase the average quality of service within the 
occupation, but this change benefits some consumers who prefer high quality and harms 
others who may be satisfied with a lower quality service, and cannot legally obtain it. 
In some of the new models, licensing requirements take the form of unspecified fixed 
costs controlled by the licensing authority, broadly similar to typical licensing 
requirements such as payment of an annual licensing fee or maintenance of a surety 
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bond. In one highly cited model (Shapiro, 1986), skill affects the relative cost of producing 
high quality services, and licensing takes the more specific form of a minimal human 
capital requirement, similar to actual requirements that entrants and sometimes 
incumbents take certain training programs or pass an exam. Apart from these special 
fixed costs, entry into and exit out of the occupation are unrestricted, which ensures that 
providers earn zero profits in equilibrium. In this economic model there are no incentives 
for human capital development after entry. 
The basic theory, which is based on Shapiro (1986), represents a fixed unit mass of 
consumers uniformly distributed from lowest preference for quality services, 
corresponding to zero, to highest, corresponding to one. In the model there is 
heterogeneity among consumers and providers of the service. Each consumer consumes 
one unit of service per period.6 Consumers can choose among three markets: a market 
for mature producers known to sell high quality services, a market for mature producers 
known to produce low quality services, and a market for young producers whose quality 
of service (low or high) is not known by the consumer at time of purchase. The aggregate 
demand curve for services in the low quality-only market, relative to the number of units 
demanded that is measured, is either limited or nonexistent. Initially proportions of low  
and high quality producers in the economy would prevail among the new practitioners in 
the mixed market but in the long run would show an increase in those who provide high 
quality services with regulation, and those who ask for and receive low quality services 
would be limited (see Kleiner and Todd, 2009). Overall, the number of persons going into 
the licensed occupation in this model would not increase, rather the distribution would 
change within the occupation toward the consumer who wants higher quality, and they 
would receive an even higher quality service at a lower price than if licensing did not exist 
in the occupation.  
Suppose an increased fixed cost requirement is imposed by the licensing authority (which 
in the context of this research project might be the requirement for an individual to make 
investments in their level of human capital). This makes low quality production 
unprofitable at the initially prevailing prices. In the new steady state, there are fewer 
mature low quality producers. With no other changes, this would raise the blended price 
in the mixed quality market and cause lifetime profits for high quality producers to exceed 
zero. Hence more producers choose to be high quality, raising output in the high quality-
only market and lowering price. Consumers in the high quality market are clearly better 
off in the new steady state, because they consume the same high quality service as in 
the initial steady state but at a lower price. By similar logic, consumers in the low quality 
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interval are clearly worse off. This illustrates how, in asymmetric information models such 
as the one noted by Shapiro, licensing tends to generate outcomes where some 
consumers gain at the expense of others. However, the new models resemble the simple 
model above in predicting, typically, that both the average quality and the average price 
of services within the regulated industry will rise as licensing requirements are tightened. 
Thus, compared to the simple model, the asymmetric information models add more 
realistic assumptions about what licensing gatekeepers can see or control and yield 
deeper insights into the welfare effects of licensing, but their predictions regarding quality 
and price are similar. A possible effect not explicitly illustrated here is that the passage of 
tougher regulations not only raises providers‘ costs but also shifts out the demand for 
their services, by enhancing consumers‘ confidence that these services are of good 
quality. This effect would operate in the market for young providers whose quality is not 
yet known. An outward shift in demand would accentuate the increase in the price of 
services, boosting provider incomes. In more general models where the total number of 
providers is endogenous, this effect can offset the direct effect of higher production costs, 
so that the overall effect of tighter regulation on the number of providers becomes 
ambiguous. Overall the workforce implications of these models are at best murky.  
2.3 Why do occupations become licensed? 
The current policy interest in licensing derives from its potential to serve as a strong 
incentive for employers and workers to invest more heavily in skills and address sub-
optimal investment where that arises. The notion is that, by introducing an entry barrier 
based on the attainment of a specified level of competence, the state (or its agents) will 
motivate both incumbents and new entrants alike to raise their skill to a pre-specified 
level which is necessarily higher than the current minimum level seen within the 
occupation. This is not the typical motivation for licensing. Consequently, in this section 
we go on to review some of the other (more common) reasons as to why occupations 
may become subject to regulation. The motivations for regulation can be grouped under 
four headings: information asymmetries; quality standardisation; quality signalling; and 
rent capture. The first three concern issues of public interest, whereas in the fourth, the 
motivation is primarily self-interest on the part of incumbents. An understanding of these 
motivations is important when trying to understand possible effects on labour and product 
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2.3.1 Information asymmetries 
As noted earlier a theoretical justification for licensing is that there are market failures due 
to asymmetric information on quality between producers and consumers that regulation 
can correct. Such failures can occur if it is more difficult for consumers than sellers to 
determine the quality of a service offered. Generally, licensed occupations claim that they 
will successfully cope with such undesirable market failures. Many of the occupations 
provide training programs to their new and continuing members that highlight the 
important benefits to the public of licensing their occupation (Benham, 1980). All else 
equal the process would enhance the educational levels of the workforce and enhance 
aggregate productivity in a nation.  
One of the major issues on costs and benefits of occupational licensing is that initially, 
licensing may be the product of consumer demands for higher levels of credible 
information on the quality of service (Law and Kim, 2005). During the early period of 
regulation in the US, there was a period where licensing laws were passed in response to 
the growth of knowledge within the professions and the reduction in transportation costs 
that made urbanisation more feasible. The theory suggests that urbanisation and 
population density were the dominant factors in the passage of initial licensing laws 
during the 20th Century in the United States. Evidence of information asymmetry as the 
major force for regulation may occur as individuals move to an urban area and have no 
information on the quality of key service providers such as lawyers and doctors. A similar 
argument can be made currently for the maintenance of licensing laws as immigrants, the 
poor, and the elderly also have little knowledge of doctors‘ or lawyers‘ competences or 
have little experience with information sources like the internet or other sources of data 
on service quality. Consequently, licensing may provide a relatively low cost method of 
providing information on critical services. 
The structure of the market may nevertheless result in the demand for licensing being 
lower than optimum because of potential ―free rider‖ problems that occur because 
consumers purchase professional services infrequently (Cox and Foster, 1990). 
Consequently, an individual consumer may incur high costs learning about a particular 
profession and determining which type of regulation is in their best interests. Moreover, 
the costs of taking action may be high since there are large costs associated with 
informing and organising a large group of consumers to take action. Many may not join to 
obtain the optimum amount of occupational regulation because they think that others may 
take group action. This is the case if the purchase price of the service were low. As a 
result consumers would rarely demand occupational licensure, or demand increases in 
entry requirements once an occupation becomes licensed.  
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2.3.2 Quality standardisation 
One of the potential benefits of regulation is to provide a common body of knowledge or 
skills within the occupation as well as provide consumers with a more homogenous 
service than would exist without regulation. Education levels, testing and other forms of 
background checks provide this standardisation of the job related quality of human 
resources that are supplied to the occupation. Governmental boards in cooperation with 
occupational associations have prescribed a set of standard procedures that are 
appropriate for the occupation, such as the ones in dentistry and for dental hygienists. 
This further standardises the type of service that is given to consumers. A major 
argument for the licensing of occupations is that it eliminates the downside risk of seeking 
the services from an occupation. If testing and background checks “eliminate charlatans, 
incompetents or frauds‖ then consumers may be willing to pay a higher price for the 
service offered by the regulated occupation. A review of the body of theory from 
experimental economics and psychology shows that consumers value the reduction in 
downside risk more than they value the benefits of a positive outcome (Kahneman et al., 
1991). This preference by consumers of the status quo or reducing risk of a highly 
negative outcome has been called ―loss aversion‖ which is an element of ―prospect 
theory‖ developed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979). For example, as discussed earlier, 
the utility to society may be greater by minimising the likelihood of a poor diagnosis as a 
consequence of going to a poor doctor, because the incompetents have been weeded 
out as a result of licensing. Consequently, the perceived benefits of a nonstandard but 
potentially highly positive outcome of going to an unlicensed biomedical research 
scientist still may not be worth it. Using the power of the state to both limit the downside 
risk of  poor quality care yet reduce the possibility of an upside benefit may be a trade off 
that maximises consumer utility or welfare. Evidence of the acceptance of this tradeoff is 
the growth of occupational licensing during the past century across virtually all nations 
that have been studied.  
The gains from an unregulated service can be potential benefits from free market 
competition of lower prices and greater innovation without the constraints of a regulatory 
body, such as a licensing board. This upside potential gain can be through both the use 
of nonstandard methods or new research that has not been approved by the licensing 
agency as appropriate for the service (Rottenberg, 1980). Deviations from prescribed 
methods of providing a service are discouraged by licensing boards, and may even be 
found to be illegal. For example, not having a dentist on site is illegal in the US when 
providing a service such as cleaning of teeth. Dental hygienists generally are not allowed 
to ―practice‖ without a dentist on site, with the ―site‖ being defined by statute or the dental 
board. In addition, dental hygienists are not allowed to open offices to compete with 
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dentists. Although this policy protects against downside losses of finding a major disease 
that may require immediate attention, it reduces the ability of the hygienist to provide only 
the service that is useful for the patient. Moreover, there is little leeway for the dental 
service industry to provide new or innovative services without being found in violation of 
the licensing laws. It may in some cases be an example of the labour relations concept of 
―featherbedding,‖ in which dentists are on the premises, but do little work.  
Voters, through the political process, often prefer to reduce the downside risk of any 
service. The outcome of ―risk aversion‖ comes at the expense of having the upside of any 
service reduced. Consequently, licensing provides consumers with the benefit of 
perceived higher quality through observed preferences for higher levels of regulation (see 
Leland, 1979). As discussed earlier, an additional societal cost is the reallocation of 
income from consumers to practitioners of the licensed occupation as well as lost output. 
The cost of licensing is a calculus that consumers should take into account as part of 
their evaluation of this labour market institution relative to others.  
2.3.3 Quality signalling 
An alternative explanation for the rationale for benefits and costs of attempting to enter an 
occupation comes from the ―club model‖ which purports to show the rationale for non-
profit organisations engaging in exclusive behaviour and having especially high time 
costs of entry (Iannaccone, 1992). Occupations can limit entry as a method to ―signal‖ 
quality and to show both those in the occupation and outsiders that individuals are 
committed to the work of the occupation (Spence, 1973). ―Signalling‖ explains apparent 
inefficiency: time and money ―wasted‖ to acquire a college degree or ―irrational‖ 
attachments to honesty, loyalty, or the giving of ―inefficient‖ presents like certificates or 
licences rather than cash (Frank, 1988). If licensing is only a signal rather than providing 
true value added, it provides little enhanced quality to consumers.  
This in part explains the high entry costs and initiation rights that are often required of 
licensed occupations as well as the exclusive nature of this form of regulation, where 
individuals not in the ―club‖ are precluded from working in the field. Further, these time 
costs can screen out people whose participation in the occupation otherwise would be 
marginal, while at the same time increasing participation among those who remain, 
thereby increasing the perceived quality of the individuals in the occupation. Individuals 
who want to enter an occupation must exhibit the resiliency of the potential shame costs 
of the stigma of failing an exam and the self-sacrifice of schooling, time spent studying for 
and taking licensing exams, residency requirements, and oaths of loyalty and honesty 
(Kandel and Lazear, 1992). In this case individuals with higher ability or smaller 
opportunity costs of doing other jobs will spend the time and money to become licensed.  
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A further explanation of the societal benefits and cost of licensing can be found in the 
theory presented by Hirschman and then applied by Freeman and Medoff  to explain how 
unions can have both a positive ―voice effect‖ on productivity and a negative ―monopoly 
effect‖ (Hirschman, 1970; Freeman and Medoff, 1984). A similar approach also could be 
applied to occupational licensing. The monopoly face of licensing is generally presented 
as the principal outcome of regulation by most economists (Rottenberg, 1980). However, 
licensing involves member activities to discuss and promote positive aspects of their work 
experience, disseminate information about how to do the job better, engage in job 
specific training, promote ethical standards, or devise methods of adjudicating disputes 
between consumers and producers. Each of these policies have the ability to promote 
―high performance workplace practices‖ within the occupation.7 A third element deals with 
the extent to which regulation affects the rate of exit from the occupation if the economic 
or social standing of the work substantially declines. Perhaps the ―club model‖ discussed 
above requires sufficiently large time commitments upon entry, and this may result in 
relatively few persons leaving these licensed occupations over time. Unlike unionisation, 
where employees can lose their job in the unionised setting and find another one in the 
non-union sector, licensed workers may be more likely to maintain their regulated status 
throughout their working lives.  
2.3.4 Rent capture 
Occupational regulation has grown, in part, because it serves the interests of those in the 
occupation as well as government. Members of an occupation benefit if they can increase 
the actual or perceived quality and thus the demand for their services, while restricting 
supply simultaneously. Government officials benefit from the electoral and monetary 
support of the regulated occupation as well as the support of the general public, whose 
members think that regulation results in quality improvement, especially when it comes to 
reducing substandard services. In this case licensing may restrict opportunities and could 
contribute to structural unemployment thus reducing workforce development and 
employment outcomes, and reducing the efficiency of the labour market. 
For the members of the occupation, obtaining licensing from government is generally the 
objective, because it imposes state sanctions on new entrants or for those moving in from 
another political jurisdiction. In the UK this could result in limiting immigration of 
practitioners from other nations.8 For the administrators of the professional association, 
the resulting increase in responsibility and revenue from dues and continuing education 
                                                 
7
 On the other hand, using the government to restrict supply in order to increase prices for the services offered, which in 
turn increases wages would be the central element of the ―monopoly face‖ of occupational licensing. 
8
 EU regulations ensure free movement of workers within the European Union, but occupational entry requirements could 
limit immigration from non EU countries.  
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usually results in an increase in pay. Moreover, most licensing provisions require 
continuing education classes for fees, which raise the revenue of the occupational 
association. For the occupational association, obtaining licensing legislation means 
raising funds from members to lobby local or national political leaders particularly the 
chairs of appropriate legislative committees. In addition, the occupational association 
often solicits volunteers from its membership to work on political campaigns. With both 
financial contributions and volunteers, the occupational association has a significant 
ability to influence legislation, especially when opposition to regulatory legislation is 
absent or minimal. In the United States, politically active groups have opposed the 
imposition of new licensing legislation from time to time. These include good government 
groups and associations of retired workers, who may have to pay higher fees or wait 
longer in order to obtain a service if regulation is implemented. Occupational licensing 
may not contribute to good workforce development when captured by members of the 
occupation. 
As mentioned earlier, licensing is assumed to affect demand through controls on entry 
and this impacts on quality (Benham, 1980). The expectation from economic theory is 
that licensing may create windfall gains or rents, and that these prospective gains in 
income provide an important impetus for licensure. The threat of loss of rents is a major 
reason why removal of licensure is so strongly resisted by members of a licensed 
occupation. Another benefit is the ability of licensing to provide some hedge against 
downside risks because of the organisation‘s ability to reduce competition differentially 
when conditions are bad (Wheelan,1998). Licensed occupations are able to limit supply 
in response to market conditions through changing licensing statutes or through 
extending the required training program for entry or reducing the numbers who pass an 
entrance exam. For example, Ballou and Podgorsky argue that, by lengthening the period 
of time that it takes to become a teacher, otherwise qualified applicants seek other 
unregulated occupations which have fewer legal restrictions resulting in lower qualified 
individuals with fewer labour market opportunities becoming teachers (Ballou and 
Podgorsky, 1998).  
The ―capture theory‖ of occupational regulation suggests that the occupations often 
expend considerable resources in an attempt to convince legislators that regulation will 
benefit the public. It argues that licensing is a response to professionals who seek to 
protect themselves from competition. If demand for the service is relatively inelastic, then 
higher prices will lead to higher incomes. Moreover, occupational licensing also could be 
viewed as a form of career insurance. If licensing reduces competition, members of the 
regulated occupation are less likely to be forced out, and be trained for another 
occupation. The prediction from microeconomics is that the lower the elasticity of demand 
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of the occupation‘s services, the greater the benefit of regulation to the members of the 
occupation (Stigler, 1971). Consequently, the theory would predict that the benefits of 
regulation to dentists, for example, would be greater than for barbers or cosmetologists 
because the availability of substitutes for dental care, even including those who give 
themselves root canals, would be lower than for cutting hair.  
The demand for regulation by the individuals in these professions is less likely to be 
affected by the kind of free rider problem faced by consumers. Individuals in the 
occupations have a greater interest in and knowledge of regulation affecting their line of 
work than most consumers, and a greater ability to act together. Consequently, the costs 
of organising behind a type of regulation are relatively less than for consumers, and the 
benefits to individuals in the occupation are more likely to be higher (Wheelan, 1998). 
Even though there are incentives for both consumers and producers of the service to 
demand regulation, consumers are rarely the moving force behind occupational 
regulation, possibly because of the issues cited above. Members of the occupations 
generally demand licensing laws at least in part due to the potential benefits of higher pay 
and control of entry into market for the occupation similar to a union‘s ―closed shop‖. 
A political campaign for regulation, where members tax themselves and apply those 
funds in the political arena, is likely to be more successful if the consumers are 
individuals rather than larger institutions like hospitals (Graddy, 1991).9 Wheelan (1998) 
suggests that support for both the public interest and rent capture theories discussed 
above would come from occupations with higher insurance premiums, which indicate 
greater risk to the public and are more likely to be regulated, and this indicates support 
for the public interest model. However, the number of members and the organisation‘s 
budget, as well as the client type, personal versus institutional, all show support for the 
rent capture rationale for licensing the profession. 
2.4 Summary of the theoretical effects of licensing 
The introduction of a ‗licence to practice‘ scheme implies the imposition of a universal and 
statutorily based entry requirement. This is typically the requirement to pass an 
examination or to possess a specified qualification. Only those workers who can meet the 
requirement are eligible to obtain a licence and only those workers who have obtained a 
licence are legally permitted to carry out the designated tasks for payment.  
The introduction of a universal, skills based entry requirement can be expected to raise 
average skill levels in the occupation, since low quality workers who cannot meet the new 
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 Employers and businesses in the US have tended to oppose licensing, arguing that it will raise costs over and above any 
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entry requirement are forced out whilst other low quality workers must engage in job 
related training in order to increase their human capital to the new minimum standard. 
The magnitude of the increase in average skill levels will depend upon the size of the gap 
between the new entry requirement and the average skill levels of incumbents prior to 
regulation; it will also depend upon the extent to which the new minimum is enforced.  
As some workers can be expected to have to increase their skills to meet the new 
minimum, one can expect to witness an increase in the prevalence of job related training, 
although any such increase may necessarily begin before the licensing regime is in place. 
Indeed, it is possible that there may be a spike shortly before the date on which licensing 
comes into force, with the rate of training falling off afterwards unless there are incentives 
for licensed workers to invest in further human capital (which would occur in situations 
where the renewal of a licence was dependent upon the requirement to demonstrate 
continued professional development).  
If the stock of human capital in the occupation rises because of the new entry 
requirement, then one may also expect the quality of the product or service to increase 
and thus for wages to rise, as long as consumers are willing to reward the associated 
increase in product/serve quality by paying higher prices. Yet if prices and wages are free 
to respond to changes in supply, then the fact that the new entry requirement is likely to 
restrict the number of workers in the occupation may also drive prices upwards and allow 
wages to rise. Thus wages may increase as a result of enhanced human capital or 
because of supply restrictions (so called ‗monopoly effects‘).  
As indicated above, the introduction of licensing may lead to a fall in employment levels 
within the occupation, at least in the short term, as low quality workers who cannot meet 
the new minimum standard are barred from engaging in the now regulated activity. Again, 
the magnitude of this employment effect will largely depend upon the height of the new 
entry barrier. In the medium to long term, however, any rise in average wages in the 
occupation may attract higher quality workers who now see the possibility of a return on 
their human capital investments. This could increase average skill levels further, whilst 
also depressing any negative employment effect.  
Turning to product market effects, licensing provides individuals with an incentive to 
invest in the acquisition of occupation specific human capital since they are reassured 
that they will not face low quality substitutes for their services (Akerlof, 1970; Shapiro, 
1986). In this sense, as Humphris et al. (2011) argue, occupational licensing resembles 
the union closed shop. When in the market, high quality producers are further prevented 
from being driven out by their low price/low quality counterparts, so the average quality of 
service provided is expected to increase (Caroll and Gaston, 1981). Since skill levels, the 
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opportunity to practice the occupation and subsequent performance are monitored in 
these ways, quality of service should improve. In practice however, it is possible that 
individuals migrate to unlicensed occupations providing similar services and attempt to 
undercut their licensed counterparts. Under such circumstances, licensing is no 
guarantee of quality. Similar expectations would hold when the regulator or some other 
institutional mechanism (e.g. the process for funding medical schools) determine the 
licensed slots available relative to putative demand and the former is larger than the 
latter. 
However, the effect of regulation on service quality can also be negative. Quality is not 
only linked to skill but also to quantity supplied. If an increase in quality through better 
trained practitioners results in a subsequent fall in their supply (due to aspiring 
practitioners not meeting the entry requirements), the service actually received by the 
consumer suffers for the following reasons. First, if a decline in the number of available 
practitioners leads to an increase in price of the product or service, then some consumers 
might opt for lower quality services. In a context of licensing, such substitutes are 
confined to ‗do-it-yourself‘ services (Friedman, 1962; Kleiner, 2006). A more extreme 
unintended consequence of licensing could involve the decision not to consume the 
service at all, which could be a health and safety risk in itself. Such an effect is likely to be 
more pronounced amongst low income consumers, meaning that any improvement in 
quality is only felt by those at the middle and upper quartiles of the income distribution 
(Shapiro, 1986). Overall, the effects of regulation should be analysed not only in relation 
to improvements in skill levels but also price and availability of services. For example, 
while one might be receiving a better quality service from a licensed security guard, such 
effects cannot be realised if such individuals are in short supply and therefore premises 
and events are understaffed. Finally, as Caroll and Gaston (1981) point out, in 
competitive industries licensing restricts competition amongst practitioners which in turn 
reduces the pressure to compete on quality.   
Turning to the impact of licensing on prices, if raising the entry requirements via 
occupational licensing (a) limits the supply of labour to a profession and (b) increases the 
entry costs for practitioners (e.g. financial investment on education and training), then the 
effect on the price of the product or service will depend on the following factors. First, the 
more price inelastic the good, the more scope there is for licensed producers to increase 
its price. Price elasticity will depend on the price and availability of substitutes and 
whether these are also subject to licensing. If there is a strong substitution effect with 
unlicensed products, then producers will be less inclined to increase price. Further, 
producers will have more scope to increase prices for goods and services that consumers 
perceive as necessities rather than luxuries. As such, if the good is highly income 
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inelastic, demand is likely to be relatively unresponsive to price changes. The proportion 
of income that is devoted to the purchase of the good or service is also an important 
consideration. The lower the proportion of consumer‘s income spent on the service, the 
more scope for licensed producers to increase prices without experiencing a 
proportionate fall in demand. Second, the effect of licensing on prices will also depend on 
the ability of consumers to switch to imported products or services from unlicensed or 
cheaper providers. Generally speaking, this is more likely to be the case with products 
since services are generally non-exportable in nature (e.g. one‘s ability to import 
childcare or a haircut from abroad is restricted).  
However, the effect of licensing on prices also depends on the institutional context in 
question. A number of licensed occupations in the UK are dominated by public sector 
provision where the government acts as the price maker, while in some EU countries 
such as France and Greece the government intervenes to set minimum price levels for 
products and services. When such restrictions are imposed on regulated occupations, 
then we would expect the impact of licensing on prices to be modest.  
2.5 Further supply implications of occupational licensing 
A basic microeconomic analysis of licensing argues that regulation restricts entry into one 
occupation and creates an oversupply in others (Filer et al., 1994). The demand side 
analysis shown above implies that licensing may impose a ―deadweight loss‖ on 
consumers. The implications suggest that licensing not only has the effect of raising 
wages and reducing employment in the regulated occupation but also reducing wages 
and increasing employment in unregulated occupations similar to models of 
discrimination first developed by Bergman (1971). Individuals who could have worked in 
regulated occupations now shift to unregulated ones driving down their wages. The 
consequences of occupational licensing are not only within the regulated occupation, but 
also can serve to dampen wage benefits for workers in other occupations. Therefore, 
comparisons of the labour market effects of licensing also need to examine the effects on 
unlicensed occupations.  
2.6 Macroeconomic Implications 
With high levels of unemployment in the UK and in other industrialised nations, one 
potential drawback of occupational licensing is that it could increase structural 
unemployment by creating barriers to move to certain service occupations where demand 
is growing. For example, if there is growing demand for civil engineers or medical 
technicians, the additional time and money costs of licensing would reduce the ability of 
the labour market to adjust to growing demand in these fields. Moreover, in fields that are 
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licensed, workers may be reluctant to move out of those areas when demand is declining, 
because they are protected from competition by licensing laws and judicial rulings that 
restrict entry. The ability for an economy and labour market to adjust to new realities may 
be reduced, and structural unemployment increased (Mortensen and Pissarides, 1994). 
Moving further, Figure 2.1 shows the basic underlying modelling approach to the 
suggestion that licensing results in potential ―dead weight losses‖ to society (Kleiner, 
2006, pp. 114-115). Before the implementation of licensing, wages are W and 
employment is at E. If licensing is implemented across all states for the occupation or if 
licensing is adopted in a state, then wages increase to W’ and employment is reduced to 
E’. If the service wage and price go up, consumers purchase less of the service. As a 
result the white rectangle area between W and W’ under the curve goes to the 
practitioners but the shaded triangle area is lost output due to occupational regulation. 
Within this standard economic model of regulation there are gains to the practitioners 
through higher wages. However, some who may have been in the occupation may suffer 
wage loss as a consequence of licensing as consumers find substitutes or engage in ―do-
it-yourself‖ remedies. Furthermore, there are likely to be overall losses to society in the 
form of lost output which is part of the ―welfare triangle loss‖ in Figure1. This loss is the 
difference between the increased earnings of the practitioners due to licensing and lost 
employment times their foregone earnings in this figure. An outcome of this potential loss 
is that licensing results in fewer choices and higher prices for consumers. The full effect 
of licensing on employment may be mitigated by regulation which increases the quality of 
the service provided. Nevertheless the impact of licensing would result in lost 
employment and service output to society. 
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2.7 Alternative modes of regulation 
Moving away from licensing, the labour market effects of other forms of regulation are 
even less clear cut. In particular, none of the alternatives (i.e. certification, accreditation 
or registration) would be expected to generate economic rents in the context of the 
models presented in the foregoing discussion.  
Registration is the one form of mandatory regulation that we consider in our schema in 
addition to licensing. Mandatory registration schemes do not impose skill standards and 
so one would not expect to see many of the effects which may arise through licensing. 
However, registration schemes do often impose other criteria, such as the requirement to 
hold a clean criminal record. If these other criteria are positively associated with human 
capital (or the propensity to invest in human capital), as seems likely, then one may 
expect some small positive effects on skill levels and on the take up of job related training 
from the introduction of a registration scheme. There may then be derived effects on 
wages although, again, one would expect such effects to be small.  
Certification and accreditation schemes involve the introduction of voluntary skill 
standards and so, in the absence of a universal entry barrier, the scale of any effects will 
ultimately depend upon the degree of demand for certified/accredited workers in the 
product market. If the level of demand is low, then one may expect that most of the low 
quality workers who do not meet the new certification standard can continue to find work. 
One would then expect only small effects on skill levels, wages or employment in the now 
regulated occupation. However, if demand for certified/accredited workers is high, then 
one may see effects that are akin to licensing. One might expect any such effects to be 
stronger in the case of certification than in the case of accreditation, all other things 
equal, if state involvement in the operation of the certification system entails more 
thorough vetting of applicants and more rigorous monitoring of standards among certified 
workers.  
Turning to product market effects, one would not necessarily expect registration to be 
associated with any direct quality effects since such schemes do not impose skill 
standards to practitioners. However, as we have noted above, such schemes can make 
stipulations regarding the characteristics of entrants which could in turn be positively 
related to human capital characteristics (or the propensity to invest in their acquisition). 
Other things constant, there might be some small effects on quality, while the effect on 
price would depend, amongst other things, on the restrictiveness of any entry 
requirements and the value that consumers place on registration as a signal of quality.  
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On the other hand, minimum skill standards are a key feature of certification and 
accreditation schemes and as such, one would expect some impact on quality, although 
the extent of this would depend on the demand for certified/accredited practitioners in the 
market. Given the voluntary nature of such schemes, the market for such services is also 
likely to be populated by unlicensed workers, so any effect on prices is likely to depend 
on the willingness of consumers to pay a premium for the services of certified/accredited 
professionals. 
2.8 From theory to evidence 
This chapter has discussed a variety of explanations as to why occupations seek to 
become regulated. It has also sought to examine the possible impacts of regulation on 
labour and product markets. A summary of the major design features of occupational 
regulation and their implications for labour and product market outcomes is provided in 
Table 2.1 below.  
The various theoretical perspectives provide many reasons for introducing regulation of 
one form or another in a given occupation. However, they also indicate why occupational 
licensing – or less restrictive forms of regulation such as registration or certification – may 
have indirect (and sometimes unforeseen) consequences. In particular, there may be 
important implications for employers, consumers and for workers in adjacent 
(unregulated) occupations, and these must be considered when examining the case for 
regulation so as to be able to come to a comprehensive assessment of the potential costs 
and benefits. Existing experience is a valuable guide, so it is important to examine cases 
of existing regulation. The next chapter goes on to consider the available empirical 
evidence. 
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Table 2.1 Major design features of occupational regulation and their implications 
Feature Implications 
Universality  
If the new requirements are mandatory, they will provide a stronger 
incentive for human capital investments. However, mandatory 
requirements are also likely to lead to greater effects on prices, wages 
and employment (at least in the short term).  
The impact of voluntary requirements is dependent upon the level of 
demand for certification or accreditation (most notably from consumers).  
Level of skill 
requirement  If the new skill requirements are similar to existing skill levels in the 
occupation, the requirement may only result in the certification of 
existing skills.  
If the new skill requirement is considerably higher than current 
average skill levels, a significant proportion of incumbents may not be 
able to attain the new entry level (and new entrants will take some time 
to become eligible). Average skill levels may rise in the short term, but at 





If grandfathering rights are available to incumbents this will ease the 
implementation of licensing – in particular reducing any negative 
employment effect.  
However, if grandfathering rights are not available to incumbents, 
licensing is likely to lead to greater levels of investment in training and 
greater rates of acquisition of formal qualifications.  
Renewal 
mechanism If the renewal of any licence/certification/accreditation is dependent 
upon continued professional development, then the regulatory 
regime is likely to have a positive, ongoing impact on rates of job related 
training among incumbents.  
If renewal is solely dependent upon payment of a renewal fee, the 
impact on overall skill levels more likely to be a one off gain seen only at 
the time of introducing the regulations and there is less to be any 
continuing effect on job related training among incumbents.  
 
Continued on next page… 
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Table 2.1 continued 
Feature Implications 
Governance 
regime If the regulations are governed by one party with particular interests, 
there is the danger of ‗regulatory capture‘. The involvement of all 
interested parties (e.g. workers, employers and consumers) can help 
to ensure that regulations are designed in the public interest.  
Periodic reviews can help to ensure that any regulations remain fit for 
purpose.  
If enforcement is not effective this will limit the strength of any 
incentive to invest in human capital, as it will be possible to practice the 
occupation (or to claim that one is certified/accredited) without having 




The introduction of regulation into one occupation may lead low quality 
workers to switch to adjacent occupations without entry barriers. This 




The impact of regulation on wages, prices and employment depend 
upon the freedom of the product market to respond to changes in supply 
and demand. Competition regulations (e.g. price controls) can prevent 
incumbents from exploiting any monopolistic position. However, price 
limits also risk reducing the incentive to invest in human capital by 
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This chapter presents a review of the existing evidence on the prevalence and impact of 
occupational regulation. The chapter begins with a discussion of the United States, where 
the evidence is most extensive, and Canada. It then goes on to discuss the limited 
existing evidence for the UK, before moving on to discuss the regulation of occupations 
within the European Union more broadly. The focus of the discussion is primarily on 
occupational licensing, as the available evidence on other forms of regulation is limited in 
Chapter Summary 
 The majority of evidence on the prevalence, operation and impact of 
occupational regulation originates in the US and mainly concerns licensing. 
 According to the latest estimates, at least 20 per cent of the US workforce is 
subject to licensing and six per cent is certified. The overall conclusions from 
the US studies are that licensing is associated with a wage premium, a 
reduction in employment growth and a rise in the cost of goods and services 
without a corresponding improvement in quality. Mixed results are reported in 
relation to job related training.  
 The limited existing evidence for the UK suggests that licensing is less common 
in the UK than in the US, although its prevalence has been expanding within 
low skilled non professional occupations. Existing estimates show that licensing 
covers 13.5 per cent of the UK workforce.  
 The limited case study evidence for the UK provides mixed results with regard 
to its effect on training and qualifications. Licensing has been found to be 
associated with a 13 per cent wage premium, although the main beneficiaries 
are those in high-skilled occupations. 
 When compared with other European countries such as Germany, France and 
Italy, the UK appears to be less restrictive in its approach to regulation 
especially in relation to post-entry restrictions such as fees and price levels, 
advertising and business location. However, regulation of low skilled 
occupations appears to be more widespread in the UK than in many other 
European countries. 
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comparison. However, forms of regulation other than licensing are mentioned where 
possible.  
3.2 The United States and Canada 
This section gives an overview of the empirical work on occupational regulation for both 
the United States (US) and Canada. Since these countries are each other‘s largest 
trading partner, and share many of the same industries with a workforce that has similar 
characteristics, they provide a useful comparison of the influence of occupational 
regulations. The tradition of research examining the labour institution of occupational 
licensing has a long and varied history in the US, but the research on Canada is much 
sparser and focuses on its influence on geographic mobility and its effect on the 
efficiency of the labour market. In this section of the report we will present the existing 
literature on the extent of licensing in the US and Canada as well as its influence on 
wages, employment, mobility, and prices for the US, but focus on wages and mobility for 
Canada. We provide some concluding comments where we develop some comparisons 
of the two nations with respect to occupational regulation. 
3.2.1 The nature and incidence of occupational regulation in the US 
Most occupational licensing in the US is at the state level, since the courts have 
determined that it is the proper venue for the determination of regulation. However, where 
there is no licensing at the state level, cities or counties can introduce their own type of 
licensing. For example, tattoo artists are often not licensed at the state level, and cities or 
counties will licence them. Taxi drivers are usually licensed at the local level with no state 
intervention. One legal or policy issue in the US is that there is little reciprocity across 
political jurisdictions, and governmental agencies in one part of the country will not accept 
licences from others without retaking substantial parts of the licensing tests or meeting 
local residency requirements. However, the highest political jurisdiction generally 
dominates. If a state licences an occupation, local authorities must accept it. In the 1990s 
the Council of State Governments estimated that more than 800 occupations were 
licensed in at least one state. In all, more than 1,100 occupations were either licensed, 
certified, or registered (Brinegar and Schmitt,1992).  
Despite limitations in data collection, the state level data show some striking trends. 
During the early 1950s, less than five per cent of the US workforce was in occupations 
covered by licensing laws at the state level (Council of State Governments, 1952). That 
number grew to almost 18 per cent by the 1980s—with an even larger number if federal, 
city, and county occupational licensing is included. By 2000, the percentage of the 
workforce in occupations licensed by states was at least 20 per cent, according to data 
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gathered from the Department of Labor and the 2000 Census (Kleiner, 2006). In contrast, 
during this period no systematic attempts were made to gather information on licensing or 
its wage or employment effects at the federal or local level. 
As employment in the United States shifted from manufacturing to service industries, 
which typically have lower union representation, the members of occupations established 
a formal set of standards that governed members of their occupation. For a professional 
association, obtaining licensing legislation required them to raise funds from members to 
lobby the state legislature, particularly the chairs of appropriate committees. In addition, 
the occupational association often solicits volunteers from its membership to work on 
legislative campaigns. With both financial contributions and volunteers, the occupational 
association has a significant ability to influence legislation and its administration, 
especially when opposition to regulatory legislation is absent or minimal (Wheelan, 1998). 
By using the American states to monitor and prevent the potential work effort of 
unlicensed workers, competition by unlicensed individuals is virtually eliminated through 
the use of the state‘s enforcement powers. For example, the work of ―hair braiders‖, 
which is an unlicensed occupation, has recently been brought under the control of the 
cosmetology board in Minnesota and the work limited to only licensed cosmetologists or 
barbers (Anderson v. Minnesota Board of Barber and Cosmetology Examiners, 2005). 
Further, when demand fluctuates for traditional tasks, the board has the ability to expand 
the regulated work through establishing administrative rules and limiting the work of 
unregulated workers. Second, the regulatory board, through its administrative procedures 
of establishing large entry barriers and moral suasion, can reduce the number of 
openings in schools that prepare individuals for licensed positions. In addition, by 
adjusting the pass rate on the licensing exam, it can change the number of new entrants 
from instate or migrants from other states or nations (Tenn, 2001, Pagliero, 2010). 
Finally, there are legal and policy battles among licensed occupations, such as dentists 
and dental hygienists, over who can do various tasks; and the legislature or the courts 
determine the winner, with economic gains to those who are more politically able (Kleiner 
and Park, 2010). 
By 2008, approximately 29 per cent of workers polled in a Westat survey said they were 
required to have a government issued licence to do their job; a further six per cent said 
that they held a certification from an agency of the government (Kleiner and Krueger, 
2009). Table 3.1 presents figures on the incidence of licensing or certification (by any 
level of government) among different types of worker, using data from the Westat survey 
(Kleiner and Krueger, 2009). In Table 3.2 we indicate the prevalence of differing 
requirements to become licensed in the US. The requirement for a university qualification 
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is more prevalent than the requirement for a high school qualification. However, 
occupation specific examinations constitute the most common entry route. It is evident 
from the table that, in many instances, there are multiple requirements. These sometimes 
arise because occupations require licences from multiple levels of government in order to 
do the work – with each level of government setting its own conditions (Kleiner and 
Krueger, 2009).  
Table 3.1 Characteristics of licensed and certified workers in the US 
Characteristic Licensed (%) Certified (%) 
All 28.6 5.8 
Gender:   
Male 28.4 6.7 
Female 28.7 5.0 
Education level:   
Less than high school 14.5 3.9 
High school 19.9 5.8 
Some college 28.1 5.9 
College (BA) 29.2 5.9 
College+ 44.1 6.2 
Race:   
White 29.5 5.8 
Hispanic 29.2 5.6 
Black 26.3 7.0 
Other  23.0 5.1 
Age:   
25 or under 12.2 2.7 
26-54 30.0 6.2 
55 or older 28.9 5.7 
Union status:   
Union 44.6 5.0 
Non-union 25.7 6.0 
Sector:   
Private 24.8 5.9 
Public 44.1 5.3 
Type of work:   
Provides services 31.2 5.9 
Makes things 11.4 5.1 
Repairs things 22.4 7.2 
Source: Kleiner and Krueger (2009)  
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High school 31.2 
Occupation specific exam 85.0 
Continuing education 69.8 
Internship 51.1 
Source: Kleiner and Krueger (2009)  
3.2.2 Wage effects of occupational licensing in the US 
Studies of the effects of licensing on wages in the US have, in many ways, paralleled the 
research methods used to study the effect of unions on wages (Lewis, 1986). These 
approaches include cross-section estimates, analyses of individuals switching from 
regulated to unregulated jobs and vice versa over time, and cross-sectional results from 
within occupation comparisons. The general estimates of cross-sectional studies using 
Census data of state licensing‘s influence on wages with standard labour market controls 
show a range from 10 to 15 per cent for higher wages associated with occupational 
licensing (Kleiner, 2006). Estimates were developed from the National Longitudinal 
Survey of Youth (NLSY) from 1984 to 2000 and show the difference in wages between 
changers from unlicensed to licensed occupations and between those who move from a 
licensed occupation to an unregulated one. The estimates show that the wage effect of 
moving from an unlicensed occupation to a licensed one is around 17 per cent higher on 
average than if one were to move from a licensed occupation to an unlicensed one 
(Kleiner, 2006). However, this effect varies considerably (from zero to 40 per cent) when 
one looks within occupational categories (Kleiner and Krueger, 2009).  
Although these results suggest that licensing – the toughest form of regulation – matters 
for wage determination, these estimates are not based on data for the whole of the US 
workforce. However, one study dealt with many of these problems by developing a 
national survey of American workers, using many of the same questions asked in the 
Current Population Survey, which is implemented by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
Kleiner and Krueger (2009) examine whether licensing is associated with higher pay. 
They augment a standard earnings regression equation to include a dummy variable 
indicating whether a licence is required for the worker‘s job. When a dummy variable 
indicating license status is added to a standard wage equation, having a license is 
associated with approximately 18 per cent higher gross hourly earnings (an estimate that 
was statistically significant from zero at the 0.1 per cent level). The cross-sectional effect 
of licensing is similar in magnitude to the estimated effect of belonging to a union in the 
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US (see Lewis, 1986), and greater than an additional year of schooling. The regression 
estimates also include educational attainment, age, self-employment, career experience 
and its square, union status, and industry and occupation dummy variables. 
In order to examine the influence of licensing on the variance in wages in the US, Kleiner 
and Krueger (2009) examine the mean within-category squared residual from a log of 
wage regressions in both licensed and unlicensed occupations, controlling for human 
capital characteristics. They also compare union and non-union earnings as a point of 
reference, since unions have been shown to reduce variations in wages (Card 1996). 
They find that the mean wage of licensed and union workers is statistically significantly 
higher than their corresponding unlicensed and non-union workers. The measure of 
dispersion of wages among licensed jobs is about the same as unregulated ones, and the 
difference is not statistically significant from zero. In contrast, they find that unionisation 
reduces the variance in wages. These results are similar to those found with data from an 
earlier survey carried out by Gallup in 2006 (see Kleiner and Krueger, 2010), suggesting 
the robustness of the findings for the role of unions and licensing over time and across 
different surveys. This indicates, whilst unions reduce wage dispersion in the US, 
licensing has no effect.  
3.2.3 Employment effects of occupational licensing in the US 
Some evidence suggests that licensing does restrict the supply of workers in regulated 
occupations in the US. One application focuses on the comparison of occupations that 
are licensed in some states and not in others. The occupations examined were librarians 
(licensed in 19 states), respiratory therapists (licensed in 35 states), and dieticians and 
nutritionists (licensed in 36 states) from 1990 to 2000 using Census data (Kleiner, 2006). 
Using controls for state characteristics, the multivariate estimates show that, in the states 
where the occupations were unlicensed, there was a 20 per cent faster growth rate than 
in states that did licence these occupations. Another study finds that the imposition of 
greater licensing requirements for funeral directors is associated with fewer women 
holding jobs as funeral directors, relative to men by 18 to 24 per cent (Cathles et al., 
2010). This gendered employment effect is thought to come about because women are 
less able (on average) than men to invest the time and financial resources associated 
with acquiring the qualifications required to satisfy the new licensing requirements.  
3.2.4 The interaction of licensing with other characteristics of the US 
labour market 
To the extent that a pattern exists, it appears that occupations that deal directly with 
customers or patients, or are allowed to work independent of other licensed occupations, 
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are most likely to receive the largest economic benefits from occupational licensing. For 
example, dentists, through a reduction in the supply of new entrants into the occupation 
from 1990 to 2000, received larger pay increases than any other major regulated 
occupation. Lawyers, through restrictions on interstate mobility also have been able to 
obtain economic benefits for practitioners (Tenn, 2001). Physicians, by limiting the supply 
of alternative medicine providers, have also been able to enhance the earnings of the 
members of their occupation (Anderson et al., 2000).  
On the other hand occupations, such as teaching and nursing, have not been able to 
significantly enhance the earnings in their profession through licensing, perhaps as a 
consequence of the market structure of their employer. Unlike doctors, dentists and 
lawyers, nurses and teachers work primarily for large institutions like hospitals or school 
boards. For nurses and dental hygienists, their work requires the oversight of doctors and 
dentists. Hospital and school administrators have incentives to reduce costs within their 
organisation and are likely to put pressure on legislatures to ease licensing restrictions to 
ensure an ample supply of practitioners. Moreover, for nurses and teachers the primary 
mode of determining wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employment is 
through collective bargaining with an employer.  
It is also possible that doctors and lawyers have a greater ability than more plentiful 
occupations to make the demand for their services more inelastic, consistent with the 
Marshal-Hicks conditions of reducing substitutes.10   
3.2.5 Price effects of occupational licensing in the US 
Most studies of the influence of occupational licensing policies, on the price of the 
occupation‘s service in the US, find a positive relationship (see Cox and Foster, 1990; 
Kleiner 2006), albeit sometimes with no improvement in quality. These include recent 
studies by Kleiner and Todd for mortgage brokers, which indicate higher prices for 
mortgages with no influence on quality (Kleiner and Todd, 2009). The existing studies 
cover policies ranging from restrictions on interstate mobility, such as by limiting 
reciprocity, to restrictions on advertising and other commercial practices (Shepard, 1978; 
Bond et al., 1980; Kleiner et al., 1982). A review of empirical research on licensing found 
that licensing is associated with consumer prices that are four to 35 per cent higher, 
depending on the type of commercial practice and location (Kleiner, 2006). Kleiner and 
Kudrle (2000), for example, found that tougher state level restrictions and more rigorous 
pass rates for dentists were associated with hourly wage rates. These were 15 per cent 
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 Under the Marshall-Hicks laws of derived demand, individuals in occupations for which there are few substitutes will have 
a greater ability to raise the price of their services without loss of demand than will workers in occupations for which there 
are many substitutes.  
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higher than in states with fewer restrictions, with no measurable increase in observable 
quality. Similarly, Barker (2007) found that higher state educational standards for real 
estate brokers ―raise broker income without improving the quality of service.‖ 
3.2.6 Training effects of occupational licensing in the US 
The effect of occupational regulation on skill investment is a topic that has been 
understudied in the US. However, in a recent study, Klee shows no evidence of a 
systematic relationship between the stringency of licensing requirements (i.e. the height 
of the entry requirement) and the incidence of training in professional occupations (2010). 
Klee analysed accountants, lawyers, cosmetologists and teachers using data provided by 
Kleiner (2006) and the US Current Population Survey (CPS), taking advantage of 
differences in licensing policy between states and changes in licensing policy over time. 
He looked at two alternative indicators of training receipt: (i) whether the CPS respondent 
is enrolled in a vocational class at the time of the survey interview; and (ii) whether the 
respondent has engaged in any training to improve their skills at any time since starting 
their current job. Klee found that the stringency of a licensing regime was unrelated to the 
probability of enrolment in a vocational class in most of his specifications.11 However, he 
did find that more stringent licensing requirements were typically positively related to the 
propensity of workers to have received training at some point since their current job 
began.  
3.2.7 Occupational licensing in Canada 
In this section we provide parallel information on the role of occupational licensing in 
Canada. As we noted earlier the detail and depth of analysis on occupational regulation is 
sparse and, in drawing conclusions about the level of regulation, wage effects, 
employment consequences, mobility and prices, we are generally reliant on a single 
study in each area, rather than many for the US. Therefore, the ability to draw policy 
conclusions from the Canadian case is limited because there has been little rigorous 
analysis and much of it is dated.  
The legal structure of occupational licensing in Canada is similar to the US, with the 
Canadian provinces having the major voice in the determination of: who is regulated; the 
general education and specific education requirements to work in the occupation; and the 
fees and continuing education requirements. As in the US, licensing and certification may 
also be done by different levels of governments, with licensing powers sometimes delegated 
by provinces to individual municipalities. Licensing covers a variety of occupational groups 
from lawyers to such trades as electricians, plumbers and hairdressers. In the early 1990s, 
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 In those few specifications where a statistically significant association was identified, it was typically negative. 
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Gunderson (1993) estimated that almost one-third of the craft workers in production jobs 
were licensed. It is currently estimated that around one fifth of occupations in Canada are 
subject to licensing.12  
One issue that arose in Canada because of the devolved administration of licensing was the 
issue of inter-province mobility for workers. Out-of-province transfers were commonly 
subject to admissions criteria which imposed upon experienced professionals the 
requirement of completing licensing courses and examinations and redoing their 
apprenticeships regardless of their experience. Differences in the requirements with respect 
to such factors as education, "intern" training, licensing examinations, and even provincial 
residency periods could make it costly for migrants to "re-qualify" especially when there is a 
lack of reciprocity across provinces (Gundersun, 1993). As strongly stated by the 
Immigration Legislative Review Advisory Group:  
Each province at some stage in its history created bodies that were 
empowered to regulate access to trades and professions in the province 
through licensing and registration requirements. These associations have 
operated in an extremely independent manner, often free of political scrutiny 
and accountability. Many have used their role as protectors of the health and 
safety of consumers as a guise to protect the interests of their members 
through exclusionary entrance requirements. This has made inter-provincial 
mobility for all Canadians extremely difficult, and has created even greater 
barriers for immigrants, who are viewed as a threat to the earning power of 
the members of some professional associations, and as unknown quantities 
with unknown qualifications by other bodies (1998, p. 36). 
Interprovincial mobility was restricted by lack of uniformity in both the requirements for the 
licence and in the types of trades that are licensed. As well, there was a lack of full 
reciprocity in recognising the qualifications from other provinces. However, a substantial 
degree of uniformity has been obtained through the voluntary Red Seal or interprovincial 
standards program co-ordinated by Employment and Immigration Canada. Reciprocity is 
obtained through the "mutual recognition" of qualifications across participating provinces for 
tradespeople who have passed a common exam. The program is generally recognised as a 
successful vehicle for harmonisation of standards in this important area. However, it is not 
universal, since not all trades are covered across all provinces. 
Gundersun concludes that ―the same competitive forces (e.g. global competition, free trade, 
industrial restructuring, technological change) that are increasing the political pressure to 
erect further barriers to inter-provincial labour mobility (largely to preserve jobs) also 
increase the importance of reducing such barriers so as to achieve the restructuring, 
specialisation and economies of scale that are necessary to create a strong, competitive 
domestic economy‖ (Gundersun, 1993).   
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 Estimate from the Canadian government. Published on-line at: http://www.canadabusiness.ca/eng/guide/4175/ 
[Accessed 1
st
 August 2011].  
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Removing such barriers to mobility was also the objective of the Labour Mobility Chapter 
(7) of the Agreement on Internal Trade (AIT) signed in 1994 that came into effect in 1995. 
That Agreement focused on barrier removal in three main areas: (1) residency 
requirements; (2) licensing, certification and registration of workers (to ensure that such 
requirements are related principally to competence, they are published regularly, they do 
not result in unnecessary delays, and they do not impose fees or other costs that are 
burdensome); and (3) recognition of occupational qualifications such as through mutual 
recognition arrangements and reconciliation of occupational standards (Forum of Labour 
Market Ministers, undated). In 2004, British Columbia and Alberta also agreed to the 
Trade, Investment and Labour Mobility Agreement (TILMA). That agreement came into 
force on April 1, 2007 and was fully implemented in April 1, 2009. These agreements 
have initiated harmonisation work between the provinces and reduced some of the 
barriers to inter-provincial mobility for workers, although there is anecdotal evidence that 
workers migrating into Canada have used the laws to their advantage by going to the 
province with the least stringent requirements in order to become registered and then 
later moving to their province of choice (Martin, 2011).  
A further development in Canada has been the introduction of Fair Registration Acts in 
some provinces, including Ontario (2006) and Manitoba (2009). The legislation has 
sought to ensure that licensing practices are fair, impartial, transparent and objective; 
commissioners have been appointed in the provinces to oversee its operation. A key 
focus has been on the appropriate recognition of international qualifications held by 
immigrants.  
3.2.8 Levels of occupational licensing in Canada  
An estimate in 2006 showed that about 1,725,215 workers were in regulated 
―occupations and professions‖ in Canada, representing 11.1 per cent of the labour force. 
The largest groups, which account for three quarters of the total, are: teachers; nurses; 
engineers; engineering technicians and technologists; public accountants; physicians; 
and lawyers (Macmillan and Grady, 2007, p. 3). Almost half of those included are in 
teaching, the health professions or social work, but no trades are included in their 
estimates. However, The Forum of Labour Market Ministers estimates that approximately 
15 to 20 per cent of workers in Canada work in one of the 51 regulated occupations 
under the Agreement on Internal Trade (Macmillan and Grady, 2007, p. 3). 
3.2.9 The effects of occupational licensing and wages in Canada 
There has been only one academic study that focuses on the influence of licensing on 
wages in Canada, and it is very dated (Muzondo and Pazderka, 1980). The study sample 
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consisted of 200 observations on mean incomes and other variables pertaining to twenty 
professional occupations across ten provinces. The observations were selected from the 
1971 Census of Canada. The mean incomes show considerable variation, especially 
across professions, but also across provinces within a given profession. Twelve are 
licensed (architects, chemical engineers, dentists, industrial engineers, lawyers, 
mechanical engineers, optometrists, osteopaths and chiropractors, pharmacists, 
physicians and surgeons, surveyors, veterinarians). Some of the others are certified, 
meaning that unlicensed persons may practise the profession but may not use the 
professional designation (nurses, physiotherapists and occupational therapists, 
agrologists, social workers). The rest are neither licensed nor certified (mathematicians, 
chemists, economists, geologists). Only males are included in their sample. Two main 
sources of information were used for their regression analysis. Data on the usual human 
capital variables were obtained from the published results of the 1971 Census of Canada. 
Information on anti competitive variables was extracted from provincial acts and 
regulations and professional codes of ethics, governing the conduct of practitioners. And 
also from returns to a questionnaire designed by the authors and distributed to provincial 
professional associations. For specific issues associated with licensing, Muzondo and 
Pazderka (1980) found that restrictions on advertising had the greatest impact on 
earnings of all the restrictive practice variables included in their regressions. Individuals in 
professions which restricted advertising earned 32.8 per cent more than individuals in 
professions which permitted advertising. They found that having higher fees for licensing 
was associated with about 10.6 per cent higher earnings. Their analysis was restricted to 
higher education and earnings professions, and no subsequent analysis has been 
attempted for other occupations.  
We were unable to find any studies that rigorously examine the role that regulation has 
on employment changes in Canada. However the studies by Gomez and Gunderson 
(2007) suggest that licensing reduces mobility across provinces and thereby reduces the 
efficient allocation of labour resources across Canada. They suggest that tougher 
regulations reduce immigration and reduce outmigration, resulting in a mismatch across 
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3.2.10 Summary for the US and Canada 
The evidence for the US suggests that, in general, occupational licensing increases the 
wage of licensed workers and the prices of the services they supply but without any 
overall improvements in the quality of service or product offered. A similar conclusion was 
reached in an earlier review of US evidence for the UK Commission (see Stanfield et al., 
2009). 
From our examination of the Canadian experience, there appear to be many similarities 
with the US in the methods by which occupations are regulated. One such is that there 
commonly exist barriers to move across political jurisdictions. The limited studies of wage 
effects in Canada suggest that licensing raises the earnings of licensed practitioners, as it 
does in the US. Unfortunately, no studies of employment or price effects are available for 
Canada to allow direct comparisons on this dimension. 
3.3 The United Kingdom 
3.3.1 Introduction 
This section of the report summarises the current evidence on the nature and impact of 
occupational regulation in the UK. Although some occupations have a long history of 
regulation in this country, the evidence base is much less extensive than is the case in 
the United States. In keeping with the US literature, however, the research evidence for 
the UK tends to focus on the most restrictive form of regulation, namely occupational 
licensing. The section begins by describing the development and typical characteristics of 
occupational regulation in the UK context. It then goes on to review the limited research 
evidence on the impact of regulation in the UK.  
3.3.2 The context and nature of occupational regulation in the UK 
Guilds are a deep seated tradition in many UK and European pre-industrial cities and can 
be considered the precursors of the UK‘s occupational regulation regime. Such 
associations of skilled craftsmen were characterised by long, standardised periods of 
apprenticeships, exclusive rights to produce and trade in certain markets granted by the 
monarchy or local authorities, as well as tight control over materials and technical 
knowledge. In the Medieval era, guilds provided a good source of revenue to the state in 
exchange for control over entry to occupations and monopolistic privileges. With 
industrialisation and the rise of the factory system in the early 19th century, the 
dominance of the guilds began to fade. At the same time, the power over legislation 
relating to occupational entry transferred from the monarch to the courts and, as a result, 
direct occupational regulation evolved (Rubin, 1980). It was also during this period that 
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professional occupations began to expand. By the 19th century, and following concerns 
about potential harm to the public caused by malpractice and poor standards of service, 
such occupational groups became the first to be subjected to regulation.   
The system of regulation that subsequently evolved in the UK has been described as one 
of ‗state sanctioned self–regulation’ (Salter, 2000). Within this model of regulation, 
professional groups acknowledge their accountability to society but retain the right to 
oversee the internal governance of their profession. This includes not only control over 
knowledge and its use, but also market entry and exit, professional training and fee 
structures. As long as professional groups are effective in delivering services of high 
standard to the public, continuous state interference has not been deemed necessary. As 
such, towards the end of the 19th century, the first professional associations began to 
emerge in the UK.  
While some professional bodies were established directly by groups of practitioners (e.g. 
Institute of Actuaries, British Nurses‘ Association13), others were created by the state but 
were allowed to operate independently from it (e.g. General Medical Council). The 
granting of Royal Charters to many practitioner led bodies symbolised their endorsement 
by the state and signified some degree of government involvement in the affairs of the 
association (e.g. amendments to the bodies‘ by laws require approval of the Privy 
Council). In practice, however, professional bodies retained a high degree of decision 
making sovereignty in relation to strictly professional issues. While they were relying on 
the state for some degree of legitimacy, professional bodies were also keen to maintain 
an arms‘ length relationship with externally imposed regulation. Amongst the first 
professional associations to be incorporated by Royal Charter were the Institute of 
Chartered Accountants (1880) and the Institute of Chartered Surveyors (1881).  
Regardless of the diverse processes behind their establishment, the purpose of these 
various professional bodies was analogous, namely that of promoting professional 
activities and ensuring that the system of self-regulation was working through the 
prescription and enforcement of rules and codes of conduct. While professional bodies 
were central in the self-regulation process, the institution can be better understood as a 
network comprising of several other supporting institutions such as training colleges and 
universities. This latter aspect of the system survives until today and comprises an even 
more sophisticated network of regulatory bodies, professional associations and 
educational institutions.  
For a number of years, the institution of occupational regulation remained stable in terms 
of its characteristics. The rise and establishment of new professions was soon followed 
                                                 
13
 The predecessor of the Royal College of Nursing.  
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by professional bodies offering accreditation and certification schemes, while the 
introduction of direct licensing was reserved for highly skilled service sector 
professionals, such as air traffic controllers and veterinarians. However, as the UK 
economy became dominated by service sector occupations, the scope of occupational 
regulation also had to adjust. Shifts in the composition of jobs (from manufacturing to 
services) meant that a greater proportion of the population worked in occupations where 
information asymmetries are more pronounced and the risk of market failure is greater. 
Concerns regarding consumer protection surfaced and, as a result, occupational 
regulation requirements were gradually extended to cover a larger number of 
occupational groups.  
While the majority of the new entrants belonged to high skilled professional categories, a 
notable and gradually growing proportion came from low skilled non-professional 
occupations. Some recent high profile additions to the list of licensed occupations include 
security guards (Private Security Industry Act 2001) and employees in the gambling 
industry (Gambling Act 2005). The Care Standards Act 2000 also introduced training 
requirements for social care workers in registered care homes, while a registration 
scheme has been brought in to cover estate agents (Consumers, Estate Agents and 
Redress Act 2007). However, forms of regulation have also been introduced to cover 
occupations in the manufacturing sector, notably building and construction, where health 
and safety risks are high. In 1995, for example, the Construction Skills Certification (CSC) 
Scheme (an accreditation scheme under our classification) was put in place for 
construction trades such as roofers, bricklayers, carpenters and glaziers, and possession 
of a CSC card is now widely acknowledged within the industry as a proof of competence.   
During this more recent period, entry criteria have been subject to regular revisions. 
Professional associations and regulatory bodies have upgraded their educational and 
qualification requirements. A recent example is youth and community workers whose 
qualifying training requirements were recently raised from a Diploma to Degree level. 
Similarly, independent financial advisers will be required to increase their minimum 
relevant qualification from Level 3 to Level 4 if they wish to continue providing financial 
advice beyond 1st January 2013. The requirement to provide evidence of engagement in 
continuous professional development (CPD) as a prerequisite to maintain membership 
has also been introduced by various professional and regulatory bodies. One example is 
the General Pharmaceutical Council whose standards require pharmacists and pharmacy 
technicians to audit their practice and engage in learning activities on a regular basis.  
Overall, state sanctioned self-regulation still remains the preferred approach. 
Accreditation and certification are still predominantly conducted by professional 
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associations, while licensure is granted by regulatory bodies. These bodies mainly 
operate national level schemes as opposed to local level ventures; for instance, the 
General Medical Council is responsible for issuing licences throughout the country and, 
once licensed, an individual can legally work anywhere within the country, unrestricted by 
district or county. However, licensing can also be conducted and managed at a local 
level. For example, local authorities are responsible for granting licences to practice to 
taxi drivers, market and street traders, beauticians and tattooists.  
Recently, a number of professional bodies are becoming increasingly eager to be 
licensed. The Hairdressing Council, for example, currently operates a voluntary 
registration regime, but has for many years campaigned for the establishment of statutory 
requirements.14 Similarly, for the last 20 years, the British Acupuncture Council has been 
pursuing the statutory regulation of the profession, but so far it has only achieved the 
granting of a Royal Charter (from January 2011), which will eventually confer protection 
of title to its members. The latter case echoes earlier efforts of various other professions 
allied to medicine to put themselves on a par with the medical profession. For instance, 
while chiropodists, speech and language therapists, occupational therapists, and medical 
radiographers working for the NHS have had to be registered to practice the profession 
since the 1960‘s, similar requirements for those working in the private sector were only 
introduced in 2001 and were welcomed by the relevant professional bodies.  
Not all regulations governing access to occupations emanate from domestic legislation. 
Indeed there are growing trends towards: (a) regulating entry into occupations at a 
European level (e.g. transport); and (b) standardising educational and training 
requirements across the EU to facilitate labour mobility across member states. With 
regards to the former, in the case of rail transport, there are now common educational 
standards that have to be attained for train drivers active in cross border services within 
the EU (Haas, 2009). Similarly, within the aviation industry, training requirements for 
mechanics and technicians working in aircraft maintenance have also been standardised 
and such individuals are now required to hold a European licence (Haas, 2008). With 
regards to the latter, the First General Systems Directive (89/48/EEC OJ 1989 L19/16) 
harmonises the requirements for the licensing of professionals across the EU and 
requires professional associations to provide membership routes for migrant 
professionals (Evetts, 1999; 2008).   
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 A Private Members‘ Bill was put before the House of Commons in 1978 seeking to replace the voluntary registration 
scheme for hairdressers, established in 1964, with a mandatory scheme restricting entry to those who had completed an 
approved training course and passed an approved examination. The Bill lacked government support and did not succeed. 
Available at: Hansard 1803-2005 [online] http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1978/jan/24/hairdressers-
registration-amendment [Accessed on 06 April 2011]. 
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3.3.3 The prevalence of occupational regulation in the UK 
Despite the long history of occupational regulation in the UK, the current prevalence of 
such regulation is unclear. While some professional bodies maintain records of 
membership, aggregate data on the number of occupations and proportion of the 
workforce that are subjected to some form of regulation is absent. To address this gap, 
Humphris et al. (2011) compiled a breakdown of qualifications and statutory licensing or 
registration requirements for each one of the non-managerial occupations categorised at 
Unit Group level of the Standard Occupational Classification (2000). Using this 
information, they calculated that, in 2008, at least 13.5 per cent of the non-managerial UK 
workforce required a licence to practice. Their estimates did not include Unit Groups that 
were only partly covered by licensing requirements (i.e. where some jobs within the Unit 
Group required licences to practice but others did not). Theirs is thus a lower bound 
estimate of the incidence of licensing in 2008. Using historical data from the Labour Force 
Survey, they indicated that the proportion of the workforce that was licensed grew 
steadily during the period 1997-2008. However, they were unable to determine whether 
this was due to occupations switching from unregulated to licensed or simply to increases 
in the size of the workforce within licensed occupations. 
With the exception of Humphris et al. (2010), the few studies that explore the impact of 
occupational regulation in the UK are based on case study evidence. The themes 
explored in these papers are diverse, but broadly representative of the themes found in 
the more extensive US literature. Below we present a summary of their findings.  
3.3.4 Wage effects of occupational licensing in the UK 
US studies of the impact of licensing on earnings have commonly focused on highly 
skilled and highly paid occupations (see Kleiner, 2000 for an exception). In an early paper 
for the UK, Siebert (1978) investigated the impact of regulation on the earnings of doctors 
and lawyers (both licensed occupations in the UK). His analysis showed that these 
occupations appeared to be obtaining a wage premium from licensing when compared 
with other workers with university degrees. Siebert went on to argue that constant upward 
shifts in the skill requirements to enter the medical profession, combined with 
grandfathering clauses to protect existing practitioners, were initiatives designed to 
economically benefit the profession rather than to upskill practitioners and protect the 
public. Drawing on his analysis of the institution, Siebert recommended the establishment 
of an ‗indicative‘ register of doctors and their qualifications but one which did not set entry 
requirements for working within the NHS.  
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Fernie‘s (2011) study of security guards is particularly interesting as it is the first study in 
the UK to explore an occupation with low skill levels. Using data from ASHE for the 
periods 2005/6 and 2006/7, she found no evidence that the mean percentage change in 
gross hourly earnings among security guards was any different to other groups in the 
same Minor group. Fernie‘s analysis makes several assumptions, not least that the 
introduction of licensing was the only change that took place within this Minor group and 
that enough individuals within this unit group became licensed so that any comparisons 
within their non-licensed counterparts are meaningful. Her analysis also makes no 
attempt to control for other differences between security guards and their chosen 
comparators.  
Humphris et al. (2010) make the first attempt to provide a macro estimate of the wage 
effect of occupational licensing in the UK. Drawing on data from the Labour Force 
Survey, the authors find that licensing is associated with approximately 13 per cent higher 
hourly pay in non-managerial occupations, a higher figure compared to the six per cent 
wage premium associated with trade union membership (Bryson and Forth, 2010) but 
one that compares favourably to the 17 per cent wage premium associated with the pre-
entry closed shop when the latter was still legal (Stewart, 1995).  
Further, Humphris et al. show that a licensing wage differential is obtained only by 
occupations that have high educational and training requirements and not by those 
occupations with low skills and wages. This indicates an important element of 
heterogeneity in the impact of licensing on wages, which is not evident from the US 
literature (which focuses primarily on professional occupations).15   
3.3.5 Impact on training and skills in the UK 
The majority of UK evidence on occupational regulation has focused on its implications 
for training and skills. Gospel and Thompson (2003) drew on evidence from interviews 
conducted with employees and managers working within seven social care providers in 
England, including the eldercare, adult and childcare sectors. Their findings show that the 
requirement set out by the Care Standards Act 2000 for registered care providers to 
ensure that all employees receive appropriate training had a direct and positive effect on 
the training of managers and on the introduction of more formal induction training for care 
staff. However, the study further found that, although regulation reduced the variability of 
training by increasing the floor of training, it also reduced the levels of training above and 
beyond the minimum required by law. The authors concluded by warning of the danger of 
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 It can be added that, by raising the wages of individuals who are already in the upper quartiles of the income distribution, 
licensing appears to be making a contribution to rising income inequality in the UK. However, the magnitude of its 
contribution has not been quantified.  
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‗the minimum becoming the new maximum‘ where training is concerned. Their reasoning 
was that employers‘ continued fear of poaching of trained staff remained a considerable 
barrier to higher levels of investment in training beyond the statutory requirements.  
Gospel and Lewis (2010) revisited these work settings in 2008 to assess the extent of 
any changes in the flow and stock measures of qualifications. Their evidence showed an 
increase in the number of employees registering and receiving NVQ awards, leading 
them to conclude that the regulations have had a considerable impact. Further, both 
management and staff interviewed were supportive of the current regulatory framework 
and in some cases they even called for strengthening some of the arrangements.  
Different conclusions were reached by Fernie (2011) in her study of the introduction of 
licensing within the private security industry in 2006. Her interviews with various security 
firms revealed little industry support for the regulation. The low statutory training 
requirements coupled with considerable scope for non-compliance mean that licensing is 
viewed as a high administrative burden in exchange for dubious quality outcomes.  The 
study further demonstrates that the low level of training required by the Security Industry 
Association has become the standard training scheme offered by many firms who used to 
offer their own, more comprehensive training courses and therefore questions the extent 
to which the introduction of licensing has addressed the market failures common in the 
industry. These concerns were voiced in an earlier study by Lister et al. (2001). They 
argued that, as training schemes are typically paid for by individuals, the requirements 
and standards are kept low to ensure attractiveness to potential entrants. Further, lack of 
employer involvement in the process diminishes the relevance and transferability of 
acquired skills to real work contexts, resulting in training being perceived, not as an 
investment, but merely a necessary condition to obtaining a licence.  
Lloyd‘s (2005) work investigated the introduction in 2002 of an industry-wide certification 
scheme within the fitness industry whereby individuals could voluntarily enter the Register 
of Exercise Professionals (REP) at one of three levels of entry (Level 1 - student, Level 2 
or Level 3), depending on prior qualifications and certified training. Drawing on interviews 
with employers and representatives of professional associations in the second year of the 
Register‘s operation, Lloyd noted that most of the companies she interviewed had not 
changed their training practices. Only a minority of companies, whose business model 
relied on a good reputation for the technical expertise of their staff, had improved their 
training standards to meet the requirements of the highest entry point in the register 
(Level 3).  
Looking at the impact on the industry as a whole, Lloyd concluded that the industry‘s self-
regulation approach had (at the time) failed to raise training standards and, by 
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implication, improve the wages and conditions of employees within a sector that is 
characterised by employment precariousness and high turnover. Lloyd also pointed out 
that the UK‘s training requirements were low in comparison to France and Germany, 
where fitness instructors must hold a professional baccalaureate and degree-level 
qualifications respectively.  
Lloyd‘s research has not been updated to account for recent developments with the 
Register, as far as we are aware. However, we understand that the Register has 
expanded since the time of Lloyd‘s research and that that the proportion of registrants at 
Level 3 has increased in the intervening period. An additional level – Level 4 (Specialist 
Exercise Instructor) – has also been added. The case would thus be worthy of re-
investigation.   
3.3.6 Impact on employment in the UK 
We are aware of no quantitative research on the impact of licensing on employment 
levels within occupations in the UK. To calculate such an effect, one would need to 
measure employment growth levels before and after the introduction of licensing, while 
controlling for other reasons that can account for employment change. Based on 
estimates from the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings, Fernie (2011) notes a six per 
cent increase in the number of individuals employed within the security industry over the 
period 2005 to 2006 (the period prior to the introduction of licensing laws) suggesting no 
downward effect of licensing on employment levels during this period. This is the closest 
a UK study has come to calculating such effects, but given the lack of statistical controls, 
the above findings should be treated cautiously.  
3.3.7 Product market effects in the UK 
There is no empirical evidence, as far as we are aware, on the impact of occupational 
regulation on prices or product/service quality in the UK. In recognition of this substantial 
evidence gap, a feasibility study was undertaken as part of the broader research project, 
in order to investigate the opportunities for such research in the UK. In the US, studies of 
the effect of licensing on price typically use average prices charged for the service or 
product, while studies of quality typically involve either measures of process and 
procedures (such as customer complaints, customer ratings, malpractice cases and 
disciplinary actions), measures of outcomes (such as pupil attainment) or value added 
proxies (such as substitution effects, access to services and insurance premiums). These 
measures each have their own limitations, however, and the robustness of any findings 
ultimately rest on the ability to combine them and control for other explanatory factors.  
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Various secondary data sources exist in the UK that would enable studies of the product 
market effects to be undertaken for specific occupations. However, in some cases, any 
analysis could only be cross-sectional in nature, while in other cases, separate datasets 
would have to be compiled. Access to some datasets would also need to be granted by 
the relevant authorities. There are thus some practical limitations to what can be done in 
the UK. But these are not insurmountable and it would clearly be possible to undertake 
some research on the product market effects of occupational regulation in the UK. Such 
research – which may be qualitative or quantitative – would address a clear gap in the 
available evidence for the UK by indicating the circumstances in which the introduction of 
occupational regulation can have positive or negative impacts on product markets. 
3.3.8 Summary for the UK 
To conclude, occupational regulation has a long history in the UK dating back to the 
Medieval Guilds. However, the institution as we know it today only began to develop 
towards the end of the 19th century. Recently, the UK has witnessed a steady growth in 
the number of occupations that require a licence to practice, but the preferred approach 
remains one of voluntarism and industry imposed training standards. The role of the state 
broadly remains one of providing legitimacy to professional bodies and interfering only in 
cases where malpractice is deemed to pose extremely high risks for the public. While 
some professions are content to preserve their right to self-regulation, others are keener 
to increase the barriers to entry via the imposition of licensing requirements.  
Despite its prevalence, evidence on the outcomes of occupational regulation is in short 
supply. On the issue of training, there are some cases in which the training requirements 
recommended or imposed in lower skilled occupations have had some effect in 
increasing the level of training and qualifications in these sectors, although in other cases 
they have been too low (or the barriers to access them have been too high) to result in 
any substantial up skilling of the workforce in question. Nevertheless, in cases where 
training take up increased (such as the social care sector), it would still be wrong to 
assume that improvements in productivity and quality of service automatically followed. 
As Kleiner (2006) notes, whilst successful completion of training and the resulting licence 
to practice the occupation demonstrates competence, these are not necessarily a good 
measure of subsequent on the job performance. In the absence of evidence of any such 
effects, further research in needed to address this issue. Moving on to the labour market 
outcomes, preliminary research demonstrates that licensing is associated with a wage 
premium in the UK, but only among the more skilled and better paid occupations. Robust 
evidence on the employment effects of licensing is currently absent. Moreover, little is 
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known about labour and product market effects of the other, less restrictive forms of 
regulation such as accreditation and certification.  
3.4 Occupational regulation in other EU Countries 
3.4.1 Introduction 
In order to gain a better understanding how the UK regulatory regime compares with that 
of other EU countries, we take two approaches. The first is to use an EU wide survey and 
an EU wide database to provide some comparative data on the extent of regulation 
across different countries. The second is to summarise the available (although limited) 
literature on occupational regulation in three of the larger EU nations: Germany, France 
and Italy. 
3.4.2 Cross EU comparisons 
There is no harmonised source of information on occupational regulation in the European 
Union. However, some comparative information on the extent and nature of regulation for 
specific professions is provided in a large scale survey undertaken by Paterson et al. 
(2003). The study focuses on the regulatory regimes to which accountants, lawyers, 
architects, engineers and pharmacists are subject across the EU and differentiates 
between market entry regulation (qualification requirements, work experience etc.) and 
conduct regulation (e.g. restrictions on fees or prices, regulation of advertising or location 
etc.). Conduct regulation is common in some EU countries with such provisions either 
emanating from national state law, regulations by the European Community or issued by 
professional bodies.  
Table 3.3 presents the total regulation (entry and conduct) indices for each of these 
professions. The regulation index can vary from 0-12, with higher values representing 
higher intensity of regulation. The authors consider all values above 5 to represent highly 
regulated regimes; Austria, Italy, Luxemburg, Germany and France have scores which 
exceed this figure for most if not all of the surveyed professions. Belgium, Spain and to 
some extent Portugal have values which average around five points. The most liberal 
regulatory regimes in the EU with respect to these professions are found in the UK, 
Sweden (with the exception of pharmacists), the Netherlands, Ireland, Finland and 
Denmark. The UK‘s most extensive regulation can be found in the case of pharmacists/ 
pharmacies although the index is still low compared to other countries.  
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Table 3.3 Total regulation indices for different professions (EU Member States) 
Country Accountants Legal Architects Engineers Pharmacists 
Austria 6.2 7.3 5.1 5 7.3 
Belgium 6.3 4.6 3.9 1.2 5.4 
Denmark 2.8 3 0 0 5.9 
Finland 3.5 0.3 1.4 1.3 7.0 
France 5.8 6.6 3.1 0 7.3 
Germany 6.1 6.5 4.5 7.4 5.7 
Greece 5.1 9.5 n.a n.a 8.9 
Ireland 3 4.5 0 0 2.7 
Italy 5.1 6.4 6.2 6.4 8.4 
Luxembourg 5 6.6 5.3 5.3 7.9 
Netherlands 4.5 3.9 0 1.5 3 
Portugal n.a 5.7 2.8 n.a 8 
Spain 3.4 6.5 4 3.2 7.5 
Sweden 3.3 2.4 0 0 12 
UK 3 4 0 0 4.1 
UK ranking 12th 11th 14th 13th 13th 
Source: Paterson et al. (2003). Rankings added.  
We are aware of no equivalent survey covering lower skilled occupations. However, 
some comparative information can be obtained from the European Commission‗s 
‗Database of Regulated Professions in the EU Member States‘.16 The database has been 
compiled under Directive 2005/36/EC which governs recognition rules for professional 
qualifications across the Single Market, and indicates the entry requirements which 
pertain to specific occupations in each Member State, so as to aid the free movement of 
workers. We have used the database to identify the entry requirements for a range of 
lower skilled occupations. These include two lower skilled occupations which have 
become subject to licensing in the UK in the past decade, plus eight lower skilled 
occupations which are not yet subject to licensing in the UK.  
The upper panel of Table 3.4 lists those countries, alongside the UK, which operate 
licensing systems for Childminders/Nursery Nurses and Security Guards. It shows that 
Childminders and Nursery Nurses, who are subject to licensing in the UK under the 2006 
Childcare Act, also have mandatory skill related entry requirements in ten other European 
countries. Security Guards on the other hand, who became subject to licensing in the UK 
in 2003, have mandatory skill related entry requirements in only five other European 
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 The European Commission‘s database is available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/qualifications/regprof/index.cfm?fuseaction=home.home. 
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countries. Among these two lower skilled occupations, the UK is therefore among only a 
minority of European countries which operate mandatory skill related entry requirements.  
Table 3.4 Comparison of entry requirements for lower skilled occupations in EU 
Member States 
Occupations recently subject to licensing in the UK 
Occupation Also subject to licensing in: 
Security guard Sweden, Poland, Malta, France, Finland 
Child care worker Switzerland, Poland, Norway, Luxembourg, Italy, Greece, 
Germany, Finland, Czech Republic 
 
Occupations not currently subject to licensing in the UK 






Cooks, Chefs; Slovenia, Poland, Iceland, Hungary, Portugal 
Beauticians; Cyprus, Belgium, Iceland, Hungary, Slovakia, Italy, Czech 
Republic, Austria 
Plumbers; Spain, Slovakia, Iceland, Leichtenstein, Hungary, Greece, 
Germany, France, Czech Republic, Belgium 
Motor Mechanics; Slovakia, Poland, Iceland, Germany, Austria 
Food processing 
workers;  
Processing of milk and dairy products: Slovenia, Slovakia, 
Iceland, Czech Republic, Austria 
Processing of fruit and vegetables: Slovenia 
Bricklayers; Hungary, Czech Republic 
Estate Agents. Switzerland, Sweden, Slovenia, Slovakia, Portugal, Poland,  
Norway, Iceland, France, Denmark, Cyprus, Belgium, 
Austria 
Source: EC Database of Regulated Professions 
The lower panel of Table 3.4 lists those countries which operate licensing systems for a 
variety of other lower skilled occupations that are not currently subject to licensing in the 
UK. The list of occupations is taken from the UK Commission‘s recent Policy Review 
(Cox et al., 2009). It is apparent from the lower panel of Table 3.4 that, in each case, the 
UK is currently in line with the majority of other European countries in not regulating entry 
to these occupations. The UK‘s major competitors, such as France and Germany, do 
appear in the table however. Germany has skill based entry restrictions for plumbers and 
motor mechanics, requiring those practicing either occupation to hold a Diploma of 
Secondary Education, whilst France has entry restrictions for plumbers (who are required 
to complete a secondary course) and estate agents (for whom the entry requirement is 
not listed). Those countries which appear most regularly in the table include Slovenia, 
Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Austria and Iceland.  
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These comparisons are, of course, limited in their scope. However, the information 
presented here suggests that the UK is among those countries which operate the least 
restrictive regulatory regimes in respect of professional occupations. In respect of lower 
skilled occupations, it suggests that the UK has, conversely, entered a minority in recently 
extending licensing to specific lower skilled occupations such as Security Guards. The 
UK would also be in the minority if it were to extend licensing requirements to any of the 
lower skilled occupations considered in the UK Commission‘s recent Policy Review.  
3.4.3 Commentary on specific countries 
The section that follows reviews the available literature on the German, Italian and 
French regulatory regimes.17 Our aim has been to discuss the prevalence of occupational 
regulation, provide an overview of the types of occupations that are regulated, look at the 
evidence of its effect on labour and product markets and comment on whether the 
trajectory is currently towards more or less regulation. We have been constrained on our 
ability to cover all these issues in sufficient depth for all three countries by the marked 
absence of literature that directly and sufficiently addresses these themes.  
Germany 
If the degree of occupational regulation is depicted as a continuum with professional 
autonomy at the far left, state sanctioned professional control in the middle and direct 
state control at the far right, Germany belongs to the latter category. Indeed, as a result of 
numerous pre and post entry restrictions and a coverage that extends to various low skill 
occupations, the literature describes the German model of occupational regulation as the 
most intense and comprehensive amongst all its European counterparts (Garoupa, 
2004).   
The German system of regulating entry to craft occupations dates back to the Guilds.  Its 
present form was imposed by the German Trade and Crafts Code in 1938. The Code 
(and its subsequent revisions) sets out skills, training and work experience requirements 
for practicing several crafts such as carpentry, plastering, printing and bookbinding, 
smiths and locksmith trades, textile processing, baker and butcher trades, interior design 
and hairdressing.18 Entry to these occupations involves a dual system of formal 
vocational training and apprenticeships (undertaken simultaneously) followed by lengthy 
on the job training provided by a Master. Indeed since 1908, any individual who wanted to 
train apprentices in one of the regulated professions had to hold a Master Certificate. In 
1935 this certificate became the mandatory educational requirement to gain professional 
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 We have only been able to review these papers that are written in English. 
18
 Notably, several related trades such as copy and paper production, textile refinement, ice-cream production and 
beauticians are not regulated.  
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registration and start a business in that occupation (Prantl and Spitz-Oener, 2009). 
Obtaining the Master Certificate involves undertaking basic vocational training lasting 
between 2 to 3 years, followed by several years of work experience. The individual then 
must acquire the journeyman degree (Gesellenzeit und-brief) and subsequently pass the 
Master examination (Meister prüfung). The rationale behind this system, which survives 
intact until today, is to ensure consumer protection through the determination of 
corresponding technical standards and business skills necessary to practice the relevant 
occupations.   
Turning to the regulation of professions, the German system is indicative of the country‘s 
tradition of legal corporatism (Dubois et al., 2006). The state is responsible for providing a 
legal framework that grants professional bodies the authority to regulate professional 
training and conduct. As in the case of the UK, in exchange for monopolistic privileges 
(i.e. responsibility for professional accreditation) and the ability to play a role in policy 
setting, such professional bodies act as the main regulatory and administrative body 
whose responsibility is to ensure the public interest is served. Examples of professions 
who are covered by such arrangements include the medical profession, lawyers, and tax 
experts. In order to qualify, individuals need a university degree, followed by work 
experience and in some cases (e.g. accountants, tax advisers and pharmacists) one also 
needs to sit a professional exam. Further, membership of a professional body is 
compulsory in Germany if one is to practice the profession (Paterson et al., 2003). For 
technical professions such as engineers and architects there are no entry restrictions, but 
the terms architect and engineering consultant are protected by law and are reserved for 
those who meet certain requirements. Post entry regulation is also strict with respect to 
fee structures (e.g. legal fees are determined by the state), advertising and organisational 
forms that professionals and semi professionals can adopt (e.g. a separation between the 
diagnosis and the implementation of solutions is common amongst medical and law 
firms).   
Evidence on the incidence and economic impact of regulation is lacking in Germany. The 
aforementioned European Commission‘s Regulated Professions database lists 152 
regulated occupations. Kleiner (2006) provides some preliminary estimates on the wage 
effects of licensing for doctors and dentists and finds that despite the high level of 
regulation present in the German context, the wage premium in licensed occupations 
relative to comparator non-licensed occupations is much lower than that found in the UK 
or France. In particular, dentists only make between one and five per cent more from 
licensing compared to the control group, while the licensing premium for doctors vis-à-vis 
chemists is less than one per cent. Post entry controls of fees and, by implication, 
earnings are offered by Kleiner (2006) as one potential explanation. If Kleiner‘s 
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hypothesis is correct, this would serve to indicate the potential importance of the broader 
regulatory framework applying to labour and product markets (particularly competition 
law) in shaping the effects of occupational licensing. 
In a study of regulatory effects, in terms of entry to self-employment and occupational 
mobility, Plantl and Spitz-Oener (2009) show that occupational regulation reduces the 
flexibility to react to occupational opportunities that arise within the labour market. High 
investment in occupation specific training necessary for entry results in individuals being 
less occupationally mobile. However, the authors point out that this effect is stronger in 
East Germany (as a result of the economic transition the region has gone through) but 
can also apply to cases where structural shifts in the economy or drastic technological 
change necessitate quick workforce adaptation.  
According to Dubois et al. (2006), a recent trend in the case of medicine and allied 
professions has been towards shifting from a system of self-governance, which has 
traditionally granted professional associations disproportionate power in setting and 
monitoring standards, towards one that grants the state more influence in the process. 
Kleiner (2006) notes that there has been a reduction in the number of regulated 
occupations in Germany and, in the case of professions, there has been a move towards 
the adoption of OECD regulatory policies (Biggar and Wise, 2000). For example, 
advertising rules have recently been relaxed and informative advertising is now permitted 
for some professions, such as architects and engineers.  
Italy 
Entry to occupations in Italy has traditionally been highly regulated. According to Brosio 
(1997), the current system of occupational regulation dates back to the 19th century and 
is supported by the Italian Constitution. It broadly resembles the regulatory frameworks 
found in other countries in that entry to occupations is dependent on attainment of 
prescribed educational and training requirements and, in many cases, this takes the form 
of a publicly organised examination followed by a period of practical training.  
The institution in its present state comprises of either licensed or certified occupations. 
Examples of the former include doctors, architects, lawyers, pharmacists, journalists, 
engineers, accountants and customs personnel. Certification comes with a protection of 
title and is common amongst technical professions such as beauticians, tourist guides 
and Alpine guides. To our knowledge, aggregate data on the proportion of occupations 
that are regulated in Italy does not exist. The closest one can get to some estimates is 
the aforementioned EC database of Regulated Professions, according to which 146 
occupations require some form of minimum training in order to be permitted to practice. 
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The majority of regulated professions are in medicine, with those aligned to medicine are 
also well represented. However, the database does not distinguish between licensed and 
certified occupations, nor does it provide us with an estimate of the percentage of the 
workforce working within such occupations.   
Professional associations in Italy have a long history of lobbying the government for the 
enactment of stricter entrance criteria and monopoly privileges thereafter. Overall, they 
appear to be effective in defining the tasks and jobs that are subject to regulation, setting 
the fees charged by professionals and getting their recommendations endorsed by the 
state which subsequently incorporates them into legislation. Their role in setting 
examinations and monitoring entry to the profession is set out by law. Empirical evidence 
has been sought to examine the implications of this. Bortolotti and Fiorentini‘s (1997) 
analysis of the accountancy profession showed a negative relationship between the 
income of professional groups and approval rates at entrance examinations. The authors 
conclude that institutional barriers to entry have been effective in raising accountant‘s 
income and as a result more occupations have been pressing the government to be 
granted licensed status. According to Brosio (1997), the end of the 1990s there were just 
over 50 occupations lobbying to such an effect.  
To our knowledge, data on the product and labour market effects of occupational 
regulation in Italy does not exist. The limited literature that is available has been critical 
about the excessive barriers governing professional entry and post entry conduct in Italy 
and has called for a regime that is less rigid and one that strips professional associations 
of their statutory privileges. Similar concerns have been raised by various consumer 
groups, and in 2007 the Italian Antitrust Commission re-opened an investigation into the 
rules limiting competition by the imposition of fixed fee scales and advertising bans.19 
This is not the first time that the Commission has launched an inquiry into the professions 
over anti competitive agreements, which is indicative of the mounting pressures towards 
relaxation of the regulatory regime.  
France 
In common with the UK, Germany and Italy, entry to regulated occupations in France is 
achieved through educational or vocational training. The government usually approves 
the curriculum, establishes quality standards and controls education funding. Professional 
associations are influential in shaping its content but their main role is one of disciplining 
their members and ensuring continuous professional development (Dubois et al., 2006). 
However, the restrictions can be severe. For example, local merchants in France have to 
                                                 
19
 The investigation focused on the orders covering architects, lawyers, tax accountants and bookkeepers, workplace 
consultants, pharmacists, geologists, building surveyors, journalists and freelancers, engineers, doctors and dentists, 
notaries, industrial technicians and psychologists.  
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approve the establishment of a new business which results in several licensed 
occupations such as attorneys, accountants and architects exercising some control over 
competition within geographical areas (Bertrand and Kramarz, 2001).  
Existing analyses of occupational regulation in France have focused on specific 
occupations (mainly high skilled, professional groups). Within this context, researchers 
such as Kleiner (2006) have described the French system of occupational regulation as 
being more restrictive than the ones found in the US and the UK, but less restrictive than 
the German case. Kleiner (2006) provided some preliminary estimates on the wage 
effects of occupational licensing for doctors and dentists in France. These occupations 
were compared to a group of comparable unlicensed occupations. He found that, for 
doctors and dentists, licensing is associated with a wage premium between 8 and 19 per 
cent relative to their comparator groups, while no wage effect is found for teachers (a 
licensed occupation) compared to social workers (an occupation subject to registration). 
The author concludes that the licensing wage premium impact is lower in France 
compared to the UK and the US. He cites the greater use of price caps and other conduct 
restrictions in continental Europe as one possible explanation (Kleiner, 2006, p. 135).  
Other research has shown that French licensed occupations behave similarly to those in 
other countries when the opportunity to capture rents emerges. Avrillier et al. (2010) 
investigated the impact of the abolition of compulsory military service (a means by which 
many French young men obtained their driving licence until 1997) on the heavily 
regulated driving school industry in France. Their findings show that the resulting 
increase in demand for driving licence training had two effects. Areas with many young 
men witnessed an increase in the number of driving schools but not an increase in total 
profits. Second, it led to an increase in the wages of driving instructors as a means of 
discouraging them from establishing their own schools (which would lead to more 
competition in the market).   
3.5 Summary 
It will have become clear from the preceding discussion that, although many studies have 
been conducted into occupational regulation in the United States, with a particular focus 
on licensing, there is a paucity of evidence on the prevalence, operation and impact of 
occupational regulations in most EU countries, including the UK. The available evidence 
suggests that licensing is less common in the UK than it is in the US. However, the 
position of the UK in relation to other countries in the EU, in respect of its approach to 
occupational regulation, is not easy to discern. From the available evidence it appears 
that the UK is less restrictive than many EU countries in its approach to regulating 
specific professions, such as accountancy and law, but that it may be in a minority if it 
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continues to extend licensing requirements among lower skilled occupations. Further, 
conduct regulations such as controls on fees, prices, advertising and location of the 
business are common amongst some occupations in EU countries and in some cases 
take very restrictive forms. Such features are not prevalent in the US and the UK. 
Clearly the origins and nature of occupational regulation differ across countries within the 
EU, and this has been evidenced in the glimpses we have obtained of the systems which 
operate in Germany, Italy and France. However, the available evidence on the operation 
of occupational regulation within such countries is extremely limited. This makes it 
impossible to make comparative assessments of the efficacy and impact of licensing in 
different national contexts within Europe.  
The best available evidence on the impacts of licensing remains that which has emerged 
from the numerous studies in the US and some more recent work in the UK. The overall 
conclusions from these studies are that licensing typically increases the wage of licensed 
workers and can also lead to a rise in prices. However studies on prices come exclusively 
from the US and, in the UK, there is evidence of heterogeneity on the impact of licensing 
wages, with a licensing wage premium only being evident among workers with high 
educational and training requirements. Thus, those workers in lower skilled and lower 
paid occupations are not likely to benefit in terms of wages. There is no consistent 
evidence of improvements in the quality of service or product offered, while the impact of 
licensing on individual and workplace productivity remains largely unknown. There is also 
a substantial evidence gap regarding to the labour and product market impact of other 
forms of regulation i.e. accreditation, certification and registration. 
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4 Mapping occupational regulation in the UK  
 
4.1 Introduction 
There exists no comprehensive database which maps the extent and nature of 
occupational regulation in the UK. The most comprehensive list of regulated occupations 
is that provided by the UK National Contact Point (UK NCP) as an input to the European 
Commission‗s ‗Database of Regulated Professions in the EU Member States‘.20 This lists 
102 occupations which require licences to practice in the UK. However, it provides few 
details about the conditions governing regulation for each of these occupations. 
Compiling a database with comprehensive information on the nature of occupational 
                                                 
20
 The list has been compiled under Directive 2005/36/EC which governs recognition rules for professional qualifications 
across the Single Market. It only covers occupations requiring a licence to practice. The UK list of regulated occupations is 
provided at: http://www.ukncp.org.uk/index.asp?page=42. The full EC database is available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/qualifications/regprof/index.cfm?fuseaction=home.home  
Chapter Summary 
 A classification scheme has been devised to identify four principal types of 
occupational regulation in the UK, namely: licensing; certification; accreditation; 
and registration. These four types of regulation vary according to whether they 
involve the use of mandatory skill standards (licensing), voluntary skill 
standards (certification and accreditation) or mandatory entry requirements that 
are not explicitly skills based (registration).  
 Using the Standard Occupational Classification (2000), a map is compiled at 
Unit Group level which classifies the types of occupational regulation and 
provides information about the characteristics and enforcement of these 
regulations. 
 Among the 353 Unit Groups within the Standard Occupational Classification 
(2000), 82 are licensed, 19 contain jobs for which there is a state based 
certification scheme and 20 are subject to registration. A further 67 Unit Groups 
contain jobs for which a recognised, non-governmental accreditation scheme 
exits. This leaves 165 Unit Groups which are unregulated.  
 Some 43 Unit Groups have experienced a switch in regulation status since 
2001. These include three Unit Groups which have switched from unregulated 
to licensing and nineteen Unit Groups which have switched from unregulated to 
either certification or accreditation.  
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regulation in the UK is a necessary first step if one is to estimate the prevalence and 
impact of occupational regulation (including any variation in impact) (see Stanfield et al., 
2009). Accordingly, the project team has sought – through desk research – to map the 
extent and nature of occupational regulation in managerial, professional and non-
professional occupations in the UK.  
The mapping has been undertaken at the most detailed level of occupational coding 
available: the Unit Group level of the Standard Occupational Classification (2000).21 For 
each of the 353 SOC(2000) Unit Groups, the project team has sought to establish 
whether any form of occupational regulation is in place. If this is the case, the project 
team has sought to compile information on the nature of that regulation and the 
characteristics of its enforcement. This information has been collated in an MS Excel 
spreadsheet, the content of which is described in this chapter.  
Alternative methods for measuring the extent of occupational regulation have been 
explored in a feasibility study. The findings are presented in Annex A.  
4.2 Classification scheme 
Within the mapping spreadsheet, each SOC(2000) Unit Group is classified to one of five 
categories in respect of its regulated status. The classification scheme that is used to 
categorise each occupation – and which has been developed specifically for this project – 
is set out in Table 4.1 below. There are three dimensions upon which the situation in any 
occupation is judged: 
1. Is there legal regulation of the activities of the occupation by the state (either directly 
or through a delegated administrative body)? 
2. If there is some legal regulation: does it place any restrictions on the right to practice 
the occupation (or some component tasks)? 
3. Is there any requirement to demonstrate a minimum level of competence?  
If the answer to all three of these questions is ‗Yes‘, the occupation is classified as being 
subject to licensing. We include occupations where the licence to practice is obtained at 
organisation level, as in the cases of restaurants and care homes discussed in Section 
1.3.22 If the first and third questions are answered positively, but there is no restriction on 
                                                 
21
 The Standard Occupational Classification (2010) is, strictly speaking, the most up to date classification. However, it is yet 
to enter common usage; SOC(2010) codes is not expected to appear on the Quarterly Labour Force Survey datasets until 
2012, for example (personal communication from ESDS Government Helpdesk). 
22
 These occupations are not strictly subject to licensing, since each individual worker does not require a licence to 
practice. However, they are analogous to licensed occupations in the sense that the state restricts the right to practice to 
those organisations which can demonstrate that a specific share of their workers meet a prescribed skill standard.  
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the right to practice, it is classified as being subject to certification. If the first and second 
questions are answered positively, but there is no minimum skill requirement, it is 
classified as being subject to registration. If a minimum skill requirement is the only 
characteristic, and there is no legal regulation of the activities of the occupation, it is 
classified as being subject to accreditation. Finally, if the answer to each of these three 
questions is ‗No‘ then an occupation is classified as unregulated.  
Having classified each SOC(2000) Unit Group to one of these five categories, the 
mapping exercise then goes on to map the features of occupational regulation which 
apply within each Unit Group. The fields are described – along with their content – in the 
following section. 
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Table 4.1 Classification schema for occupations 













The occupation may be subject to conventions, 
whereby employers will typically cite minimum 
entry criteria, but these are not co ordinated, 
nor do they have any legal basis.  
 
UK example: retail assistant 
 
 
Non-governmental accreditation schemes 
 
Practitioners may apply to be accredited as competent by an 
accrediting body, which is usually a professional body or industry 
association. May permit the accredited person to use a specific title or 
acronym but confers no legal protection of title, nor any legal protection 
of function.   
 










There is no legal restriction as to who may carry out the tasks covered 
by the occupation, but practitioners may apply to be certified as 
competent by the state (or an appointed agent). This certification may 
sometimes (but not always) confer legal protection of title. 
 









Requires registration of personal details. May 
also make stipulations in areas other than 
competence (e.g. finance) 
 




Only those who can demonstrate the specified level of competence may 
obtain a licence permitting them to undertake the tasks covered by the 
regulation. 
 
UK example: licensing of taxi drivers by local authorities 
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4.3 Overview of the Map of Occupational Regulation 
Each of the fields in the mapping spreadsheet is described below. The coding schema 
makes each field amenable to descriptive analysis; tables containing descriptive statistics 
are provided in the text. 
Regulation status: This field records the form of occupational regulation (if any) which 
applies to jobs included within the SOC(2000) Unit Group. The classification is set out in 
the previous section. Some 82 Unit Groups contain jobs that require licences to practice 
(Table 4.2). A further 19 contain jobs for which there is a state based certification scheme 
whilst 20 contain jobs that are subject to registration requirements. Some 121 Unit 
Groups (34 per cent) thus contain jobs that are subject to a form of state regulation.  
A further 67 Unit Groups (19 per cent) contain jobs for which there is not state regulation 
but for which there exists a recognised, non-governmental accreditation scheme. The 
classification scheme is thus hierarchical, in the sense that accreditation schemes are 
only recorded in the absence of state based regulation (i.e. where a Unit Group is not 
already subject to licensing, certification or registration). 
This leaves 165 Unit Groups (47 per cent) that are classified as being ‗unregulated‘. All 
other fields in the spreadsheet are coded ‗N/A‘ if the Unit Group is coded as 
‗Unregulated‘. 
Table 4.2  Regulation status 
Regulation status Unit Groups Unit Groups 
 No. Col % 
Licensing 82 23 
Certification 19 5 
Registration 20 6 
Accreditation 67 19 
Unregulated 165 47 
Total 353 100 
Base: All SOC(2000) Unit Groups 
Source: Map of Occupational Regulation 
Coverage: Records whether all jobs that are classified within the Unit Group are subject 
to regulation or whether regulation only extends to some jobs. One example of partial 
coverage is SOC(2000) Unit Group 6121 (Nursery nurses), in which licences to practice 
are not required by those working in the child‘s home. Around three fifths of Unit Groups 
that contain at least one regulated occupation (115 out of 188) are comprised wholly of 
regulated occupations, leaving around two fifths (73 out of 188) where the regulations 
extend only to some job titles within the Unit Group (Table 4.3). Further text fields (not 
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reported here) record the regulated job titles in cases where only some of the jobs within 
a Unit Group are regulated. 
Table 4.3  Regulation status, by Job coverage within the Unit Group 
Regulation status All job titles Some job titles Total 
 No. No. No. 
Licensing 53 29 82 
Certification 17 2 19 
Registration 5 15 20 
Accreditation 40 27 67 
Total 115 73 188 
Base: All regulated Unit Groups 
Source: Map of Occupational Regulation 
Any protection of title: Indicates whether state based certification schemes or 
recognised accreditation schemes lead to some protection of title. An example would be 
the accreditation scheme offered by the Royal Institute of Chartered Surveyors, which 
entitles accredited persons to use the protected title of ‗Chartered surveyor‘. Twelve of 
the 19 cases of state based certification and 38 of the 67 cases of accreditation confer 
protection of title (Table 4.4).  
Table 4.4  Regulation status, by Availability of protection of title 
Regulation status Yes No Total 
 No. No. No. 
Certification 12 7 19 
Accreditation 38 29 67 
Total 50 36 86 
Base: All Unit Groups offering Certification or Accreditation 
Source: Map of Occupational Regulation 
Level: Records the level at which any regulations apply. In most cases of occupational 
regulation, the requirements (e.g. to meet a specific skill standard) fall upon individual 
workers. Examples include doctors, taxi drivers and security guards who are each 
required individually to be licensed. However, there are some cases in which the 
requirements fall only upon organisations; the registration scheme for estate agents is 
one example, in which the registration requirements fall upon firms and sole traders. In 
some cases, the regulation places requirements on both individuals and organisations. 
An example would be the licensing of pharmacists, where both individual pharmacists 
and their premises must be licensed. Among the 188 Unit Groups that are subject to 
some form of occupational regulation, 156 are subject to regulations that apply to 
individuals, four are subject to regulations that apply to organisations and 28 are subject 
to regulations that apply at both levels (Table 4.5).  
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Table 4.5  Regulation status, by Level at which requirements apply 
Regulation status Individual Organisation Both Total 
 No. No. No. No. 
Licensing 66 1 15 82 
Certification 19 0 0 19 
Registration 10 3 7 20 
Accreditation 61 0 6 67 
Total 156 4 28 188 
Base: All regulated Unit Groups 
Source: Map of Occupational Regulation 
Characteristics of enforcement body: Contains information about the nature of the 
enforcement body. In 55 of the 188 cases of regulation, enforcement is undertaken by a 
dedicated regulatory body (Table 4.6); examples include the General Pharmaceutical 
Council and the Architects‘ Registration Board. In a further 40 cases, it is undertaken by a 
government agency, such as the Financial Services Authority, which has additional 
responsibilities besides occupational regulation. In 71 cases, enforcement is undertaken 
by a professional body such as the Chartered Institute of Marketing or the Association of 
British Travel Agents. In the remaining cases, enforcement is undertaken either by local 
authorities (17 cases) or by organisations that are difficult to classify (5 cases).23 Further 
text fields (not reported here) record the name and contact details of the enforcement 
body.  














Other Varies Total 
 No. No. No. No. No. No. No. No. 
Licensing 32 27 15 0 3 1 4 82 
Certification 14 5 0 0 0 0 0 19 
Registration 8 8 2 0 2 0 0 20 
Accreditation 1 0 0 36 30 0 0 67 
Total 55 40 17 36 35 1 4 188 
Base: All regulated Unit Groups 
Source: Map of Occupational Regulation 
Funding of Enforcement Body: indicates whether the enforcement body is funded by 
the government (as in the case of the General Pharmaceutical Council) or self-funded (as 
in the case of the Chartered Institute of Marketing). Among the 188 cases of regulation, 
we record 92 cases in which the enforcement body is government funded and 96 in which 
it is self-funded (Table 4.7).  
                                                 
23
 Those which are difficult to classify include sports governing bodies which regulate sports coaches and officials (Unit 
Group 3442) and the National Youth Agency which regulates youth and community workers (Unit Group 3231).  
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 No. No. No. 
Licensing 69 13 82 
Certification 5 14 19 
Registration 18 2 20 
Accreditation 0 67 67 
Total 92 96 188 
Base: All regulated Unit Groups 
Source: Map of Occupational Regulation 
Renewal mechanism: Indicates whether any licence to practice, certification, registration 
or accreditation must be renewed and, if so, by what mechanism. In 111 of the 188 
regulated cases, there is no requirement to renew (Table 4.8). In a further 47 there is a 
requirement to re-register after a specified period of time but there is no new examination 
of the person‘s competence. In the remaining cases, the re-registration process either 
involves a requirement to demonstrate continuing professional development (17 cases) or 
involves an examination (10 cases).  
Table 4.8 Regulation status, by Renewal mechanism 
Regulation 
status 






 No. No. No. No. No. 
Licensing 50 17 7 8 82 
Certification 17 2 0 0 19 
Registration 11 7 2 0 20 
Accreditation 33 21 8 2 67 
Total 111 47 17 10 188 
Base: All regulated Unit Groups 
Source: Map of Occupational Regulation 
Month and year of commencement: These fields indicate the date on which each 
instance of occupational regulation came into force. Some date back to the 19th century 
whereas, in 52 Unit Groups (such as 9241 – Security Guards), regulation commenced 
since 2000 (Table 4.9). These recently regulated occupations include 15 Unit Groups that 
are now subject to licensing, six that now have certification schemes, 15 that are now 
subject to registration and 16 that now have accreditation schemes. A further text field 
(not reported here) records the statutory instrument through which instances of licensing 
or state based certification have been established.  
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 No. No. No. No. No. No. No. 
Licensing 21 14 3 16 15 13 82 
Certification 0 1 12 0 6 0 19 
Registration 0 2 1 0 15 2 20 
Accreditation 12 8 6 18 16 7 67 
Total 33 25 22 34 52 22 188 
Base: All regulated Unit Groups 
Source: Map of Occupational Regulation 
The date of commencement is not known in 22 of the 188 cases of regulation; these are 
typically cases in which the occupation has been regulated for some considerable time. It 
should be noted that we have only attempted to code the month of commencement if the 
year of commencement was 2001 or later, as these are the cases that can be identified in 
our analysis of the Quarterly Labour Force Survey 2001-2010. We have been successful 
in identifying the month of commencement for around two thirds of these cases.  
Rationale for regulation: In this field we have attempted to code the reasons for the 
introduction of regulation. Seven different reasons have been identified, with more than 
one reason being coded in many cases. The most common coded reason is ‗protection of 
the public‘ (124 of 188 cases), followed by ‗demonstration of competence‘ (54 cases) 
(Table 4.10). It should be noted that this is often a subjective judgement, based upon 
information published by the enforcement body or correspondence with those bodies.  


























 No. No. No. No. No. No. No. No. 
Licensing 75 16 7 0 0 5 0 82 
Certification 12 1 12 0 6 0 0 19 
Registration 19 0 0 0 1 1 0 20 
Accreditation 18 37 12 14 3 7 3 67 
Total 124 54 31 14 10 13 3 188 
Base: All regulated Unit Groups 
Source: Map of Occupational Regulation 
Entry requirements (qualifications): The text field records the nature of any 
educational or vocational qualifications that are required as a condition of becoming 
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licensed, certified or accredited.24 The coded field goes on to classify these qualifications 
to one of five categories based on their correspondence to the National Qualifications 
Framework (NQF).25 The most common requirement (65 cases) is for a qualification at 
NQF Level 4-6 (comprising Level 4 NVQs, teaching qualifications and first degrees) 
(Table 4.11). There is one case in which (Unit Group 3131 - IT Operations Technician) in 
which the relevant accreditation scheme (run by the Chartered Institute for IT) does not 
prescribe an entry route based on attainment of qualifications but, instead, requires all 
applicants to demonstrate relevant work experience. In some other cases, entrants are 
required to pass examinations that are specific to the occupation and which do not map 
across to the NQF in an obvious way; this situation applies in 13 Unit Groups (including 
Unit Group 3132 - police officers) and these cases are coded ―Don‘t know‖. Entry 
requirements are highest for professionals, as one might expect (see Table 4.12).  











 No. No. No. No. No. No. No. No. 
Licensing 0 20 11 6 32 2 11 82 
Certification 0 0 7 0 2 10 0 19 
Accreditation 1 2 19 9 31 3 2 67 
Total 1 22 37 15 65 15 13 168 
Base: All Unit Groups with Licensing, Certification or Accreditation 












                                                 
24
 This field is not relevant in the case of registration, since registration does not involve qualification-based entry 
requirements.  
25
 The coding was undertaken through reference to the table on pp.107-8 of the Labour Force Survey User Guide (Volume 
5: LFS Classifications). This table shows the correspondence between specific educational and vocational qualifications 
(as coded on LFS variable HIQUAL8) and five levels of the NQF. See: 
http://www.statistics.gov.uk/downloads/theme_labour/Vol5_2009.pdf 
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 No. No. No. No. No. No. No. No. 
Managers and 
senior officials 
0 1 7 0 9 1 2 20 
Professionals 0 0 0 0 24 13 0 37 
Assoc Prof and 
Technical 
1 2 1 9 24 1 7 45 
Admin and 
Secretarial 
0 1 0 0 2 0 0 3 
Skilled trades 0 4 11 4 4 0 3 26 
Personal 
service 








0 11 8 0 0 0 0 19 
Elementary 0 2 5 0 1 0 0 8 
Total 1 22 16 15 63 15 13 168 
Base: All Unit Groups with Licensing, Certification or Accreditation 
Source: Map of Occupational Regulation 
Type of qualification: Indicates whether the entry requirement is in the form of an 
educational qualification (e.g. a first degree) or a vocational qualification (e.g. an NVQ). In 
a small number of cases (seven in total) entry may be granted through either route (as in 
the case of teachers who may become eligible for Initial Teacher Training either by 
obtaining a first degree in a relevant subject or by obtaining a vocational qualification). 
The remaining cases are split between educational (67 cases) and vocational 
qualifications (80 cases) (Table 4.13). Requirements for educational qualifications are 
typically at a higher level than requirements for vocational qualifications, as one would 
expect.  
Table 4.13  NQF level of entry qualification, by Type of qualification required 
Regulation status Educational Vocational Either Total 
 No. No. No. No. 
Below level 2 0 22 0 22 
Level 2 0 36 1 37 
Level 3 1 14 0 15 
Level 4-6 52 7 6 65 
Level 7-8 14 1 0 15 
Total 67 80 7 154 
Base: All Unit Groups where entry qualification required and known 
Source: Map of Occupational Regulation 
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Entry requirement (work experience): Records the number of years of work experience 
that are required in addition to the qualifications noted above, in order to attain the 
licence/certificate/accreditation. In 131 of the 168 cases, no additional work experience is 
required (Table 4.14). The longest requirement is for ten years of work experience, which 
is a condition of becoming accredited as a Chartered Chemist (Unit Group 2111) or a 
Chartered Biologist (Unit Group 2112). There are a small number of cases in which the 
requirement for work experience varies across jobs within the same Unit Group and these 
are coded separately; one example is Electronic Engineers (Unit Group 2124). 
Table 4.14 Regulation status, by Years of experience required  
Regulation 
status 
None 1-2 years 3-4 years 5+ years Varies Total 
 No. No. No. No. No. No. 
Licensing 75 3 1 0 3 82 
Certification 13 0 0 0 6 19 
Accreditation 43 13 5 5 1 67 
Total 131 16 6 5 10 168 
Base: All Unit Groups with Licensing, Certification or Accreditation 
Source: Map of Occupational Regulation 
Other entry requirement: Records any other entry requirements. These may include a 
competence test (e.g. health and safety test), a criminal records check or a medical 
examination. Such additional entry requirements applied to 102 of the 188 regulated Unit 
Groups. They are most common in cases of licensing (Table 4.15).  
Table 4.15  Regulation status, by Any other entry requirement 
Regulation status Yes No Total 
 No. No. No. 
Licensing 53 29 82 
Certification 9 10 19 
Registration 11 9 20 
Accreditation 29 38 67 
Total 102 86 188 
Base: All regulated Unit Groups 
Source: Map of Occupational Regulation 
Grandfathering rights: In the case of licensing, this field records whether or not those 
persons who were already practising the occupation when licensing was first introduced 
were automatically granted licences to practice by virtue of their existing work experience. 
For example, some Psychologists (Unit Group 2212) were afforded grandfathering rights 
when a licensing system was introduced by the Health Professions Council in 2009. 
However, those who were practising professions allied to medicine in the private sector, 
such as physiotherapists in private clinics (Unit Group 3221), were not awarded such 
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rights when the licensing of such professions was extended to cover private sector 
practitioners in 2002. Grandfathering rights have been awarded to incumbents in a 
minority of Unit Groups subject to licensing.  
In cases of accreditation or certification, the field indicates whether job holders who do 
not possess the prescribed entry qualifications may obtain certification or accreditation by 
demonstrating that they have a specified period of relevant work experience. Experience-
based routes are available in a majority of cases of certification or accreditation (Table 
4.16).  
Table 4.16  Regulation status, by Availability of grandfathering rights 
Regulation status Yes No Total 
 No. No. No. 
Licensing 27 55 82 
Certification 14 5 19 
Registration 0 20 20 
Accreditation 35 32 67 
Total 76 112 188 
Base: All regulated Unit Groups 
Source: Map of Occupational Regulation 
Geographical coverage: Indicates the geographical scope of the regulation. In 185 of 
the 188 cases, regulation extends to cover jobs throughout the United Kingdom (Table 
4.17). However, the accreditation scheme for toymakers (one part of Unit Group 5499) 
extends only to cover jobs in Britain, whereas the accreditation scheme for Legal 
secretaries (Unit Group 4212) extends only to jobs in England and Wales (Table 4.16).   
Table 4.17  Regulation status, by Geographical coverage 
Regulation status UK GB England & Wales Scotland Total 
 No. No. No. No. No. 
Licensing 81 0 0 1 82 
Certification 19 0 0 0 19 
Registration 20 0 0 0 20 
Accreditation 65 1 1 0 67 
Total 185 1 1 1 188 
Base: All regulated Unit Groups 
Source: Map of Occupational Regulation 
Changes in coverage since 2001: Indicates whether the coverage of the regulations 
has changed in the last decade and, if so, whether coverage has extended to all jobs in 
the Unit Group or whether coverage remains partial. Coverage has extended to all jobs in 
seven cases, whereas it has extended to cover more jobs (but not all) in a further five 
cases (Table 4.18). One example of the former is Unit Group 3221 (Physiotherapists); all 
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job holders in this Unit Group must now hold a licence to practice. An example of the 
latter is Unit Group 3229 (Therapists not elsewhere classified); the range of jobs that 
require a licence to practice has increased in this Unit Group but there remain some jobs 
which do not require licences.  
Table 4.18  Regulation status, by Any change in coverage since 2001 
Regulation status 




No Don't know Total 
 No. No. No. No. No. 
Licensing 6 3 68 5 82 
Certification 0 0 19 0 19 
Registration 0 2 18 0 20 
Accreditation 1 0 64 2 67 
Total 7 5 169 7 188 
Base: All regulated Unit Groups 
Source: Map of Occupational Regulation 
Changes in skill requirements since 2001: Indicates whether the skill requirements laid 
down by the relevant regulation have changed in the last decade. This is known to have 
occurred in 14 cases (Table 4.19). One example is Unit Group 2442 (Social workers) who 
now require an honours degree rather than a diploma.   
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Table 4.19  Regulation status, by Any change in skill requirements since 2001 
Regulation status Yes No Don't know Total 
 No. No. No. No. 
Licensing 11 67 4 82 
Certification 0 19 0 19 
Registration 0 20 0 20 
Accreditation 3 63 1 67 
Total 14 168 5 188 
Base: All regulated Unit Groups 
Source: Map of Occupational Regulation 
Switcher since 2001: Indicates whether the regulation status of the Unit Group has 
changed since 2001. This has occurred in 43 cases. These include twelve cases in which 
the Unit Group has become subject to licensing for the first time since 2001. Table 4.20 
categorises all switching Unit Groups, according to the nature of the change in regulation 
status, and also provides some examples; a full list of switching Unit Groups is provided 
in Annex B. This field defines the population from which the subset of occupations is 
chosen for the ‗difference-in-differences‘ analysis reported in Chapter Six. 
Table 4.20  Switches in regulation status since 2001 
Nature of switch Unit Groups Example 
 No.  
No change 145  
Yes, from certification to licensing 7 SOC 2442: Social Workers (2005) 
Yes, from unregulated to licensed 5 
SOC 9241: Security Guards and 
Related Occupations (2003) 
Yes, from unregulated to certification 6 SOC 3443: Fitness Instructors (2002) 
Yes, from unregulated to accreditation  16 
SOC 5232: Vehicle Body Builders and 
Repairers (2006) 
Yes, from unregulated to registration 9 
SOC 3544: Estate Agents and 
Auctioneers (2008) 
Total 188  
Base: All regulated Unit Groups 
Source: Map of Occupational Regulation 
4.4 Additional notes and caveats 
There are a small number of additional points to note in respect of the mapping exercise, 
by way of qualification.  
First, as noted above, SOC(2000) Unit Groups often comprise more than one job title and 
so situations do arise in which the individual job titles that are included within a single Unit 
Group are subject to different regulatory arrangements. In some cases, all job titles are 
regulated but are subject to regulation of different forms. In other cases, all job titles are 
subject to the same form of regulation (say, accreditation) but the nature of the regulation 
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may differ between jobs. In these cases, there are different regulatory situations covering 
different jobs (and hence multiple enforcement agencies and multiple entrance 
requirements). One example is Unit Group 5499, where there are separate accreditation 
schemes for toymakers and wigmakers (other job titles in this Unit Group, such as blind 
makers, are unregulated). We have coded the most restrictive form (i.e. the stricter form 
of regulation or the higher entry requirement). This is a necessary simplification for the 
purposes of the statistical analysis.  
Finally, it should also be noted that occupations are coded as ‗licensed‘ by default when 
the state is the sole employer and imposes a single mode of entry with a skills based 
entry requirement. Examples include fire service personnel and paramedics. In such 
cases, there are no other means of practising the occupation other than by successfully 
adhering to the skills requirement laid down by the relevant state body. Such occupations 
thus have the characteristics of licensed occupations although the enabling statutory 
instrument may be difficult to identify. 
4.5 Summary 
The preceding discussion has outlined the main characteristics of the first comprehensive 
map of occupational regulation in the UK. It has also provided a descriptive overview of 
the regulatory characteristics applying within each occupation (defined at SOC(2000) Unit 
Group level). The database enables estimates of the prevalence of each form of 
occupational regulation to be compiled, and these are provided in the next chapter of this 
report. It also enables estimates of the impact of occupational regulation to be derived; 
these are presented in Chapter Six.  
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 The classification arising from the Map of Occupational Regulation has been 
applied to the Quarterly Labour Force Survey in order to provide estimates of 
the prevalence of occupational regulation in the UK for the period 2001-2010.  
 The estimates indicate that at least 14 per cent of all jobs in the UK are subject 
to licensing. At least three per cent have the option of certification, whilst at 
least 10 per cent have the option of accreditation. At least two per cent are 
subject to registration requirements. The true figures are likely to be higher, as 
precise estimates cannot be obtained for jobs belonging to Unit Groups where 
only some tasks are regulated. In total, at least 28 per cent of all jobs in the UK 
are covered by one of the four types of regulation, although the true figure is 
likely to be at least one third and may be as high as fifty per cent. 
 The most reliable estimates indicate that the share of all jobs that are subject to 
regulation has risen by five percentage points over the period 2001-2010. This 
growth represents the combined effect of employment growth in occupations 
that were regulated in 2001 and the extension of regulation to occupations 
which were unregulated in 2001.  
 Professional occupations are the most likely to be regulated followed by 
Process, plant and machine operatives. Sales occupations, Skilled trades, 
Personal service occupations and Elementary occupations are the least likely 
to be regulated.  
 Regulated jobs are more likely to be held by men than by women. Those in the 
licensing and accreditation groups tend to be older, on average, than other 
groups, which may be related to the time investment that is sometimes needed 
in order to gain the qualifications or work experience that is required under a 
licence to practice or an accreditation.  
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5.1 Introduction 
The mapping exercise discussed above provides a comprehensive picture of the patterns 
of occupational regulation within different occupations in the UK. However, it also 
provides a basis for estimates of the prevalence of occupational regulation to be derived. 
Such estimates are presented in this section of the report, using data from the UK‘s 
Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLFS). The QLFS is a sample survey of households 
living at private addresses. It is conducted by the Office of National Statistics in Britain 
and by the Central Survey Unit of the Department of Finance and Personnel in Northern 
Ireland. The survey provides many of the UK‘s official statistics on the labour market.   
The QLFS contains no questions on licences to practice or other forms of occupational 
regulation. However, it does contain SOC(2000) Unit Group codes for all main and 
second jobs held by employees and self-employed persons in the survey. It is thus 
possible to match the SOC(2000) Unit Group data that has been compiled in the mapping 
exercise to the equivalent Unit Group codes that are present for each job in the QLFS. 
This enables each job to be classified according to the regulatory characteristics of the 
Unit Group to which it belongs. One can then obtain an estimate of the percentage of all 
jobs that are accounted for by Unit Groups requiring licences to practice, for example.  
The QLFS has a number of other advantages for this purpose. First, it provides a large 
sample of workers – roughly 90,000 each year once the records for unique respondents 
have been pooled across the four quarters in each calendar year. Any estimates are thus 
subject to very small sampling errors; a variety of sub group analyses are also feasible. 
Second, it offers SOC(2000) Unit Group codes for each quarter since April-June 2001; 
this makes it possible to use the information collected in the mapping exercise on the 
date of introduction of each regulatory arrangement to chart the growth of occupational 
regulation over the past decade. Third, the survey has good quality control mechanisms 
(by virtue of its use to produce many National Statistics) and so can be relied upon to 
produce robust population estimates. 
5.2 Methodology 
We pool the observations from successive quarters in each calendar year to produce 
annual datasets spanning the period 2001-2010. The annual dataset for 2001 is based on 
only three quarters of data, due to the non availability of SOC(2000) Unit Group codes in 
the Jan-March quarter of that year. The 2010 annual dataset is also based on only three 
quarters of data, as the July-September quarter was the latest available from the 
Economic and Social Data Service at the time of writing. The complete pooled dataset 
thus comprises 38 quarters from April 2001 to September 2010.  
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The estimation sample comprises those respondents who report that they are either an 
employee or are self-employed at the time of the survey (i.e. those in paid work, not on 
government schemes). Data are extracted on main and second jobs, so that the 
estimates represent the proportion of all jobs that are characterised by different forms of 
regulation (rather than the proportion of all workers). This avoids any potential biases 
which may arise from differences in the prevalence of occupational regulation between 
main jobs and second jobs.  
As the classification of job is applied at SOC(2000) Unit Group level, there is the potential 
for measurement error in cases where only some of the jobs that are classified to a 
particular Unit Group are subject to regulation. Some of this potential measurement error 
can be avoided in instances where it is possible to pinpoint regulated workers through the 
characteristics of their employing organisation. There are two specific cases:  
 Those workers within SOC(2003) Unit Groups 1225, 1239, 4123, 6211, 9226 and 
9229 who are required to be licensed under the Gambling Act (2005) are taken to be 
those whose employing organisations are classified to Class 92.00 of the Standard 
Industrial Classification (2007), which identifies organisations involved in ‗Gambling 
and betting activities‘ 
 Those within SOC(2003) Unit Groups 1174 and 9241 who are required to be licensed 
under the Private Security Industry Act 2001 are taken to be those who either are self-
employed or are directly employed by organisations classified to Class 80.10 of the 
Standard Industrial Classification (2007), which identifies organisations involved in 
‗Security and investigation activities‘. 
In both cases, any job within these Unit Groups which did not meet these criteria was 
classified as unregulated.  
Any job observed in the survey at a point in time before its Unit Group became subject to 
regulation is also classified as unregulated at that time. The introduction of the Health 
Professions Act 2001 extended licensing to cover therapist jobs outside the National 
Health Service within SOC(2003) Unit Groups 3213, 3214, 3215, 3221, 3222, 3223 and 
3229 from February 2002. Any private sector jobs in these Unit Groups are thus classified 
as unregulated before this date.26  
There remain many Unit Groups in which regulation does not extend to all constituent 
jobs and in which it is not possible to distinguish between those jobs which are regulated 
and those which are not. This restriction means that it is necessary to produce two 
estimates for the prevalence of each type of regulation: an upper bound estimate which 
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 This is only possible for main jobs; there is no public/private sector code for second jobs in the QLFS.  
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assumes that all jobs within such Unit Groups are subject to regulation; and a lower 
bound estimate which assumes that none of the jobs in such Unit Groups are subject to 
regulation. This serves to identify the range within which the true estimate of the 
prevalence of regulation lies. 
Finally, it should be noted that the SOC based classification provides estimates of the 
percentages of jobs that are subject to different forms of regulation; it does not provide 
estimates of the percentages of workers who have been successful in any applications 
for licences, certificates and so on. So in the case of mandatory requirements such as 
licensing and registration, this approach gives estimates of the percentages of jobs that 
are subject to these mandatory forms of regulation. It cannot account for any non- 
compliance on the part of workers. In the cases of certification and accreditation, it gives 
estimates of the percentages of jobs in which workers have the option of applying to be 
certified or accredited. It does not indicate the percentages of workers who have actually 
applied to be certified or accredited, nor does it indicate the percentages of workers who 
have been successful in any such applications. 
5.3 The prevalence of occupational regulation in 2010 
Upper and lower bound estimates of the prevalence of each form of occupational 
regulation in 2010 are presented in Table 5.1. The upper bound estimates indicate that: 
up to 31 per cent of all jobs require licences to practice; up to three per cent have the 
option of state certification; up to six per cent require registration; and up to 19 per cent 
have the option of accreditation. The lower bound estimates indicate that: at least 14 per 
cent of all jobs require licences to practice; at least three per cent have the option of state 
certification; at least two per cent require registration; and at least 10 per cent have the 
option of accreditation. These estimates imply that the overall percentage of jobs that are 
covered by state based regulation of some form (whether licensing, certification or 
registration) lies between 40 per cent and 19 per cent. The percentage of jobs that is 
‗unregulated‘ lies between 40 per cent and 72 per cent.  
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Table 5.1  Regulation status in 2010 
Regulation status Upper bound Lower bound 
 Col % Col % 
Licensing 31 14 
Certification 3 3 
Registration 6 2 
Accreditation 19 10 
Unregulated 40 72 
Total 100 100 
Base 152,191 152,191 
Base: All employee and self-employed jobs 
Source: QLFS Jan-Sept 2010 
These ranges are considerable in the case of licensing and accreditation. However, we 
have identified those Unit Groups which contribute most to the range of uncertainty for 
each of these two forms of regulation (i.e. those which contribute most to the percentages 
in column two of Table 5.2). We have then gone on to identify the various job titles that 
are classified to each of these Unit Groups and, in this way, it is possible to make a 
judgement as to whether the minority or majority of jobs in each of these ‗key‘ Unit 
Groups are likely to be subject to the regulation that is coded. In most cases, we judge 
that only a minority of the jobs in these Unit Groups are subject to the regulation.27 
Accordingly, we judge that the true incidence of licensing is closer to 14 per cent than 31 
per cent and that the true incidence of accreditation is closer to 10 per cent than 19 per 
cent. The percentage of unregulated jobs is thus considerably closer to 72 per cent than 
40 per cent.  
Table 5.2  Regulation status of Unit Group in 2010, by Job coverage within the Unit 
Group 
Regulation status  
of Unit Group 
All job titles Some job titles N/A Base 
 Cell % Cell % Cell % No. 
Licensing 14 17 0 48,206 
Certification 3 1 0 5,107 
Registration 2 4 0 8,661 
Accreditation 10 10 0 28,970 
Unregulated 0 0 40 61,247 
Total 28 32 40 152,191 
Base 42,948 47,996 61,247  
Base: All employee and self-employed jobs 
Source: QLFS Jan-Sept 2010 
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 For example, we judge that the only a minority of sales retail assistants (Unit Group 7111) are involved in food sales 
roles, which are covered by the training requirements laid down in the Food Safety Act 1990.  
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5.4 The changing incidence of occupational regulation 
As noted earlier, it is possible to utilise the information from the mapping exercise on the 
date at which each regulatory arrangement commenced in order to classify jobs as either 
regulated or unregulated (as appropriate), depending upon the year in which the job is 
observed in the survey. A particular Unit Group may thus be coded as unregulated in one 
year, but regulated the year after. This makes it possible to chart the changing incidence 
of regulation over the past decade, since 2001.  
 
If we rely on the upper bound estimates of the prevalence of regulation, we find that the 
percentage of jobs subject to licensing requirements has risen from 23 per cent to 31 per 
cent between 2001 and 2010, whilst the percentage of unregulated jobs has fallen from 
55 per cent to 40 per cent over the same period (Table 5.3). However, if we rely on the 
lower bound estimates, which we consider to be more accurate, we find that the 
percentage of jobs subject to licensing requirements has risen from 12 per cent in 2001 to 
14 per cent in 2010, whilst the percentage of unregulated jobs has fallen from 77 per cent 
to 72 per cent (Table 5.4).  
Table 5.3  Regulation status (upper bound), by Year (2001-2010) 
Year Licensing Certif. Regist. Accred. Unreg. Total Base 
 Row % Row % Row % Row % Row % Row % No. 
2001 23 3 3 16 55 100 194,246 
2002 24 3 3 17 53 100 256,066 
2003 24 3 3 17 53 100 246,129 
2004 24 3 3 18 52 100 238,278 
2005 27 3 3 18 49 100 234,886 
2006 30 3 3 19 45 100 229,230 
2007 29 3 5 20 43 100 228,249 
2008 30 3 5 20 42 100 224,196 
2009 31 3 6 20 41 100 211,034 
2010 31 3 4 20 40 100 152,191 
Base: All employee and self-employed jobs 
Source: QLFS Apr 2001 - Sept 2010 
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Table 5.4  Regulation status (lower bound), by Year (2001-2010) 
Year Licensing Certif. Regist. Accred. Unreg. Total Base 
 Row % Row % Row % Row % Row % Row % No. 
2001 12 2 2 7 77 100 194,246 
2002 12 2 2 8 76 100 256,066 
2003 13 2 2 8 76 100 246,129 
2004 13 2 2 8 76 100 238,278 
2005 13 2 2 9 74 100 234,886 
2006 14 2 2 10 73 100 229,230 
2007 13 2 2 10 72 100 228,249 
2008 14 2 2 10 72 100 224,196 
2009 14 3 2 10 72 100 211,034 
2010 14 3 2 10 72 100 152,191 
Base: All employee and self-employed jobs 
Source: QLFS Apr 2001 - Sept 2010 
Although the rise in licensing on the ‗lower bound‘ measure is relatively small in 
magnitude, it is nonetheless statistically significant at the one per cent level because of 
the large sample sizes.28 Further investigation shows that around half of the two 
percentage point growth in licensing, since 2001 on this measure, has come about 
because of the extension of licensing requirements to Unit Groups that were previously 
unlicensed; the remaining half can be attributed to a higher rate of employment growth 
among licensed occupations than among non-licensed occupations over the past decade.  
5.5 The prevalence of occupational regulation by job type 
The availability on the Quarterly Labour Force Survey of a variety of characteristics of 
each job, in addition to its occupational classification, makes it possible to explore the 
prevalence of occupational regulation among various different types of job. In doing so, 
we continue to rely on the ‗lower bound‘ measure of regulation status, as we consider this 
to be the best available. However, tables which instead apply the upper bound measure 
of regulation status are provided in Annex C, so that comparisons can be made.  
Using the lower bound measure, we find that 33 per cent of self-employed jobs belong to 
regulated Unit Groups, compared with 27 per cent of employee jobs (Table 5.5). Self-
employed jobs are therefore more likely to be regulated than employee jobs. The 
difference lies in the greater prevalence of accreditation opportunities among self-
employed jobs (15 per cent of self-employed jobs belong to Unit Groups with 
accreditation schemes, compared with nine per cent of employee jobs).  
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 The increased availability of certification, from two per cent of jobs in 2001 to three per cent in 2010, is also statistically 
significant at the one per cent level, as is the rise in accreditation, from seven per cent of jobs in 2001 to 10 per cent in 
2010.  
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Table 5.5  Regulation status in 2010 (lower bound), by Employment status 
Employment 
status 
Licensing Certif. Regist. Accred. Unreg. Total Base 
 Row % Row % Row % Row % Row % Row % No. 
Employee 14 3 2 9 73 100 129,530 
Self-employed 14 3 2 15 67 100 22,643 
All 14 3 2 10 72 100 152,173 
Base: All employee and self-employed jobs 
Source: QLFS Jan-Sept 2010 
A comparison between SOC(2000) Major Groups is more striking however (Table 5.6). 
Professional occupations are the most likely to be regulated (76 per cent are subject to 
some form of regulation using our lower bound measure); professional occupations are 
also the most likely to be subject to licensing, as one would expect from the discussion in 
Chapter Three. The group which is next most likely to be subject to regulation is Process, 
plant and machine operatives (58 per cent); this group includes taxi drivers, HGV drivers 
and others requiring transportation licences. In contrast, fewer than 10 per cent of jobs 
are regulated in those Major Groups which comprise of Administrative and secretarial 
occupations, Personal service occupations and Elementary occupations.29  
Table 5.6  Regulation status in 2010 (lower bound), by SOC(2000) Major Group 
SOC(2000) Major 
Group 
Licensing Certif. Regist. Accred. Unreg. Total Base 
 Row % Row % Row % Row % Row % Row % No. 
Managers and 
senior officials 
6 0 3 12 78 100 23,241 
Professionals 40 13 0 22 24 100 21,102 
Assoc Prof and 
Technical 
26 4 5 10 55 100 22,485 
Admin and 
Secretarial 
0 0 4 3 94 100 17,147 
Skilled trades 2 0 0 21 77 100 15,771 
Personal service 0 0 0 2 98 100 13,831 
Sales and 
customer service 
0 0 0 0 100 100 11,027 
Process, plant and 
machine operatives 
51 6 0 1 42 100 10,054 
Elementary 0 0 0 7 93 100 17,533 
All 14 3 2 10 72 100 152,191 
Base: All employee and self-employed jobs 
Source: QLFS Jan-Sept 2010 
The prevalence of regulation in Skilled trades is perhaps of particular interest, given the 
tradition of Guilds discussed in Section 3.3.1; 23 per cent of workers in Skilled trades are 
subject to regulation using the lower bound measure, with the vast majority of these 
                                                 
29
 Note that we are using our lower bound measure here, which counts all partially-regulated Unit Groups as unregulated.  
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working in occupations with voluntary accreditation schemes.30 Skilled trades do, 
however, include a number of occupations (e.g. chefs, electricians and motor mechanics) 
where only some of the activities covered by the Unit Group are subject to regulation. The 
prevalence of regulation is therefore substantially higher under the upper bound measure, 
as it is for Managers and senior Officials, Personal service occupations and Sales 
occupations (see Table C.6 in Annex C for details).  
 
There are small variations in the prevalence of regulation across the different regions of 
the UK. The percentage of regulated jobs is lowest in the North East and the West 
Midlands; in both regions it stands at 26 per cent (Table 5.7). This contrasts with a figure 
of 33 per cent in London. London has the highest incidence of regulation because of the 
relatively high prevalence of registration (a function of the concentration of financial jobs 
in the City) and the relatively high prevalence of jobs covered by accreditation schemes. 
Table 5.8, which reports on occupational regulation by the former Learning and Skills 
Council areas, indicates that five per cent of all jobs in Central London are subject to 
registration requirements.  
Table 5.7  Regulation status in 2010 (lower bound), by Region of workplace 
Government 
Office Region 
Licensing Certif. Regist. Accred. Unreg. Total Base 
 Row % Row % Row % Row % Row % Row % No. 
North East 14 3 1 8 74 100 6,490 
North West 15 3 1 9 72 100 17,535 
Yorks and The 
Humber 
14 3 1 9 73 100 13,625 
East Midlands 15 3 1 8 73 100 11,066 
West Midlands 14 3 1 9 74 100 12,963 
East of England 14 3 1 10 71 100 13,608 
London 14 2 4 12 67 100 17,255 
South East 13 3 2 10 73 100 19,952 
South West 13 3 1 9 73 100 13,559 
Wales 15 2 1 9 72 100 6,624 
Scotland 15 3 1 9 72 100 13,255 
Northern Ireland 17 2 1 10 70 100 5,593 
All 14 3 2 10 75 100 151,525 
Base: All employee and self-employed jobs 
Source: QLFS Jan-Sept 2010 
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 Examples include carpenters, painters and bricklayers.  
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Table 5.8  Regulation status in 2010 (lower bound), by LSC area 
LSC area Licensing Certif. Regist. Accred. Unreg. Total Base 
 Row % Row % Row % Row % Row % Row % No. 
County Durham 13 4 1 9 73 100 2,878 
Northumberland 16 3 0 9 71 100 2,152 
Tees Valley 14 3 1 8 73 100 3,756 
Tyne & Wear 13 2 1 9 74 100 6,697 
Cheshire/ 
Warrington 
13 3 2 10 73 100 
6,065 
Cumbria 15 4 0 9 71 100 3,297 
Greater 
Manchester 
15 3 1 10 71 100 
14,953 
Lancashire 14 3 1 9 73 100 8,882 
Greater Merseyside  16 2 1 9 71 100 7,700 
Humberside 14 4 1 8 74 100 5,598 
North Yorkshire 15 2 2 8 73 100 5,129 
South Yorkshire 14 2 1 9 74 100 7,607 
West Yorkshire 13 3 2 10 72 100 13,861 
Derbyshire 14 3 1 9 73 100 6,383 
Leicestershire 14 2 1 9 73 100 6,151 
Lincolnshire/ 
Rutland 
16 3 0 7 73 100 
4,781 
Northampton-shire 13 2 2 10 72 100 4,837 
Nottinghamshire 15 3 1 9 72 100 6,424 
Birmingham & 
Solihull 








13 4 1 9 73 100 
4,758 
Shropshire 15 3 1 8 73 100 2,792 
Staffordshire 14 2 1 9 74 100 7,012 
The Black Country 15 2 1 8 73 100 5,154 
Bedfordshire and 
Luton 
13 3 1 10 74 100 
3,724 
Cambridgeshire 14 3 1 11 72 100 5,153 
Essex 14 3 3 10 70 100 9,859 
Hertfordshire 12 3 2 14 69 100 6,842 
Norfolk 14 3 2 8 73 100 5,149 
Suffolk 12 3 1 10 73 100 4,836 
Central London 14 2 5 13 65 100 6,917 
East London 14 2 3 11 70 100 9,615 
Continued on next page 
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Table 5.8 continued 
LSC area Licensing Certif. Regist. Accred. Unreg. Total Base 
 Row % Row % Row % Row % Row % Row % No. 
North London 16 2 2 11 70 100 4,677 
South London 15 3 3 13 68 100 7,123 
West London 13 2 2 12 71 100 6,328 
Berkshire 12 3 2 12 71 100 5,372 
Sussex 13 2 2 10 73 100 9,477 
Hampshire/  
Isle of Wight/ 
Portsmouth/ 
Southampton 
13 3 2 10 72 100 11,080 
Kent/Medway 13 2 2 9 74 100 9,319 
Oxon/Bucks/Milton 
Keynes 
13 3 2 11 72 100 
8,563 
Surrey 14 3 3 12 68 100 6,769 
West of England 14 3 1 11 70 100 6,771 
Bournemouth/ 
Dorset/Poole 
14 3 1 9 73 100 
4,338 
Devon & Cornwall 13 2 1 9 74 100 9,403 
Gloucestershire 12 5 1 10 72 100 3,718 
Somerset 13 3 1 8 75 100 3,330 
Wiltshire & 
Swindon 
13 4 2 10 72 100 
4,601 
All 14 3 2 10 72 100 301,057 
Base: All employee and self-employed jobs in England 
Source: QLFS Jan 2009 - Sept 2010 
Table 5.9 goes on to indicate the prevalence of each form of regulation within each 
Section of the Standard Industrial Classification (2007). It indicates the relatively high 
prevalence of registration in Section K (Finance), where 25 per cent of all jobs are subject 
to registration requirements. Industries with high shares of licensed jobs are: Section H 
(Transport and storage), where 40 per cent of jobs are subject to licensing; Section P 
(Education) where 31 per cent of jobs are licensed; Section Q (Health and social work) 
where 29 per cent are licensed; and Section O (Public administration and defence) where 
24 per cent of jobs require licences. In addition to these industry sectors, Section M 
(Professional, scientific and technical activities) also has a relatively high incidence of 
regulation, since licensing, certification schemes and accreditation are each prevalent in 
this industry.  
A Review of Occupational Regulation and its Impact 
84 
Table 5.9  Regulation status in 2010 (lower bound), by Industry  
SIC(2007) Section Licensing Certif. Regist. Accred. Unreg. Total Base 
 Row % Row % Row % Row % Row % Row % No. 
A: Agriculture, 









































































































































































































































































































All 14 3 2 10 72 100 151,052 
Base: All employee and self-employed jobs 
Source: QLFS Jan-Sept 2010 
Table 5.10 provides a further insight into the industrial distribution of regulation as it 
indicates the prevalence of each form of regulation in those industry sectors which form 
the footprints for each of the Sector Skills Councils (SSCs).31 Those SSC sectors with the 
                                                 
31
 The SSC network was established following the creation of the Sector Skills Development Agency (SSDA) in 2001. The 
SSDA licensed SSCs in accordance with specific criteria. Each SSC had to state what footprint area it intended to cover, 
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highest incidence of regulated jobs are: GoSkills (passenger transport); Skills for Health; 
and Skills for Justice. In each case, at least half of all jobs in sectors covered by these 
SSCs are subject to some form of regulation. Those SSC sectors with the lowest 
incidence of regulated jobs are Asset Skills (property, planning, cleaning and parking), 
Lantra (land based and environmental industries) Creative and Cultural Skills, Skillset 
(also creative industries) and Skillsmart Retail.  
Table 5.10  Regulation status in 2010 (lower bound), by Sector Skills Council 
SIC(2007) Section Licensing Certif. Regist. Accred. Unreg. Total Base 
 Row % Row % Row % Row % Row % Row % No. 
Asset Skills 1 0 0 4 95 100 3,737 
Cogent 4 18 1 8 69 100 2,769 
ConstructionSkills 2 9 0 34 54 100 10,793 
Creative and 
Cultural Skills 
1 1 0 14 85 
100 
1,907 
E-skills UK 1 2 0 25 72 100 3,527 
Energy and Utility 
Skills 





1 0 22 18 59 
100 
7,094 
GoSkills 55 1 0 6 38 100 3,350 
Government Skills 9 2 1 10 78 100 7,410 
IMI 5 1 0 9 85 100 2,786 
Improve Ltd 12 2 0 3 83 100 2,238 
Lantra 5 1 0 3 91 100 3,613 
Lifelong Learning 
UK 
27 1 0 7 65 
100 
10,074 
People 1st 12 0 0 17 71 100 8,499 
Proskills UK 4 5 1 10 80 100 2,722 
SEMTA 3 14 0 8 75 100 8,319 
Skills for Care and 
Development 
9 0 0 3 88 
100 
10,198 
Skills for Health 46 0 3 3 48 100 11,463 
Skills for Justice 58 0 0 5 37 100 3,005 
Skills for Logistics 22 1 1 5 71 100 7,341 
SkillsActive 2 8 0 7 83 100 2,715 
Skillset 2 1 0 13 83 100 3,234 
Skillsmart Retail 6 0 0 2 92 100 14,365 
SummitSkills 0 6 0 5 89 100 2,425 
Unclassified - no 
lead SSC 
20 1 1 10 68 100 16,128 
All 14 3 2 10 72 100 151,615 
Base: All employee and self-employed jobs 
Source: QLFS Jan-Sept 2010 
                                                                                                                                                   
based on SIC codes (and in some cases related occupations based on SOC codes). The footprints are accurate as at 
November 2010. 
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5.6 The characteristics of job holders in regulated Unit Groups 
The Labour Force Survey may also be used to explore the characteristics of job holders 
in regulated Unit Groups and, thus, to compare the characteristics of job holders covered 
by one form of regulation with the characteristics of those covered by another. We focus 
here on the demographic characteristics of job holders within the different groups (other 
characteristics such as qualifications and wages are considered in Chapter Six). We 
continue to use the lower bound indicator of regulation status, this being our preferred 
measure; tables using the upper bound measure are again provided in Annex C.   
One finds that regulated jobs are more likely to be held by men than by women, with the 
certification group very strongly biased towards men (87 per cent of job holders in this 
group are male) (Table 5.11). Those in the licensing group tend to be older, on average, 
than other groups (Table 5.12), which may be related to the time investment that is 
sometimes needed in order to gain the qualifications or work experience that is required 
under a licence to practice. Those in the licensing group are also less likely to be white 
than the average (Table 5.13), but are a little more likely to have a disability than those in 
the other regulated groups (Table 5.14). The differences on these last two items are, 
however, fairly small.  
Table 5.11 Gender of job holder, by Regulation status of Unit Group in 2010 (lower 
bound) 
Regulation status 
of Unit Group 
(lower bound) 
Male Female Total Base 
 Row % Row % Row % No. 
Licensing 52 48 100 21,863 
Certification 87 13 100 4,097 
Registration 55 45 100 2,413 
Accreditation 69 31 100 14,575 
Unregulated 50 50 100 109,243 
All 53 47 100 152,191 
Base: All individuals in employee and self-employed jobs 
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Table 5.12 Age of job holder, by Regulation status of Unit Group in 2010 (lower bound) 
Regulation status 
of Unit Group 
(lower bound) 
16-19 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60+ Total Base 






Row % No. 
Licensing 0 15 26 29 22 8 100 21,863 
Certification 1 20 25 26 20 8 100 4,097 
Registration 0 18 29 28 18 7 100 2,413 
Accreditation 2 22 25 25 18 7 100 14,575 
Unregulated 5 21 20 26 19 9 100 109,243 
All 4 20 22 26 20 8 100 152,191 
Base: All individuals in employee and self-employed jobs 
Source: QLFS Jan-Sept 2010 
Table 5.13 Ethnic group of job holder, by Regulation status of Unit Group in 2010 (lower 
bound) 
Regulation 










Chinese Other Total Base 
 Row % Row % Row % Row % Row % Row % Row % No. 
Licensing 88 1 6 3 0 2 100 21,847 
Certification 92 1 3 1 1 1 100 4,094 
Registration 89 1 7 2 1 1 100 2,413 
Accreditation 93 1 4 2 0 1 100 14,565 
Unregulated 91 1 4 2 0 1 100 109,182 
All 91 1 5 2 0 1 100 152,101 
Base: All individuals in employee and self-employed jobs 
Source: QLFS Jan-Sept 2010 
Table 5.14 Disabled status of job holder, by Regulation status of Unit Group in 2010 
(lower bound) 
Regulation 
















 Row % Row % Row % Row % Row % No. 
Licensing 5 6 3 86 100 21,863 
Certification 4 6 2 88 100 4,097 
Registration 3 7 2 88 100 2,413 
Accreditation 4 6 3 87 100 14,575 
Unregulated 6 6 3 85 100 109,243 
All 6 6 3 85 100 152,191 
Base: All individuals in employee and self-employed jobs 
Source: QLFS Jan-Sept 2010 
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5.7 Conclusions 
This chapter has presented new estimates of the prevalence of occupational regulation, 
derived using data from the UK‘s Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLFS). The fact that 
only parts of some Unit Groups are covered by regulation means that one obtains upper 
and lower bound estimates of the prevalence of regulation. The upper bound estimates 
indicate that:  
 up to 31 per cent of all jobs require licences to practice;  
 up to three per cent have the option of state certification;  
 up to six per cent require registration; and  
 up to 19 per cent have the option of accreditation.  
The lower bound estimates indicate that:  
 at least 14 per cent of all jobs require licences to practice;  
 at least three per cent have the option of state certification;  
 at least two per cent require registration; and  
 at least 10 per cent have the option of accreditation.  
Those Unit Groups which contribute most to the range of uncertainty are ones in which 
only a minority of the jobs are likely to be subject to the regulation. Accordingly, we judge 
that the true incidence of licensing is closer to 14 per cent than 31 per cent and that the 
true incidence of accreditation is closer to 10 per cent than 19 per cent. The percentage 
of unregulated jobs is thus much closer to 72 per cent than 40 per cent. The percentage 
of jobs subject to licensing requirements rose over the decade between 2001 and 2010.  
Professional occupations are the most likely to be regulated, and the most likely to be 
subject to licensing. They are followed by Process, plant and machine operatives – a 
group which includes taxi drivers, HGV drivers and others requiring transportation 
licences. A majority of jobs in each of these Major Groups is subject to some form of 
regulation on our lower bound measure. In contrast, only a small minority of jobs are 
estimated to be regulated (in any form) within those Major Groups which comprise of 
Sales occupations, Skilled trades, Personal service occupations and Elementary 
occupations.  
Turning to demographic characteristics, regulated jobs are more likely to be held by men 
than by women, with the certification group very strongly biased towards men (87 per 
cent of job holders in this group are male). Those in the licensing and accreditation 
groups tend to be older, on average, than other groups, which may be related to the time 
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investment that is sometimes needed in order to gain the qualifications or work 
experience that is required under a licence to practice or an accreditation. Those in the 
licensing group are also less likely to be white than the average, but are a little more likely 
to have a disability than those in the other groups.  
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6 Assessing the impact of regulation on 




 Using data from the Quarterly Labour Force survey, a cross-sectional analysis 
has been undertaken to compare levels of qualifications, wages and rates of 
job related training between workers in regulated and unregulated occupations, 
while controlling for other individual and job characteristics. 
 Among Professional occupations and Associate Professional and Technical 
occupations, qualifications, wages and the take up of job related training are 
found to be higher among workers in licensed jobs than among workers in 
unregulated jobs. 
 No consistent patterns are identified among other occupational groups or for 
other types of regulation. This suggests that there may be unobserved 
differences between regulated and unregulated workers in these instances. 
 A difference-in-differences methodology is employed to identify the causal 
relationship between occupational regulation and labour market outcomes. The 
analysis focuses on five occupations which experienced a change in their 
regulation status over the period 2001-2010, namely security guards; care 
workers; social care managers; childcare workers and automotive technicians. 
 The analysis identifies an increase in the wages amongst security guards and a 
rise in qualification levels and job related training among care workers. The 
latter is part of anticipation effects which were also observed in the case of care 
managers who were subject to the same legislation. No evidence of any labour 
market effects of regulation is found for childcare workers and automotive 
technicians.  
 Although data constraints do not enable firm conclusions to be made, it is 
plausible that the impact of occupational regulation is stronger when entry 
requirements are higher or are more extensively applied.  
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6.1 Introduction 
It will have been apparent from the preceding chapters of this report that one may expect 
occupational regulation to impact upon a number of labour market outcomes, including 
skill levels, the prevalence of job related training, wages and employment levels. 
However, it will also have been apparent that the empirical evidence for such effects in 
the UK is very limited. Robust quantitative evidence is in particularly short supply.  
The supply of empirical evidence on the labour market effects of occupational regulation 
is more plentiful in the US. However, the US evidence tends to be concentrated on 
employment and wage effects, with very little evidence on the impact of regulation on 
skills (Klee, 2010, is one notable exception). The US evidence is also almost exclusively 
focused on occupational licensing – the most restrictive form of regulation – with 
comparatively little research having been carried out to examine the impact of voluntary 
arrangements such as certification or accreditation. Moreover, it is not clear that any 
relationships observed for a specific occupation in the US labour market would 
necessarily carry over to the labour market in the UK. Whilst there is some overlap in the 
types of occupations which are subject to licensing in the two countries, and some 
similarities in the broader institutional contexts, there are also important differences 
between US and UK in the scope and operation of licensing which may affect the nature 
of any associated outcomes.32  
The increase over the past decade in the proportion of all jobs in the UK, that are subject 
to some form of occupational regulation, heightens the need for more robust evidence on 
the labour market effects of such regulation. Fortunately, the extension of regulation to 
cover occupations that were not previously regulated in the UK (such as security guards 
and care workers) also provides opportunities for the robust identification of any such 
effects.  
In this chapter of the report, we present the results of a quantitative analysis which 
compares labour market outcomes among groups of employees who are subject to 
different forms of occupational regulation (including those in occupations which are 
unregulated). In common with the analysis presented in the previous chapter, this 
analysis is based on data from the Quarterly Labour Force Survey.  
We first report cross-sectional analyses in which we examine the extent to which any raw 
differences in wage levels, qualifications and the take up of job related training between 
workers in regulated and unregulated occupations persist after controlling for 
                                                 
32
 These include governance arrangements and the nature of the labour market.  
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compositional differences.33 In other words, if workers in licensed occupations earn 
higher wages than workers in unregulated occupations, do these differences persist after 
controlling for demographic characteristics and other job characteristics? Such analyses 
help us to gain a better understanding of the nature of regulated jobs and how they differ 
(in cross-section) from unregulated jobs. In summary, the raw differences in wages and 
so on between regulated and unregulated jobs are not always explained away by other 
observable worker characteristics. Some differences remained unexplained.  
This could indicate that regulation has an independent, causal effect on labour market 
outcomes. However, the pattern of results is not uniform across occupational groups and 
is not always in line with theoretical expectations. Accordingly, there may also be 
unobservable factors at work which are confounding our attempts to identify a causal 
effect of occupational regulation through cross-sectional analysis. Specifically, 
occupational regulation is not randomly assigned. Instead, there are often particular 
reasons why one occupation is subject to regulation and another may not (see Chapter 
Three). Such non random and unobserved factors are difficult to account for in a cross-
sectional analysis.  
We employ a difference-in-differences (DiD) approach in an attempt to resolve this 
identification problem. In the absence of the random assignment of occupational 
regulation, we use the extension of occupational regulation to specific occupations over 
the period 2001-2010 as a form of ‗natural experiment‘. We examine the wage differential 
(say) between the workers in a soon to be regulated occupation (the treatment group) 
and the workers in similar unregulated occupation (the comparison group). We then 
examine whether the magnitude of that differential changes after the treatment group 
becomes regulated. By assuming that the pre-treatment differential would have been 
maintained if the treatment had not occurred, the DiD analysis aims to provide a robust 
estimate of the causal impact of regulation.  
We focus on five occupations which saw either the introduction of regulation or a change 
in the type of regulation over the period 2001-2010, namely: security guards; care 
workers; social care managers; childcare workers; and automotive technicians.34 We find 
some effects which can plausibly be attributed to the introduction of occupational 
regulation. However, these are not universal. The nature of the regulation – and the 
context within which it is introduced – seem important in determining outcomes.  
                                                 
33
 Unregulated occupations are chosen as the reference category throughout as this represents the ‗default‘ state in the 
absence of any intervention by the state, employers or workers.  
34
 A full list of those 43 Unit Groups which changed regulation status between 2001 and 2010 is provided in Annex B.  
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6.2 Data  
Our analysis rests, first, on the SOC(2000) Map of Occupational Regulation that was 
described in Chapter Four. This Map of Occupational Regulation provides our indicators 
of the regulatory status of each SOC(2000) Unit Group.  
Our data on workers and jobs comes from the Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLFS).  
The QLFS is a sample survey of households living at private addresses, conducted by 
the Office of National Statistics in Britain and by the Central Survey Unit of the 
Department of Finance and Personnel in Northern Ireland. The survey provides many of 
the UK‘s official statistics on the labour market. The QLFS provides a large sample of 
workers (around 55,000 each quarter). It collects data on main and second jobs and 
includes both employee jobs and self-employed positions.  
Following the practice outlined in the previous chapter, the SOC(2000) Unit Group data 
from the Map of Occupational Regulation has been matched to each job observed in the 
Quarterly Labour Force Survey between April 2001 and September 2010. This enables 
each job to be classified according to the regulatory characteristics of the Unit Group to 
which it belongs, at the time at which it is observed.  
6.3 Methods 
Cross-sectional analysis 
We are able to use our augmented QLFS dataset to identify regulated jobs and, 
thereafter, to identify whether regulated jobs differ from unregulated jobs in terms of the 
average skill levels of job holders, the propensity to engage in job related training and 
average wage levels, after controlling for a range of demographic and job characteristics. 
This cross-sectional analysis is conducted for all jobs observed in the QLFS in 2010.  
Skill levels are measured by the level of the highest qualification attained since birth. We 
employ the LEVQUAL variable in the QLFS which maps qualifications to one of six 
categories (including ‗no qualifications‘) by reference to the National Qualifications 
Framework (see, for example, Table 4.11).35 The propensity to engage in job related 
training is measured by the ED4WK variable in the QLFS which identifies whether the 
respondent has taken part in any ―education or any training connected with [their] job, or 
a job that [they] may be able to do in the future‖ within the four weeks prior to the survey 
interview. A second indicator, derived from the NEWQUL variable which is available only 
in the April-June quarter of each year, identifies education or training that will ―lead to a 
                                                 
35
 The six categories are: No qualifications; Below Level 2; Level 2; Level 3; Level 4-6; Level 7-8. The classification schema 
is provided on pp. 107-8 of Volume 5 of the QLFS User Guide. See: 
http://www.esds.ac.uk/doc/6632%5Cmrdoc%5Cpdf%5Clfs_user_guide_vol5_classifications2009.pdf  
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qualification‖. Finally, wages are measured as gross weekly earnings in the survey 
reference week (QLFS variable GRSSWK) divided by actual hours of work in the 
reference week (TTACHR).36  
Any observed differences in these labour market ‗outcomes‘ may represent the effects of 
regulation, but they may equally also represent differences in group composition which 
are unrelated to regulation. For example, group A may have higher skills and wages than 
group B simply because job holders in the former group are older, on average, than those 
in the latter group. Differences may also be attributable to differential rates of unionisation 
(see Bryson and Forth, 2010) or differences in the proportions of public sector jobs (see 
Disney and Gosling, 2008), for example. We control for such compositional differences 
through cross-sectional regression analyses. These regressions control for the following 
sets of factors: 
 Demographic characteristics: gender; ethnicity; disability; marital status; number of 
dependent children.  
 Human capital: age; qualifications. 
 Job characteristics: main or second job; tenure; whether full time or part time; 
whether permanent or temporary; union membership; pay set by collective 
bargaining.  
 Employer characteristics: industry sector; workplace size; private or public sector; 
region.  
 Survey characteristics: whether proxy respondent; month of interview. 
The cross-sectional regression analysis of highest qualification employs an ordered probit 
estimator, whilst the analysis of job related training uses a probit estimator. The analysis 
of wage levels is conducted via ordinary least squares.37  
The analysis is confined to data from 2010 so as to avoid any complications which arise 
from changes in the identity of the regulated groups over time. The only switch in 
regulation status which took place in the period January – September 2010 was the 
introduction of accreditation for garage managers (SOC 1232) in May 2010.38 The cross-
sectional analysis therefore does nothing to exploit the time dimension in the QLFS data. 
However, this dimension is used explicitly in the difference-in-differences analysis.  
                                                 
36
 In accordance with standard practice, we set wage values to missing if the reported hourly rate for the job (HOURPAY) 
exceeds £100 per hour. 
37
 We take the natural logarithm of the wage value prior to regression. We include a variable among our controls which 
identifies cases in which the respondent reports that their wage in the reference week differs from its normal level 
(UGRSSWK, available for main jobs only).  
38
 By comparison, eight SOC Unit Groups saw a switch in regulation status in 2009. 
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Difference-in-differences analysis 
We use difference-in-differences (DiD) analysis to evaluate the impact of switches in 
regulation status on skill levels, job related education and training, wages and 
employment. A formal exposition of the approach is provided by Blundell and Costa-Dias 
(2009).  
The DiD approach is operationalised within a regression framework in which one dummy 
variable is used to distinguish those occupations which see a switch in regulation status 
(the ‗treated‘ occupations) from those which have not (the ‗non-treated‘), and another 
dummy variable is used to distinguish the period in which the regulations apply (the 
‗treatment period‘) from the preceding period in which no regulations apply. The treatment 
effect is captured by an interaction effect between the treatment dummy and the dummy 
which identifies the post-treatment period. In variants of this basic approach, the 
‗treated‘/‘non-treated‘ indicator can be interacted with a variable which indicates the 
passage of time since the change in regulation status; this allows one to establish 
changes over time in the size of the treatment effect. 
The DiD approach is superior to the before-after estimator because counterfactual 
outcomes are proxied with an appropriate comparator group who are 'like' the treatment 
group except that they do not experience the switch in licensing status.39 If one can 
reasonably assume that macro effects (such as the business cycle) affect outcomes for 
both treated and comparators in a similar fashion, then it is possible to use the DiD 
approach to net these ‗common trends‘ out of any estimates of the treatment on 
outcomes (something that cannot be done with a before-after estimator).40 
Our choice of ‗treatment‘ groups is dictated to a large extent by practicality. First, we 
require the occupation to switch its regulation status at some point in the observation 
period, i.e. between April 2001 and September 2010. There are 43 such SOC(2000) Unit 
Groups. However, we also require the switch to have occurred towards the middle of our 
observation period, so that we have a number of periods either side of the switch in which 
to observe both pre-and post-treatment behaviour. We also require the treatment group 
to be of a reasonable size, so that estimates can be obtained with a fair degree of 
precision. This narrows down the possible selection. Among the available occupations 
which met these criteria, we have then chosen to focus primarily (although not 
exclusively) on switches which involve a move to licensing, since that is the form of 
                                                 
39
 The assumption is that switches in status are exogenous. It is possible that there may be endogenous factors at work 
however (e.g. lobbying activity by incumbents). This is a necessary caveat.  
40
 Of course, any uncommon trends (factors other than the introduction of regulation which might begin to influence one 
group and not the other during the observation period) have the potential to compromise the identification of the treatment 
effect if they affect the outcome of interest.  
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regulation which we expect to have the most noticeable effects.41 We have also chosen 
to focus primarily on lower skilled occupations since we are aware that such occupations 
are of particular interest to the UK Commission.  
Our chosen treatment groups are as follows: 
 Private security guards (SOC 9241), who saw the introduction of licensing in April 
2003; 
 Social care managers (SOC 1184 and 1185), who switched from certification to 
licensing in April 2005;  
 Care workers (SOC 6115), a quota of whom (at least 50% in each residential care 
home) were required after April 2005 to hold an appropriate NVQ in order for the 
home to meet a set of mandatory National Minimum Standards for care homes;  
 Childcare workers (SOC 6121-6124), who switched from certification to licensing in 
March 2007; 
 Automotive technicians (SOC 5232, 5234, 8135) who saw the introduction of an 
accreditation scheme in June 2006. 
The comparison group in each case is taken to be those occupations within the same 
SOC(2000) Major Group who remain unregulated throughout the whole of the 
observation period (2001-2010). The comparison groups have been defined at Major 
Group level so as to ensure that each comparison group possesses broadly similar job 
requirements to the treatment group whilst also offering a healthy sample size. The 
exception to this rule is the DiD analysis of automotive technicians, in which we define the 
comparison group more tightly as comprising SOC(2000) Unit Groups 5212-5216, 5221-
5223, 5233 and 8132, in recognition of the considerable heterogeneity within SOC Major 
Group 5 in particular.  
The DiD analysis focuses solely on jobs within England, so as to avoid  the complications 
introduced by the different times at which some regulations have been enacted in 
Scotland and Northern Ireland. The set of control variables are equivalent to those used 
in the cross-sectional analysis. However, in a departure from the cross-sectional analysis, 
each of the DiD analyses utilises ordinary least squares because of the problems 
associated with the use of the DiD approach in nonlinear specifications (see Blundell and 
Costa-Dias, 2009, pp. 583-6).  
 
                                                 
41
 We include switches from an unregulated state to licensing and switches from certification to licensing.  
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General comments about estimation 
The sets of control variables used in the analyses are standard in the literature (see 
Blanchflower and Bryson, 2010, and Bryson and Forth, 2010, in respect of the analysis of 
wages using the QLFS; see Jones et al., 2010, in respect of analysis of job related 
training). We obtain patterns of coefficients across these control variables which accord 
with expectations, based on theory and previous research. The regression models thus 
appear to be well specified.   
It is notable, however, that some of the control variables listed in Section 3.2.1 above 
may be endogenous with respect to the regulatory status of a job. Specifically, it is 
possible that working hours, contractual status and the longevity of job tenure may be 
affected by the regulatory status of a job. Such effects could spill over to lifestyle choices 
such as marital status and numbers of children. By including these specific controls we 
may inadvertently net out some of the effect of licensing on a dependent variable such as 
wages. We therefore run our regressions with and without these specific controls, in order 
to examine the sensitivity of the results. In practice, the impact is small. The comparative 
results are explicitly presented in the section which reports the DiD analysis, but they are 
omitted from the section which reports the cross-sectional analysis for reasons of limited 
space.  
In respect of wages, it will be noted that we control for qualifications, which may 
themselves have been acquired in order to meet a regulatory requirement. However, their 
inclusion in the base specification is justified on the basis that most qualifications are 
obtained prior to labour market entry.42 By including qualifications within the base 
specification, we interpret the impact of regulation on wages as being net of any effect 
which results in the job holder moving to a higher level on the qualifications scale. It thus 
represents any upskilling which does not result in movement to the next level on the 
qualifications scale, plus any monopoly effect of regulation in restricting labour supply.  
All analyses are conducted at the level of the job and utilise the survey weights provided 
in the QLFS.43 We use a robust variance estimator to account for the non-independence 
of observations which results from the panel element of the QLFS whereby a selected 
individual may appear in the survey for up to five successive quarters. As noted earlier, 
the total sample size is around 55,000 workers per quarter. However the samples 
available for the analysis of wages comprise around 22,000 workers per quarter since 
income questions are asked only in the first and the final quarter of a person‘s time within 
                                                 
42
 One would ideally wish to be able to separate the two.   
43
 The approach is thus based on repeated cross-sections of individuals. See Blundell and Costa-Dias (2009: 583). First 
and second jobs are given equal weight (i.e. there is no weighting to adjust for differences in hours between jobs); we do, 
however, include full/part-time status among our control variables.  
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the sample; the samples available for the analysis of job related training which leads to a 
qualification is also restricted since the question on whether training leads to a 
qualification is asked only in the April-June quarter of each year.  
The analysis of employment levels differs from the analysis of the other outcomes 
considered here. It is not possible to examine employment levels within the cross-
sectional framework because the impact of regulation is identified within that framework 
through SOC(2000) Unit Group. It is, therefore, not possible to separate the probability of 
residing in a SOC(2000) Unit Group from the regulation status of that group. Equally, the 
analysis of employment does not fit directly within the DiD framework when 
operationalised at job level because, in an analysis of employment, the treatment dummy 
is the natural dependant variable. However, by taking this treatment dummy as the 
dependant variable it is possible to use a simplified version of the DiD framework for the 
analysis of employment in which one estimates the probability of a job holder being 
employed within the treatment group, as opposed to the comparison group, and 
examines changes in this probability before and after treatment after controlling for other 
factors.44  
Measurement issues 
In respect of measurement issues, it should be noted first that we do not observe whether 
an individual job holder possesses a licence to practice (or equivalently, whether they 
have registered under a mandatory registration scheme). Instead, we observe only that 
they are working in an occupation where a mandatory requirement is present. Any non- 
compliance will therefore introduce measurement error and bias our estimated 
coefficients downwards. More importantly, in instances where only some of the workers 
within a Unit Group are required to obtain a licence or to register, we do not observe 
which workers are required to do so; and in instances of certification or accreditation, 
where compliance is voluntary, we do not observe which individual workers have 
obtained the appropriate certification or accreditation. Again, this will bias downwards any 
estimated effects of being licensed/registered/certified/accredited. Our estimates can be 
more appropriately thought of as estimates of the effect of working in an occupation 
where a particular form of regulation applies, when compared with employment in a 
similar occupation that is unregulated. 
It is also important to bear in mind the hierarchical nature of our classification schema for 
occupational regulation, whereby certification and registration schemes are only mapped 
within those occupations where no licensing system is place, and accreditation schemes 
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 We include a linear control for the year of interview. The dummy variable identifying the treatment period thus identifies 
whether there is a change in the general time-trend between the pre-and post-treatment periods.  
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are only mapped within those occupations that have no other form of regulation 
(licensing, certification or registration). We find that it is rare for a Unit Group to be subject 
both to licensing and certification/registration.45  However, some of those Unit Groups that 
are subject to state based forms of regulation also have accreditation schemes which are 
run by occupation or industry groups; one example is Chartered Secretaries (SOC 1131) 
who are required to register with the Financial Services Authority but who also have an 
accreditation scheme available to them, operated by the Institute of Chartered 
Secretaries and Administrators. As noted above (and in Section 4.3), such accreditation 
schemes only appear within our ‗regulation status‘ classification variable if the Unit Group 
is not subject to any state based form of regulation.46 This has implications for the 
interpretation of any coefficients: any estimated impact of accreditation should be thought 
of as the effect (when compared with the base case of no regulation) of belonging to an 
occupational group which has no state regulation, but which does have an accreditation 
scheme. It should not be thought of as the effect of introducing accreditation, on average, 
to any occupation. Of course, this feature of our classification schema also has 
implications for the interpretation of any estimates of the prevalence of accreditation.  
6.4 Preliminary observations about the nature of occupational 
regulation in the UK 
Chapter Five of the report provided an overview of the incidence and nature of 
occupational regulation in the UK, based upon the Map of Occupational Regulation, 
which has been compiled as part of the broader project. That overview illustrated two 
important issues for the empirical analysis which follows. The first is the heterogeneity in 
the form of occupational regulation as it is evident in the UK. The second is the change 
over the time in the prevalence of different forms of regulation. 
6.4.1 Heterogeneity in forms of occupational regulation 
The SOC(2000) classification contains a total of 353 Unit Groups. The Map of 
Occupational Regulation records that a total of 82 Unit Groups are subject to licensing, 
19 are subject to certification and 20 are subject to registration requirements. 
Accordingly, some 121 of the 353 Unit Groups are subject to some form of state based 
regulation. A further 67 are not subject to state based regulation but have a recognised 
accreditation scheme which is available to at least some workers within the Unit Group. 
This leaves a total of 165 Unit Groups which are not subject to any of these four forms of 
occupational regulation.  
                                                 
45
 This could logically only apply if some jobs were subject to licensing, whilst others were subject to certification or 
registration.  
46
 Such schemes are mentioned occasionally in the Comments field in the mapping spreadsheet, but we have not sought to 
map such schemes in a systematic manner. This could be done, but would require additional resources.  
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In 115 of the 188 Unit Groups where we record some form of occupational regulation, it is 
universally applicable to all job tasks or roles which are classified to that Unit Group. 
Examples include teachers (SOC 2314 and 2315) and nurses (SOC 3211). In the 
remaining 73 cases, the regulation covers only some of the activities which are classified 
to the Unit Group (e.g. in SOC 5314 plumbers and heating engineers are only regulated if 
they are installing gas appliances; in SOC 7111 sales and retail assistants are only 
regulated if they are handling food). There is therefore some heterogeneity, in that some 
regulations apply universally throughout a Unit Group whereas others do not. In practice, 
one can identify nine separate categories as indicated in Table 6.1.  
Table 6.1  Regulation status of the SOC(2000) Unit Group in 2010, by Job coverage 
within the Unit Group 
Regulation status 
All activities in 
Unit Group 
Some activities 
in Unit Group 
N/A Total 
 No. No. No. No. 
Licensing 52 29 - 81 
Certification 19 2 - 21 
Registration 5 15 -  20 
Accreditation 39 27 - 66 
Unregulated - - 165 165 
Total 115 73 165 353 
Base: All SOC(2000) Unit Groups 
Source: Map of Occupational Regulation 
There is also considerable heterogeneity in terms of entry requirements. Obtaining a 
licence to practice, for example, may require possession of a qualification at NQF Level 4 
or above (as is the case for most medical professions, which typically require a Level 6 
qualification) or may require a qualification at NQF level 2 or below (as in case of security 
guards). In respect of licensing, it is notable that entry requirements are typically lower 
where the regulation covers only some of the activities coded to a particular Unit Group 
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 No. No. No. No. No. No. No. No. 
Licensing for all 
activities 
0 14 3 3 26 1 5 52 
Licensing for 
some activities 
0 6 8 3 5 1 6 29 
Certification for 
all activities 
0 0 6 0 3 10 0 19 
Certification for 
some activities 
0 0 1 0 1 0 0 2 
Accreditation for 
all activities 
1 2 11 4 17 3 1 39 
Accreditation for 
some activities 
0 0 8 5 13 0 1 27 
Total 1 22 37 15 65 15 13 168 
Base: All SOC(2000) Unit Groups subject to licensing, certification or accreditation  
Note: Registration is excluded because of the absence of qualification based entry requirements 
Source: Map of Occupational Regulation 
One implication of the patterns evident in Table 6.2 is that, although each type of 
occupational regulation has some representation at both higher and lower levels of the 
occupational hierarchy, different types of occupational regulation are clustered at different 
points. This is made clear in Table 6.3, which shows individual Unit Groups, and Table 
6.4, which applies the Map of Occupational Regulation to the QLFS and which thus 
accounts for differences in the prevalence of each Unit Group within the economy at 
large. For instance, ‗licensing for all activities‘ is heavily concentrated among Professional 
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Table 6.3 Regulation status, by SOC(2000) Major Group (Base: Unit Groups) 
Regulation 
status 






















 No. No. No. No. No. No. No. No. No. No. 
Lic. for all 
activities 
6 13 21 0 3 0 0 9 0 52 
Lic. for some 
activities 
5 0 6 0 5 6 1 2 4 29 
Cert. for all 
activities 
0 10 4 0 0 0 0 5 0 19 
Cert. for some 
activities 
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 
Reg. for all 
activities 
1 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 5 
Reg. for some 
activities 
3 0 1 2 0 4 3 0 2 15 
Acc. for all 
activities 
6 10 8 2 10 1 0 1 1 39 
Acc. for some 
activities 
3 4 5 1 8 1 0 2 3 27 
Unregulated 21 9 25 17 28 10 7 23 25 165 
Total 45 46 73 24 54 21 11 42 35 353 
Base: All SOC(2000) Unit Groups  
Source: Map of Occupational Regulation 
Table 6.4 Regulation status, by SOC(2000) Major Group (Base: jobs) 
Regulation 
status 






















 Row % Row % Row % Row % Row % Row % Row % Row % Row % No. 
Lic. for all 
activities 
7 40 28 - 2 - - 24 - 21,863 
Lic. for some 
activities 
12 - 6 - 16 25 25 3 13 26,343 
Cert. for all 
activities 




- - 19 - - 81 - - - 1,010 
Reg. for all 
activities 




23 - 3 6 - 62 5 - 1 6,248 
Acc. for all 
activities 
19 32 15 3 22 2 - - 8 14,575 
Acc. for some 
activities 
19 12 12 19 28 1 - 3 7 14,395 
Unregulated 17 6 15 21 7 3 7 5 19 61,247 
Total 15 14 15 11 10 9 7 7 12 152,191 
Base: All employee and self-employed jobs 
Source: QLFS Jan-Sept 2010 
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Going into more detail, it is apparent that: 
 Unit Groups with ‘Licensing for all activities’ predominantly comprise professional 
or associate professional jobs requiring qualifications at NVQ Level 4-6 (around 60 
per cent of the jobs classified to this form of regulation fit these criteria), whilst the 
remainder mostly comprise driving jobs requiring qualifications at NVQ Level 2 or 
equivalent.  
 Unit Groups with ‘Licensing for some activities’ predominantly comprise skilled jobs 
(chefs, mechanics), personal service workers (care workers, teaching assistants) and 
sales workers requiring NVQ Level 2 qualifications or lower.  
 Unit Groups with ‘Certification for all activities’ mostly comprise professional jobs in 
which certification requires possession of NVQ Level 7-8 qualifications (as in the case 
of engineers) or Level 4-6 qualifications (as in the case of architects), along with some 
associate professional jobs (e.g. fitness instructors) and process operatives (e.g. in 
chemicals) where the requirement is for NVQ Level 2.  
 Unit Groups with ‘Certification for some activities’ primarily comprise hairdressers 
(who require NVQ Level 2) or science and engineering technicians (who require NVQ 
Level 4-6).  
 Unit Groups with ‘Registration for all activities’ mostly comprise of higher level 
occupations, with 76 per cent of jobs falling in SOC(2000) Major Groups 1 and 3, 
whereas Unit Groups with ‘Registration for some activities’ are more widely spread 
across the occupational hierarchy, albeit with some concentration in SOC Major 
Group 6 by virtue of the registration requirements for childminders.  
 Unit Groups with ‘Accreditation for all activities’ or ‘Accreditation for some 
activities’ are spread across the occupational hierarchy, albeit with a bias towards 
more highly skilled groups. Prominent examples include the accreditation schemes for 
marketing and sales managers, software professionals, construction trades and 
tyre/exhaust/windscreen fitters.   
This heterogeneity is a challenge for the cross-sectional analysis in particular. Pooled 
regressions which include jobs from across the occupational hierarchy are unlikely to 
elicit meaningful results if the entry requirements for a single type of regulation vary 
greatly across different Unit Groups. Given the patterns outlined above, it is more 
appropriate to estimate regressions in which we control for the broad skill requirements of 
particular jobs in a very explicit way. We have no direct measure of these skill 
requirements. But skill requirements typically have a degree of homogeneity within each 
A Review of Occupational Regulation and its Impact 
104 
SOC Major Group.47 Consequently, we run separate cross-sectional regressions within 
each SOC Major Group. This approach bears similarities with the approach taken in 
earlier research by Kleiner (2006, pp. 75-7).  
We are not able to include all nine regulation categories within the regressions for each 
SOC Major Group. The ‗Assoc Professional and Technical Occupations‘ group (SOC 
Major Group 3) is the only one in which all eight forms of regulation are present (see 
Tables 6.3 and 6.4 above). However, the restriction will enable us to obtain cleaner 
comparisons between non-regulated jobs and regulated jobs, as the jobs entered into 
one regression will all be at a broadly similar skill level.  
We follow a similar principle in the DiD analysis by confining our comparison groups to 
jobs within the same SOC Major Group. 
6.4.2 Changes in occupational regulation over time 
Section 6.2 alluded to the fact that a number of Unit Groups changed their regulatory 
status over the period 2001-2010. This has been a major factor driving the expansion in 
the proportion of all regulated jobs over the decade. Table 6.5 shows the prevalence of 
each of the nine categories of regulation each year between 2001 and 2010. The most 
significant growth is in the percentage of all jobs classified to Unit Groups where there is 
at least some licensing: this figure grew from 23.3 per cent in 2001 to 31.4 per cent in 
2010. The final row shows that, had there been no changes in regulation status over the 
period, the percentage of jobs in licensed Unit Groups would have risen to only 24.7 per 
cent. Most of the growth is attributable to the introduction of licensing to occupations that 
were previously unregulated (notable cases include security guards, care workers and 







                                                 
47
 The exception is, perhaps, Managers and Senior Officials, where the skill requirements (in terms of formal qualifications 
at least) are low for some Unit Groups (e.g. publicans and restaurant mangers) and high for others (e.g. financial 
managers). 
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 Row % Row % Row % Row % Row % Row % Row % Row % Row % No. 
2001 12.1 11.2 2.0 0.7 1.6 1.4 7.2 9.2 54.7 194,246 
2002 12.3 11.4 2.2 0.7 1.6 1.5 7.6 9.4 53.4 256,066 
2003 12.6 11.6 2.1 0.7 1.7 1.4 7.9 9.3 52.9 246,129 
2004 12.7 11.5 2.1 0.7 1.5 1.4 8.1 9.5 52.4 238,278 
2005 13.1 13.7 2.2 0.7 1.7 1.4 8.6 9.7 48.9 234,886 
2006 13.5 16.1 2.3 0.7 1.6 1.5 10.0 9.4 44.9 229,230 
2007 13.3 16.0 2.3 0.7 1.8 3.2 10.1 9.6 42.3 228,249 
2008 13.5 16.3 2.3 0.6 1.6 3.8 10.1 9.5 41.7 224,196 
2009 14.0 17.0 2.6 0.7 1.6 4.0 10.0 9.6 40.5 211,034 
2010 14.1 17.3 2.7 0.7 1.7 4.0 9.8 9.6 40.0 152,191 
2010* 13.4 11.3 2.2 0.7 1.7 1.5 7.8 9.1 52.4 152,191 
* Assuming that regulation status is ‘frozen’ over the period 2001-2010 
Base: All employee and self-employed jobs 
Source: QLFS Apr 2001 - Sept 2010 
As noted in Section 6.2, such changes in regulation status over time are difficult to 
accommodate within the cross-sectional regressions, unless one is to estimate 
regressions for many different time periods. The cross-sectional analysis thus focuses 
purely on the situation in 2010. However, changes in regulation status over time are 
explicitly utilised in the DiD analysis.  
6.5 Results of the cross-sectional analysis 
This section presents the results of our cross-sectional analysis of the QLFS in which we 
measure the raw differences in qualifications, job related training and wages between 
workers in regulated and unregulated occupations and examine whether these 
differences persist after controlling for compositional differences between these groups of 
workers.  
The results for each outcome of interest (qualifications, job related training and wages) 
are presented consecutively. In each case, we first present a table showing the average 
level of the particular outcome variable for workers in occupations with each of the eight 
forms of regulation discussed earlier, along with the average level among workers in 
unregulated occupations. We then present a table of coefficients from a regression 
analysis containing no control variables; this serves to indicate the magnitude and 
statistical significance of any differences which may be apparent between regulated and 
unregulated workers in the first table.48 Finally, we present a table of coefficients from a 
                                                 
48
 The regressions could be re-specified in order to compare one type of regulation with another. However, this is not done 
here. Unregulated occupations are taken as the reference category throughout.  
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regression analysis containing the full set of control variables discussed in Section 6.22; 
this indicates whether the raw differences persist after controlling for the composition of 
the various groups. In each table we present separate results for each of the nine 
SOC(2000) Major Groups. The results of a pooled analysis containing all SOC Major 
Groups are also presented for completeness.  
6.5.1 Level of Highest Qualification 
The discussion in Chapter Two indicated that each of the four main types of regulation 
(licensing, certification, registration and accreditation) has the potential to raise average 
skill levels within an occupation. However, it also indicated that such an effect is most 
likely to arise from a situation in which all workers in a Unit Group are subject to a 
mandatory skill based requirement via universal licensing, and that it is least likely to 
arise in the case of registration.  
If the introduction of regulation does lead to an increase in skill levels within an 
occupation, one would expect this to lead, in some cases, to an increase in the average 
level to which incumbents are qualified. One might thus expect the highest qualifications 
of individuals in regulated occupations to be at a higher level, on average, than those of 
workers in unregulated occupations.  
The analysis of qualification level employs a six category variable which identifies 
whether the worker‘s highest educational or vocational qualification is:  
 at the equivalent of NQF Level 4 or above;  
 at the equivalent of NQF Level 3;  
 a trade apprenticeship (around half of which are at NVQ Level 3, with the remainder 
at NVQ Level 2);  
 at the equivalent of NQF Level 2; or  
 below NQF Level 2.  
 A final category identifies workers with no qualifications.49  
In order to give a general indication of the differences in qualification levels between the 
nine categories of regulation and between the nine SOC Major Groups, we compute the 
mean value on this six category variable when coded from 1 (No qualifications) to 6 (NQF 
Level 4 or above). Table 6.6 presents these mean values and shows, for example, that 
the average qualification level of a Professional whose occupation is unregulated is lower 
                                                 
49
 QLFS variable LEVQUAL. For the coding schema see: 
http://www.esds.ac.uk/doc/6632%5Cmrdoc%5Cpdf%5Clfs_user_guide_vol5_classifications2009.pdf 
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than a Professional whose occupation is licensed for all activities, but higher than a 
Professional whose occupation is certified for all activities. We do not present the full 
categorical breakdown on our six-category qualification variable for reasons of brevity. 
Within none of the nine SOC Major Groups are those workers in unregulated occupations 
in fact the least qualified on average.  
Table 6.6 Mean of qualification index, by Reg. status and SOC(2000) Major Group  
Regulation 
status 






















 Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean 
Lic. for all 
activities 
4.9 6.9 6.2  3.9   3.8  5.8 
Lic. for some 
activities 
5.0  5.8  4.6 5.1 4.4 3.7 3.8 4.7 
Cert. for all 
activities 
 6.2 5.8     4.0  5.8 
Cert. for some 
activities 
  5.6   4.9    5.0 
Reg. for all 
activities 
5.4  5.9 4.8      5.5 
Reg. for some 
activities 
5.8  5.4 4.8  5.3 4.2  4.0 5.4 
Acc. for all 
activities 
5.7 6.4 6.0 4.7 4.6 5.0  3.9 4.8 5.6 
Acc. for some 
activities 
5.8 6.4 5.8 5.0 4.6 4.3  4.2 3.7 5.2 
Unregulated 5.7 6.6 5.8 4.8 4.9 4.5 4.7 4.0 3.8 5.0 
All 5.6 6.6 5.9 4.9 4.6 5.0 4.5 3.9 3.8 5.2 
Base 22,654 20,216 21,131 16,391 15,426 13,057 10,187 9,836 15,902 144,800 
Base: All employee and self-employed jobs 
Source: QLFS Jan-Sept 2010 
Tables 6.7 and 6.8 present the results of our regression analyses of qualification levels; 
Table 6.7 presents the results of the analysis without control variables, whilst Table 6.8 
presents the results of the analysis where compositional differences between the various 
groups are controlled for. A positive coefficient indicates that workers in occupations to 
which a particular type of regulation applies are more highly qualified, on average, than 
workers in unregulated occupations. Negative coefficients indicate that they are less 
highly qualified than workers in unregulated occupations. Asterisks are used to identify 
coefficients which are statistically significant from zero; if a coefficient is without asterisks 
then the coefficient is not estimated with sufficient precision for us to be confident that a 
positive or negative relationship truly exists within the population at large.   
The patterns discussed in respect of Table 6.6 are necessarily replicated in Table 6.7, 
which presents the regression coefficients from simple ordered probit regressions, 
containing no additional control variables other than the nine category regulation status 
variable. In only a minority of instances are workers in regulated occupations more highly 
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qualified, on average, than workers in unregulated occupations. These are: Professional 
and Associate Professional occupations where licensing is present for all activities; 
Personal Service and Elementary occupations where licensing is present for some 
activities; Personal Service occupations where certification is available for some 
activities; Managerial and Personal Services occupations where registration is available 
for some activities; Associate Professional, Personal Service and Elementary 
occupations where accreditation is available for all activities; and Managerial, 
Administrative/Secretarial and Process/Plant/Machine Operative occupations where 
accreditation is available for some activities. The only SOC Major Group in which workers 
in the majority of regulatory classes are more highly qualified than unregulated workers is 
Personal Service occupations.  
Table 6.7 Qualification level: ordered probit coefficients (without controls), by 


























Lic – all -0.510** 0.554** 0.377**  -0.675**   -0.076*  0.582** 
 (11.40) (10.84) (12.34)  (6.97)   (2.02)  (38.18) 
Lic – some -0.449**  -0.003  -0.190** 0.385** -0.185** -0.163** 0.061* -0.167** 
 (14.23)  (0.07)  (5.56) (9.43) (6.01) (2.75) (2.09) (15.97) 
Cert – all  -0.568** -0.039     0.037  0.554** 
  (11.05) (0.69)     (0.56)  (20.03) 
Cert – some   -0.177   0.181**    -0.022 
   (1.39)   (3.44)    (0.66) 
Reg – all -0.181**  0.042 0.005      0.337** 
 (3.32)  (0.77) (0.08)      (10.38) 
Reg – some 0.103*  -0.299* -0.035  0.472** -0.299**  0.188 0.256** 
 (2.12)  (2.52) (0.46)  (5.31) (2.97)  (0.71) (7.99) 
Acc – all 0.002 -0.382** 0.139** -0.086 -0.227** 0.352**  -0.069 0.648** 0.385** 
 (0.06) (7.87) (3.40) (1.16) (6.64) (3.20)  (0.35) (12.91) (25.55) 
Acc – some 0.095** -0.308** 0.026 0.122** -0.173** -0.169  0.178** -0.022 0.134** 
 (2.77) (4.90) (0.58) (3.66) (4.85) (0.83)  (2.72) (0.47) (9.19) 
Base 22,645 20,211 21,126 16,382 15,410 13,056 10,184 9,831 15,890 144,735 
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses; ** = significant at 1% level, * = significant at 5% level.  
Base: All employee and self-employed jobs 
Source: QLFS Jan-Sept 2010 
The regressions reported in Table 6.7 take no account of compositional differences. Once 
compositional differences are controlled for, only one positive and statistically significant 
coefficient remains within the Personal Services Major Group: the coefficient associated 
with workers in occupations where some activities are licensed (see Table 6.8). The 
magnitudes of the remaining coefficients in this Major Group have reduced in size, such 
that they are no longer statistically significant from zero. However, most of the other 
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statistically significant coefficients in Table 6.7 retain the same sign and remain significant 
from zero. It is therefore the case that the qualification levels of regulated workers in most 
of the SOC Major Groups remain different from those of unregulated workers in the same 
Major Group after controlling for compositional differences. However, the sign of these 
differences is often contrary to expectations. Even if one focuses solely on a comparison 
between workers in universally licensed occupations and their counterparts in 
unregulated occupations, one finds a mixture of coefficients that are variously positive (for 
Professionals and Associate professionals) and negative (for Managers, Skilled trades 
and Process operatives). Consequently, whilst the results for professionals and 
associated professionals accord with expectations, there is no consistent pattern across 
the Major Groups, even within this type of regulation. This suggests that at least some of 
the estimates may be confounded by unobserved factors.  
Table 6.8 Qualification level: ordered probit coefficients (with controls), by SOC(2000) 


























Lic – all -0.380** 0.614** 0.243**  -0.674**   -0.165**  0.162** 
 (6.40) (10.44) (6.55)  (6.76)   (3.48)  (8.50) 
Lic – some -0.117**  -0.044  -0.058 0.374** -0.051 -0.176** 0.038 -0.064** 
 (2.90)  (0.88)  (1.34) (6.76) (1.36) (2.70) (1.22) (4.68) 
Cert – all  -0.312** 0.039     0.086  -0.166** 
  (4.20) (0.65)     (1.24)  (5.07) 
Cert – some   -0.039   -0.027    0.025 
   (0.30)   (0.32)    (0.57) 
Reg – all -0.260**  0.159* 0.124      -0.082* 
 (3.75)  (2.25) (1.81)      (2.26) 
Reg – some 0.129*  -0.372** -0.158  0.218 -0.188  -0.056 0.076* 
 (2.53)  (3.10) (1.93)  (1.93) (1.78)  (0.17) (2.21) 
Acc – all 0.028 -0.187** 0.132** -0.065 -0.178** 0.124  -0.020 0.370** 0.035* 
 (0.73) (2.88) (3.13) (0.78) (4.32) (0.97)  (0.10) (6.60) (1.99) 
Acc – some 0.188** -0.116 0.053 0.182** -0.089* -0.154  0.210** 0.102 0.069** 
 (5.25) (1.54) (1.11) (5.23) (2.13) (0.77)  (2.59) (1.32) (4.30) 
Base 22,480 20,110 20,973 16,250 15,226 12,950 10,050 9,722 15,669 143,430 
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses; ** = significant at 1% level, * = significant at 5% level.  
Base: All employee and self-employed jobs 
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6.5.2 Recent job related training 
A further set of indicators relating to human capital investment measure the rate of take 
up of job related training, and the rate of take up of training that leads to the acquisition of 
a qualification. Both are binary indicators and so can be used to identify the proportions of 
workers in different types of occupation that are engaging in job related training.  
One necessary caveat to this analysis is that any universal licensing system which 
requires all incumbents to meet a specified skill standard prior to entry into the occupation 
will require any skills training to have taken place before the worker is observed within the 
licensed occupation, unless there are grandfathering rights. Nevertheless, some licensing 
systems require continual professional development as a condition of licence renewal, 
and this may be expected to raise training levels, all other things equal. Moreover, 
voluntary systems (i.e. certification and accreditation) do not set occupational entry 
requirements and so, as long as any relevant training can be carried out alongside paid 
work, one may expect to see positive associations between these types of regulation and 
rates of job related training.  
Average rates of take up of job related training are presented in Table 6.9. Probit 
coefficients, indicating the statistical significance of any differences between the 
regulated categories and unregulated workers, are shown in Table 6.10. Again, there are 
a mixture of positive, negative and zero coefficients and these remain broadly intact after 
controlling for compositional differences (see Table 6.11). Licensing is shown to be 
positively associated with the take up of job related training among Professionals, 
Associate Professionals and Personal Service workers. However, it is negatively 
associated with take up among Process/Plant/Machine Operatives and has no 
association for Managerial workers, Skilled trades, Sales/Customer Service workers and 
those in Elementary occupations. The only SOC Major Group in which more than one 
form of regulation is positively associated with the take up of job related training is Major 
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Table 6.9 Percentage of workers receiving job related training in past four weeks, by 
Reg. status and SOC(2000) Major Group  
Regulation 
status 






















 Cell % Cell % Cell % Cell % Cell % Cell % Cell % Cell % Cell % Cell % 
Lic. for all 
activities 
11 27 27  8   5  20 
Lic. for some 
activities 
10  22  8 20 10 7 8 13 
Cert. for all 
activities 
 13 17     7  13 
Cert. for some 
activities 
  11   15    14 
Reg. for all 
activities 
14  19 6      14 
Reg. for some 
activities 
11  8 12  11 6  7 10 
Acc. for all 
activities 
11 14 14 10 5 8  2 14 11 
Acc. for some 
activities 
10 13 12 10 8 4  7 6 10 
Unregulated 11 20 14 10 9 13 11 9 6 11 
All 11 20 18 10 7 18 11 6 7 13 
Base 22,654 20,216 21,131 16,391 15,426 13,057 10,187 9,836 15,902 144,800 
Base: All employee and self-employed jobs 
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Table 6.10 Job related training in past four weeks: probit coefficients (without 


























Lic – all 0.006 0.238** 0.466**  -0.061   -0.304**  0.414** 
 (0.10) (6.44) (15.61)  (0.43)   (5.34)  (27.23) 
Lic – some -0.045  0.305**  -0.036 0.259** -0.037 -0.096 0.113* 0.138** 
 (1.05)  (5.96)  (0.70) (5.37) (0.85) (1.05) (2.40) (9.37) 
Cert – all  -0.273** 0.147*     -0.109  0.120** 
  (5.54) (2.07)     (1.06)  (3.73) 
Cert – some   -0.114   0.068    0.180** 
   (0.81)   (0.81)    (2.79) 
Reg – all 0.163*  0.200** -0.275**      0.179** 
 (2.36)  (3.20) (2.61)      (4.33) 
Reg – some -0.018  -0.293 0.111  -0.093 -0.328*  0.042 -0.021 
 (0.29)  (1.49) (1.07)  (0.81) (2.44)  (0.09) (0.49) 
Acc – all -0.012 -0.216** 0.014 -0.028 -0.330** -0.299  -0.643 0.431** 0.024 
 (0.28) (4.91) (0.29) (0.21) (5.39) (1.67)  (1.55) (5.60) (1.19) 
Acc – some -0.052 -0.251** -0.078 0.022 -0.057 -0.665*  -0.141 0.001 -0.050* 
 (1.15) (4.29) (1.43) (0.47) (1.08) (2.57)  (1.25) (0.01) (2.44) 
Base 22,647 20,211 21,126 16,384 15,413 13,056 10,184 9,833 15,891 144,745 
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses; ** = significant at 1% level, * = significant at 5% level.  
Base: All employee and self-employed jobs 
Source: QLFS Jan-Sept 2010 
A Review of Occupational Regulation and its Impact 
113 
Table 6.11 Job related training in past four weeks: probit coefficients (with controls), by 


























Lic – all 0.128 0.114** 0.199**  0.005   -0.249**  0.157** 
 (1.54) (2.70) (5.20)  (0.03)   (3.01)  (7.68) 
Lic – some 0.090  0.255**  0.057 0.160* 0.081 -0.114 0.023 0.062** 
 (1.70)  (4.66)  (0.90) (2.51) (1.53) (1.10) (0.45) (3.18) 
Cert – all  -0.314** 0.228**     -0.080  -0.016 
  (4.61) (3.01)     (0.74)  (0.43) 
Cert – some   -0.107   -0.100    0.021 
   (0.78)   (0.88)    (0.31) 
Reg – all 0.091  0.207* -0.329**      0.031 
 (1.06)  (2.49) (3.02)      (0.68) 
Reg – some 0.020  -0.075 -0.006  -0.213 -0.174  -0.217 -0.043 
 (0.31)  (0.39) (0.05)  (1.57) (1.25)  (0.53) (0.97) 
Acc – all 0.039 -0.280** 0.008 0.127 -0.239** -0.121  -0.516 0.035 -0.059* 
 (0.81) (4.99) (0.18) (0.92) (3.41) (0.62)  (1.16) (0.39) (2.56) 
Acc – some 0.025 -0.354** -0.064 0.105* 0.063 -0.765**  -0.120 -0.006 -0.009 
 (0.53) (5.31) (1.13) (2.15) (1.01) (2.78)  (0.87) (0.05) (0.40) 
Base 22,482 20,110 20,973 16,252 15,228 12,932 10,041 9,717 15,655 143,439 
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses; ** = significant at 1% level, * = significant at 5% level.  
Base: All employee and self-employed jobs 
Source: QLFS Jan-Sept 2010 
Tables 6.12 to 6.14 go on to present the equivalent analyses for the binary indicator of 
take up of job related training that leads to the acquisition of a qualification. Such training 
is necessarily a subset of the job related training examined in Tables 6.9 to 6.11. Those 
workers who have not undertaken any training at all in the past four weeks continue to 
score zero on the binary indicator, rather than being dropped from the analysis.  
The pattern of results is in fact similar to that discussed above. One again finds a mixture 
of positive, negative and zero coefficients, although fewer of these remain statistically 
significant from zero after controlling for compositional differences – particularly within the 
Associate Professionals group (see Tables 6.13 and 6.14). After controlling for 
differences in composition, licensing is shown to be positively associated with the take up 
of qualification targeted training only among workers in Elementary occupations.50 It is 
negatively associated with qualification targeted training among Professionals. Other 
forms of regulation are positively associated with training in specific Major Groups, but 
with no consistent pattern across the occupational hierarchy.  
                                                 
50
 The coefficients for workers in Associate Professional and Sales occupations where some activities are licensed are 
positive but only statistically significant only at the 10 per cent level (Table 6.14).  
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Table 6.12 Job related training in past four weeks that leads to a qualification, by Reg. 
status and SOC(2000) Major Group  
Regulation 
status 






















 Prop. Prop. Prop. Prop. Prop. Prop. Prop. Prop. Prop. Prop. 
Lic. for all 
activities 
0.04 0.07 0.08  0.06   0.03  0.06 
Lic. for some 
activities 
0.04  0.10  0.04 0.10 0.07 0.03 0.05 0.07 
Cert. for all 
activities 
 0.05 0.10     0.04  0.06 
Cert. for some 
activities 
  0.04   0.11    0.10 
Reg. for all 
activities 
0.03  0.09 0.02      0.05 
Reg. for some 
activities 
0.03  0.06 0.04  0.11 0.02  0.00 0.04 
Acc. for all 
activities 
0.04 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.01  0.00 0.11 0.05 
Acc. for some 
activities 
0.02 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.00  0.03 0.03 0.05 
Unregulated 0.03 0.08 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.04 
All 0.03 0.06 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.09 0.06 0.03 0.04 0.05 
Base 22,654 20,216 21,131 16,391 15,426 13,057 10,187 9,836 15,902 144,800 
Base: All employee and self-employed jobs 
Source: QLFS Apr-Jun 2010 
Table 6.13 Job related training in past four weeks that leads to a qualification: probit 


























Lic – all 0.170 -0.105 0.182**  0.222   -0.198*  0.174** 
 (1.46) (1.49) (3.02)  (0.96)   (1.97)  (5.64) 
Lic – some 0.146  0.330**  0.008 0.173* 0.163* -0.130 0.227** 0.254** 
 (1.75)  (3.46)  (0.08) (2.02) (2.10) (0.74) (2.81) (9.39) 
Cert – all  -0.262** 0.323**     -0.044  0.161** 
  (2.77) (2.61)     (0.25)  (2.67) 
Cert – some   -0.189   0.258*    0.439** 
   (0.58)   (1.96)    (4.39) 
Reg – all 0.054  0.285* -0.263      0.133 
 (0.34)  (2.46) (1.27)      (1.63) 
Reg – some 0.054  0.031 0.068  0.246 -0.528  N/a 0.017 
 (0.42)  (0.09) (0.32)  (1.36) (1.83)   (0.21) 
Acc – all 0.123 -0.262** 0.018 0.081 -0.233* -0.709  N/a 0.680** 0.048 
 (1.37) (3.15) (0.21) (0.42) (2.08) (1.78)   (5.89) (1.26) 
Acc – some -0.118 -0.139 0.067 0.245** 0.105 N/a  -0.146 0.004 0.051 
 (1.14) (1.30) (0.67) (2.91) (1.11)   (0.69) (0.03) (1.33) 
Base 7,522 6,637 6,873 5,433 5,146 4,202 3,312 3,257 5,209 47,638 
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses; ** = significant at 1% level, * = significant at 5% level.  
N/A = coefficient not estimated because category predicts success / failure perfectly 
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Base: All employee and self-employed jobs. Source: QLFS Apr-Jun 2010 
Table 6.14 Job related training in past four weeks that leads to a qualification: probit 


























Lic – all 0.260 -0.251** 0.039  0.246   -0.102  0.013 
 (1.48) (3.00) (0.50)  (0.94)   (0.69)  (0.32) 
Lic – some 0.138  0.208  0.018 0.072 0.172 -0.325 0.257** 0.082* 
 (1.27)  (1.96)  (0.14) (.) (1.76) (1.70) (2.69) (2.20) 
Cert – all  -0.192 0.358**     -0.035  0.073 
  (1.43) (2.68)     (0.18)  (1.03) 
Cert – some   -0.032   0.093    0.177 
   (0.10)   (.)    (1.56) 
Reg – all 0.069  0.575** -0.280      0.156 
 (0.36)  (4.02) (1.27)      (1.79) 
Reg – some 0.111  0.292 0.059  0.130 -0.273  N/a 0.068 
 (0.81)  (0.79) (0.26)  (.) (0.83)   (0.77) 
Acc – all 0.147 -0.285** 0.057 0.095 -0.300* -0.380  N/a 0.335* 0.003 
 (1.42) (2.62) (0.61) (0.43) (2.17) (.)   (2.25) (0.07) 
Acc – some -0.085 -0.216 0.079 0.281** 0.061 N/a  -0.044 -0.213 0.088* 
 (0.81) (1.72) (0.76) (3.04) (0.51)   (0.17) (0.67) (2.11) 
Base 7,299 6,576 6,824 5,219 5,072 4,153 3,161 3,011 5,049 47,233 
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses; ** = significant at 1% level, * = significant at 5% level.  
N/A = coefficient not estimated because category predicts success / failure perfectly 
Base: All employee and self-employed jobs 
Source: QLFS Apr-Jun 2010 
6.5.3 Wages 
The final outcome to be examined in the cross-sectional analysis is gross hourly wages. 
This outcome can necessarily be examined for employees only, in contrast to each of the 
previous outcomes which could be examined for combined samples of employees and 
self-employed workers. The expectation (outlined in Chapter Two) is that licensing may 
lead to a rise in wages as a result either of human capital effects or as a result of 
restrictions on labour supply. Any increases in average human capital which arise from 
other forms of regulation may also serve to raise wages in comparison with non-
regulation, however the effects are not expected to be as large or as widespread as in the 
case of licensing.  
Table 6.15 presents mean gross hourly wage levels among workers in each category of 
regulation within each of the nine SOC Major Groups. Workers in unregulated 
occupations are the lowest paid, on average, in only two of the SOC Major Groups: 
Professionals and Administrative and Secretarial, although in the latter case the average 
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wages of workers in unregulated occupations are not significantly different from those of 
workers in occupations where some activities are subject to registration or occupations 
where all activities may be accredited (Table 6.16). Within Skilled trades, the average 
wages of workers in unregulated occupations are in fact higher than those of any 
regulated group before one attempts to control for any compositional differences.  
Table 6.15 Gross hourly wages (£ per hour), by Reg. status and SOC(2000) Major Group  
Regulation 
status 






















 Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean 
Lic. for all 
activities 
14.54 18.86 16.17  7.62   9.67  15.45 
Lic. for some 
activities 
13.25  15.08  9.77 8.57 6.91 7.97 6.88 8.74 
Cert. for all 
activities 
 17.78 13.38     10.83  15.72 
Cert. for some 
activities 
  12.35   6.79    8.42 
Reg. for all 
activities 
21.24  20.45 11.18      18.34 
Reg. for some 
activities 
22.61  13.47 10.67  7.21 8.62  6.30 16.88 
Acc. for all 
activities 
18.71 19.20 14.85 11.17 10.73 8.85  8.08 6.33 15.60 
Acc. for some 
activities 
20.09 19.38 14.28 11.51 10.52 10.38  11.46 8.63 14.40 
Unregulated 18.26 17.24 13.76 10.49 11.81 9.13 8.14 10.09 7.72 11.84 
All 18.14 18.57 14.96 10.70 10.70 8.58 7.42 9.79 7.49 12.55 
Base 5,074 4,449 4,869 4,314 2,367 2,970 2,767 2,160 4,012 32,982 
Base: All employee and self-employed jobs 
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Table 6.16 Natural log of gross hourly wages: OLS coefficients (without controls), by 


























Lic – all -0.356** 0.097** 0.166**  -0.449**   -0.050*  0.269** 
 (6.85) (3.97) (9.60)  (9.73)   (2.38)  (27.00) 
Lic – some -0.328**  0.063  -0.216** -0.031 -0.166** -0.230** -0.094** -0.272** 
 (12.13)  (1.67)  (8.99) (1.18) (10.85) (7.36) (5.83) (34.04) 
Cert – all  0.069* -0.024     0.042  0.320** 
  (2.41) (0.57)     (0.99)  (17.37) 
Cert – some   -0.040   -0.315**    -0.345** 
   (0.92)   (5.51)    (7.43) 
Reg – all 0.164**  0.361** 0.101**      0.438** 
 (3.88)  (8.04) (3.17)      (16.76) 
Reg – some 0.142**  -0.051 0.042  -0.160** 0.050  -0.116** 0.261** 
 (3.08)  (0.43) (1.02)  (2.74) (0.94)  (3.18) (7.90) 
Acc – all 0.042 0.136** 0.081** 0.031 -0.112** 0.034  -0.223 -0.155** 0.273** 
 (1.63) (5.19) (3.29) (0.57) (3.69) (0.52)  (1.66) (6.98) (21.89) 
Acc – some 0.108** 0.126** 0.047 0.106** -0.140** 0.132  0.121 0.134** 0.202** 
 (4.30) (3.57) (1.71) (5.78) (5.34) (1.12)  (1.85) (4.76) (17.13) 
Base 4,867 4,296 4,702 4,153 2,269 2,897 2,693 2,111 3,926 31,914 
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses; ** = significant at 1% level, * = significant at 5% level.  
Base: All employee and self-employed jobs 
Source: QLFS Jan-Sept 2010 
Once control variables are introduced to account for compositional factors, some of the 
differences apparent in Table 6.16 are reduced and become non-significant: this is the 
case for most of the coefficients among Professionals and Skilled trades (Table 6.17). 
The resulting pattern of coefficients is far from uniform. However, it broadly indicates that 
the wages of licensed workers are higher than those of unregulated workers within 
Professional occupations and Associate Professional occupations, whilst they are 
typically lower than those of unregulated workers in other SOC Major Groups. There are 
no statistically significant differences between the wages of workers in certified 
occupations and those of workers in unregulated occupations. Some significant 
differences are found between the wages of workers in registered and accredited 
occupations and those of workers in unregulated occupations, and where such 
differences are found they are all positive; however, there is no consistent pattern to 
these associations across the SOC Major Groups.  
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Table 6.17 Natural log of gross hourly wages: OLS coefficients (with controls), by 


























Lic – all -0.033 0.109** 0.091**  -0.205**   -0.073**  0.038** 
 (0.64) (4.53) (4.81)  (4.12)   (3.23)  (3.79) 
Lic – some -0.084**  0.069*  -0.022 -0.057 -0.038* -0.115** -0.040* -0.036** 
 (3.08)  (2.26)  (0.76) (1.94) (2.37) (3.74) (2.49) (4.47) 
Cert – all  -0.062 -0.012     0.070  -0.028 
  (1.63) (0.37)     (1.89)  (1.71) 
Cert – some   -0.042   -0.028    -0.026 
   (0.98)   (0.42)    (0.77) 
Reg – all 0.053  0.231** 0.033      0.098** 
 (1.27)  (5.54) (1.09)      (4.54) 
Reg – some 0.116**  -0.086 0.001  0.088 -0.037  0.029 0.069** 
 (3.05)  (0.62) (0.04)  (1.41) (0.73)  (0.70) (2.72) 
Acc – all 0.032 -0.001 0.051* -0.015 -0.025 -0.135  -0.090 0.045 0.025* 
 (1.35) (0.04) (2.32) (0.28) (0.86) (1.83)  (0.65) (1.75) (2.53) 
Acc – some 0.116** -0.000 0.014 0.079** -0.022 0.236  0.050 0.086* 0.064** 
 (5.35) (0.01) (0.60) (4.72) (0.86) (1.96)  (0.85) (2.23) (6.90) 
Base 4,857 4,289 4,687 4,144 2,263 2,882 2,682 2,108 3,911 31,823 
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses; ** = significant at 1% level, * = significant at 5% level.  
Base: All employee and self-employed jobs 
Source: QLFS Jan-Sept 2010 
If one were to draw any tentative conclusion from the cross-sectional analysis of wages it 
would be that there may be some evidence that licensing raises wages among 
Professional and Associate Professional occupations. This is at least consistent with the 
positive associations seen among Professionals and Associate Professionals in respect 
of qualifications and job related training in Tables 6.8 and 6.11. It is also consistent with 
previous evidence for the UK (Humphris et al., 2010; discussed in Section 3.18) which 
indicated that the wage premium from licensing in the UK is restricted to workers in the 
upper half of the earnings distribution. However, the negative coefficients on licensing 
within all other occupational groups suggest that there are unobservable factors at play 
(e.g. the interaction with other labour market characteristics, as discussed in section 
3.2.4), which we are unable to account for in this cross-sectional framework (with the data 
available from the QLFS). 
The uneven patterns of results that have been discussed earlier in this chapter in respect 
of qualification levels and the take up of job related training would support a similar 
conclusion in respect of those labour market outcomes.  
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6.6 Results of the difference-in-differences analysis 
This section presents the results of our DiD analysis, in which we utilise switches in 
regulation status among a selected set of occupations as a means of identifying the 
causal impact of occupational regulation. We focus on five occupations which saw either 
the introduction of regulation or a change in the type of regulation over the period 2001-
2010, namely: security guards; care workers; social care managers; childcare workers; 
and automotive technicians. The rationale for focusing on these occupations was set out 
in Section 6.3, along with a description of the DiD methodology.  
The results for each occupation are presented consecutively. For each occupation, we 
provide a short summary of the nature of the regulatory switch before going on to present 
the results of the analyses of qualifications, job related training, wages and employment. 
It is important to note that the choice of outcomes here is driven by the focus of this 
study; raising qualification levels (say) may not necessarily have been a motivation (or a 
primary motivation) for the introduction of regulation in each case. 
6.6.1 Private security guards 
The provisions for a licensing system covering workers who provide private security 
services were made as part of the Private Security Industry Act 2001. The Act stipulated 
that anyone who carries out manned guarding, vehicle immobilisation or key holding must 
possess a licence, although in-house security guards were exempt. In order to obtain a 
licence, an applicant must be aged 18 or more, hold an appropriate qualification 
(equivalent to NVQ level 2) and pass a criminal record bureau and other fit and proper 
person checks. The licensing requirements first came into force in April 2003. Further 
details on the industry and the development of the licensing system are provided by 
Fernie (2011).  
We identify the treatment group as those holding jobs classified to SOC(2000) Unit Group 
9241 (Security Guards and Related Occupations). However, because of the exemption 
for in-house security guards, we exclude from the treatment group all those workers who 
are directly employed by organisations outside of SIC(2007) Group 80.1 (Security and 
Investigation Activities). After making this exclusion, we consider that almost all of the 
jobs in our treatment group will be subject to licensing from April 2003 onwards. The 
exceptions are private detectives, who are not subject to licensing, but we expect their 
numbers to be very small.  
We form a comparison group from all other Unit Groups in SOC(2000) Major Group 9 
(Elementary occupations) which remained unregulated throughout the period 2001-2010. 
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The sample of security guards numbers around 630 each year, whilst the sample of jobs 
in the comparison group numbers around 14,500 each year.  
Figure 6.1 shows the raw, unadjusted labour market outcomes for the treatment and 
comparison group over the period 2001-2010. The figure contains five charts showing, 
respectively:  
 the percentage of jobs held by workers with qualifications at NVQ Level 2 or above;  
 the percentage of jobs held by workers who engaged in job related training in the four 
weeks prior to their QLFS interview;  
 the percentage of jobs held by workers who engaged in job related training which 
would lead to a qualification;  
 average gross hourly wages; and  
 the percentage of all jobs in the treatment group.  
If there were to be a clear and unambiguous effect from the introduction of the licensing 
system in April 2003, one might expect to see some change in the differential between 
the treatment and comparison groups as one moves from the pre-treatment period (i.e. 
before April 2003) to the post-treatment period (i.e. after April 2003). However, such an 
effect may not be easy to discern from the charts if it is relatively small, or if the pattern is 
obscured by other factors. Accordingly, Table 6.18 presents formal tests in which any 
such ‗treatment effect‘ would appear as a statistically significant coefficient on the 
interaction term in the DiD regression model. Table 6.18 presents three specifications for 
each dependent variable: (1) has no control variables; (2) controls for the set of factors 
outlined in Section 6.2.2, minus those potentially endogenous factors discussed there; (3) 
controls for the full set of factors, including these potentially endogenous items.  
Beginning with the analysis of qualification levels, which focuses on the percentage of 
jobs in the treatment and comparison groups held by workers who are qualified to NVQ 
Level 2 or above, one sees no obvious treatment effect in the chart. There is an increase 
in the percentage of qualified workers between 2004 and 2005, but this falls back in 2006 
and 2007 to a level below that which was seen in the pre-treatment period. The 
coefficient on the interaction term in the DiD regression is negative, but is not statistically 
significant from zero in any of the three specifications. The introduction of licensing in 
April 2003 therefore appears to have had no obvious impact on qualification levels among 
security guards.   
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Figure 6.1 Labour market outcomes for security guards and comparison group, 2001-2010 
 
Base: All employee and self-employed jobs in treatment and comparison groups (except for wages – employee jobs only) 
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Table 6.18 Difference-in-differences estimates for security guards  
 Qualification level Job related training 
Job related training for 
qualification 
Gross hourly wages Employment 
 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
Treated 
group 0.09 ** 0.173 ** 0.187 ** 0.034 ** 0.042 ** 0.044 ** 0.014  0.014  0.021  -0.022  -0.075 ** -0.102 ** 
      
 3.84  6.97  7.55  3.00  3.78  4.01  1.06  1.07  1.65  -0.94  -3.09  -4.19        
Treatment 
period 0.03 ** 0.032 ** 0.034 ** -0.007 ** -0.01 ** -0.009 ** -0.007 ** -0.010 ** -0.010 ** 0.168 ** 0.165 ** 0.161 ** -0.010  0.002  0.003 
 
 5.95  6.72  7.07  -3.45  -4.67  -4.44  -2.68  -4.11  -3.91  30.18  31.61  31.25  -0.30  0.58  1.01  
Interaction -0.027  -0.023  -0.02  -0.028 * -0.024 * -0.023  -0.014  -0.009  -0.008  0.063 * 0.067 * 0.064 *       
 -1.01  -0.84  -0.76  -2.24  -1.98  -1.93  -0.98  -0.61  -0.6  2.38  2.54  2.42        
Base                
Notes: t-statistics below coefficients; ** = significant at 1% level, * = significant at 5% level.  
(1) no additional control variables; (2) restricted set of control variables; (3) full set of control variables 
Base: All employee and self-employed jobs in treatment and comparison groups (except for wages – employee jobs only) 
Source: QLFS Apr 2001 - Sept 2010 
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Moving on to job related training, there is a clear increase in the incidence of job related 
training in 2002; the year preceding the introduction of the licensing requirement. The 
incidence of training then falls back to its 2001 level after the regulations are in force. This 
suggests an anticipation effect, alluded to in Section 6.4.2, whereby incumbents are 
required to engage in training prior to the introduction of the mandatory requirement. The 
spike in 2002 yields a negative coefficient on the interaction term in the DiD regression 
but, if this is truly an anticipation effect, then the DiD provides a misleading estimate of 
the treatment effect due to mis specification of the treatment period. It seems probable 
that a positive treatment effect would be identified if one were to specify the treatment 
period as beginning in 2001, when the legislation was enacted.  
It is perhaps surprising, given the pattern of job related training, that no equivalent spike 
was seen in chart one, however it could be that many security guards do not consider the 
mandatory Level 2 Award as a ―qualification‖ in the language of the QLFS.51 This notion 
is supported by the fact that no similar spike is seen in chart three. The regressions 
further indicate no positive impact of licensing on the incidence of ‗training for 
qualifications‘ among security guards. 
The fourth chart in Figure 6.1 shows average gross hourly wages. Having experienced a 
common trend in the period 2001-2003, the wages of security guards overtake those of 
the comparison group in the post-treatment period. The regression analysis estimates a 
wage premium of six per cent for security guards arising from the introduction of 
licensing. This seems unlikely to represent a monopoly effect arising from any restriction 
in the supply of security guards, since the employment equations show no significant 
change in the probability of being a security guard after the introduction of licensing. It 
seems more likely to represent a human capital effect which is not being picked up in the 
qualifications measure.  
In summary, the introduction of licensing for security guards appears to have resulted in 
an increase in wage levels. It also appears to have led to an increase in job related 
training, albeit one that was short lived and which appears to have largely been in 
anticipation of the introduction of the mandatory skill requirement. We find no impact on 
employment. We also find no impact on qualification levels, although it seems possible 
that the results on qualifications may be subject to measurement error.  
The analysis focuses solely on the situation in England so as to avoid complications 
arising from the later introduction of licensing in Scotland (November 2007) and Northern 
                                                 
51
 The question NEWQUL asks, ―Will the education or training that you have been doing in the last 4 weeks lead to a 
qualification, a credit towards a qualification or neither?‖. There is no prompt for the respondent to include vocational 
awards as well as educational qualifications.  
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Ireland (December 2009). However, it could be profitable to extend the analysis to these 
countries once more years of post-treatment data become available, or to look for 
possible spillover effects in those regions within the current observation period.  
6.6.2 Care workers 
The provisions for a new regulatory system covering residential care homes in the social 
care sector were made as part of the Care Standards Act 2000. The Act introduced a 
number of regulations governing the sector, including a requirement by April 2005 for at 
least 50 per cent of care staff in care homes to possess an NVQ Level 2 qualification in 
Care or Health and Social Care.52 Further details are provided by Gospel and Lewis 
(2011).  
The regulations thus introduced a system of licensing for care homes which had direct 
implications for skill levels within the sector, by imposing a quota for the proportion of 
care workers within each care home who should meet a specified skill standard. One 
would expect this to have influenced skill levels within the sector, although the fact that 
only a subset of all care workers were required to reach the proscribed skill standard 
suggests that the effects are likely to have been less pronounced than if each individual 
care worker had been required to obtain a licence to practice. We identify the treatment 
group as those holding jobs classified to SOC(2000) Unit Group 6115 (Care Assistants 
and Home Carers), making the necessary restriction that the industry sector of the 
employing organisation is classified to SIC(2007) Division 87 (Residential Care Activities) 
or 88 (Social Work Activities Without Accommodation).53 After making this exclusion, we 
consider that, from April 2005 onwards, all of the jobs in our treatment group will be 
located within establishments that were covered by the new licensing system, with 
around half of these jobs needing to adhere to the new skill standard.  
We form a comparison group from care workers working outside of SIC(2007) Divisions 
87 and 88, plus all other Unit Groups in SOC(2000) Major Group 6 (Personal service 
occupations) which remained unregulated throughout the period 2001-2010. The sample 
of care workers numbers around 3,100 each year, whilst the sample of jobs in the 
comparison group numbers around 2,600 each year. 
Figure 6.2 presents charts showing the raw, unadjusted labour market outcomes for the 
treatment and comparison group over the period 2001-2010. Table 6.19 presents the 
results of the DiD regression analyses. The charts and the regression results suggest that 
                                                 
52
 The explicit requirement for an NVQ Level 2 qualification was, however, dropped in 2010 as part of a revision of the 
standards governing social care. Under the provisions of the Health and Social Care Act 2008 (Regulated Activities) 
Regulations 2010, care workers are now required only to be ―suitably qualified, skilled and experienced‖. 
53
 This serves to exclude the many care assistants working hospitals, for example.  
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levels of qualifications and rates of job related training have risen among care workers 
relative to their comparators between the pre-and post-treatment periods. This accords 
with the findings of Gospel and Lewis (2011). The DiD analyses indicate that the 
differential between care workers and their comparators in the percentage with 
qualifications at NVQ Level 2 or above has risen by around 16 percentage points, whilst 
the differential in the percentage engaging in job related training has risen by around 2 
percentage points. Nevertheless, it is quite apparent from the charts that any differential 
trend does not begin around April 2005 but appears to extend back at least to the 
beginning of our observation period in 2001. Again, one suspects that there may have 
been some substantial anticipation effect, given that the legislative provisions were in 
place as early as July 2000.  
It is surprising, given the scale of the changes in qualification levels and the take up of job 
related training, that no equivalent changes are seen in the percentage of workers 
engaging in training that leads to a qualification. This again makes us suspect that some 
vocational qualifications may be missed by this particular measure.54  
Moving on to wages, the regression analysis finds no effect of licensing on wage levels 
among care workers. This is noteworthy given the evident upskilling within the sector.55 It 
could be that local authorities and the NHS have sufficient monopsony power in this 
product market to prevent the licensing requirements from generating the price increases 
that would allow wages to rise. However, we are unable to subject this hypothesis to any 
formal testing with the available data.  
Finally, in respect of employment, it certainly appears that the introduction of licensing 
has not harmed the employment prospects of care workers: indeed, the proportion of all 
SOC6 jobs held by care workers has risen by around 12 percentage points between the 
pre-and post-treatment periods. We are wary of attributing this increase to the licensing 
system, however, since it seems more plausible that it may represent an increase in the 
demand for social care provision arising from an ageing population.  
                                                 
54
 This suspicion gains further justification in Section 6.5.3.  
55
 Gospel and Lewis argue that there have been real increases in skill levels, rather than the licensing provisions having 
simply prompted the certification of existing skills (2011: 11-12). 
A Review of Occupational Regulation and its Impact 
126 
 
Figure 6.2 Labour market outcomes for care workers and comparison group, 2001-2010 
 
Base: All employee and self-employed jobs in treatment and comparison groups (except for wages – employee jobs only) 
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Table 6.19 Difference-in-differences estimates for care workers  
 Qualification level Job related training 
Job related training for 
qualification 
Gross hourly wages Employment 
 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
Treated 
group 
-0.033 ** 0.004  0.006  0.089 ** 0.074 ** 0.073 ** 0.077 ** 0.060 ** 0.059 ** -0.067 ** 0.043 ** 0.045        
 -3.11  0.32  0.53  13.98  10.65  10.56  9.25  6.55  6.48  -5.25  3.49  3.7        
Treatment 
period 
0.026 * 0.037 ** 0.033 ** -0.05 ** -0.039 ** -0.037 ** -0.036 ** -0.027 ** -0.026 ** 0.188 ** 0.166 ** 0.163  0.254 ** 0.121 ** 0.121 ** 
 2.31  3.41  3.01  -8.98  -6.9  -6.53  -5.66  -4.36  -4.15  12.89  12.72  12.51  7.28  11.18  11.18  
Interaction 0.170 ** 0.163 ** 0.164 ** 0.046 ** 0.025 ** 0.022 ** 0.01  -0.007  -0.009  -0.013  0.008  0.011        
 11.54  11.10  11.20  5.34  2.85  2.59  0.89  -0.67  -0.79  -0.71  0.49  0.67        
Base                
Notes: t-statistics below coefficients; ** = significant at 1% level, * = significant at 5% level.  
(1) no additional control variables; (2) restricted set of control variables; (3) full set of control variables 
Base: All employee and self-employed jobs in treatment and comparison groups (except for wages – employee jobs only) 
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6.6.3 Social care managers 
This third group to be examined comprises SOC(2000) Unit Group 1184 (Social Services 
Managers) and Unit Group 1185 (Residential and Day Care Managers). These jobs were 
also subject to new regulatory requirements under the Care Standards Act 2000. 
However, in these cases the requirement was for all job holders to possess, by April 
2005, an NVQ Level 4 qualification in Care or Social Work together with an NVQ Level 4 
qualification in Management. The skill requirements were therefore much higher for care 
managers than for care workers; moreover, they were binding on all job holders, in 
contrast to the quota system for care workers.  
We identify the treatment group as those holding jobs classified to the two SOC(2000) 
Unit Groups noted above, again making the necessary restriction that the industry sector 
of the employing organisation is classified to SIC(2007) Division 87 (Residential Care 
Activities) or 88 (Social Work Activities Without Accommodation). After making this 
exclusion, we consider that all of the jobs in our treatment group will be subject to 
licensing from April 2005 onwards. We form a comparison group from all other Unit 
Groups in SOC(2000) Major Group 1 (Managers and Senior Officials) which remained 
unregulated throughout the period 2001-2010. The sample of care managers numbers 
around 530 each year, whilst the sample of jobs in the comparison group numbers 
around 11,000 each year. 
Figure 6.3 presents charts showing the raw, unadjusted labour market outcomes for the 
treatment and comparison group over the period 2001-2010. Table 6.20 presents the 
results of the DiD regression analyses.  
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Figure 6.3 Labour market outcomes for social care managers and comparison group, 2001-2010 
 
Base: All employee and self-employed jobs in treatment and comparison groups (except for wages – employee jobs only) 
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Table 6.20 Difference-in-differences estimates for social care managers  
 Qualification level Job related training 
Job related training for 
qualification 
Gross hourly wages Employment 
 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
Treated 
group 0.115 ** 0.074 ** 0.082 ** 0.18 ** 0.125 ** 0.129 ** 0.124 ** 0.105 ** 0.106 ** -0.235 ** -0.117 ** -0.117 **       
 5.84  3.7  4.13  13.53  9.16  9.49  7.71  6.42  6.49  -10.59  -5.66  -5.65        
Treatment 
period 0.048 ** 0.05 ** 0.05 ** -0.017 ** -0.018 ** -0.019 ** -0.008 ** -0.007 ** -0.007 ** 0.126 ** 0.107 ** 0.105 ** 0.023  0.003  0.002  
 8.65  9.19  9.14  -6.57  -6.88  -7.2  -3.11  -2.72  -2.7  15.32  14.96  14.78  0.56  0.73  0.51  
Interaction 0.041  0.037  0.037  0.004  0.005  0.005  -0.022  -0.021  -0.021  0.026  0.002  0.005        
 1.66  1.55  1.55  0.26  0.29  0.32  -1.06  -1.05  -1.03  0.89  0.1  0.18        
Base                
Notes: t-statistics below coefficients; ** = significant at 1% level, * = significant at 5% level.  
(1) no additional control variables; (2) restricted set of control variables; (3) full set of control variables 
Base: All employee and self-employed jobs in treatment and comparison groups (except for wages – employee jobs only) 
Source: QLFS Apr 2001 - Sept 2010 
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The first chart suggests that, in common with care workers, levels of qualifications among 
care managers have risen relative to their comparators between the pre-and post-
treatment periods. The coefficient on the interaction term in the DiD regression is not 
statistically significant at the five per cent level, however, lying just outside of statistical 
significance at the 10 per cent level. Moreover, in common with care workers, any 
increase in qualification levels appears to have begun before April 2005 and dates back 
at least to 2001 when our observation period begins. There is thus a clear suggestion 
again of anticipation effects which may plausibly have been stimulated by the passing of 
the legislation in 2000. The third chart, which shows a sharp increase in 2001 in the 
percentage of care managers engaging in training that leads to a qualification, dropping 
away after the implementation of the licensing system, adds support to this hypothesis.56 
However, it would only be possible to examine the impact of the passing of the legislation 
on anticipatory activity with a longer period of data.  
Moving on to wages and employment, there is no suggestion of a treatment effect in 
either chart four or in the DiD regressions. However, in the case of wages, it is notable 
that, despite care managers being more qualified on average than their comparators (and 
increasingly so throughout the period), their wage levels are considerably lower than their 
comparators. This is not a function of the restricted base for the wage data, which is 
necessarily derived only from employees.57 One possibility, as discussed in the case of 
care assistants, is that wages are not free to respond to increase in human capital in this 
sector. Another possibility, however, which is given weight by the magnitude of the 
differential (roughly £4 per hour throughout the period) is that there is some segmentation 
in the market for managers. If this is the case, the treatment and comparison group may 
not be subject to common macro trends, and this caveat must be acknowledged.58  
6.6.4 Childcare workers 
The Childcare Act 2006 introduction a requirement for all childcare workers working with 
children aged seven or younger to register with Ofsted. Registration was not dependent 
upon possession of a relevant qualification, but was subject to background checks. This 
provision came into force in March 2007. The Childcare Act also led to the creation of the 
Early Years Foundation Stage framework which required, from September 2008, that 
childminders must have attended a training course within six months of registration and 
that, in registered settings other than childminding settings, all supervisors and managers 
                                                 
56
 It seems plausible that the NVQ Level 4 qualifications are more readily recognised by respondents as formal 
qualifications at QLFS question NEWQUL than the lower-level vocational qualifications required by care workers and 
security guards.  
57
 If one re-draws the charts in Figure 6.3 on a sample of employees only (excluding the self employed), the patterns are 
not qualitatively different.  
58
 It may be possible, through further investigation, to find a smaller comparison group within SOC Major Group 1 whose 
wage levels are closer to those of the treatment group in the pre-treatment period.  
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must hold a relevant NVQ Level 3 qualification and 50 per cent of all other staff must hold 
a relevant NVQ Level 2 qualification. These various provisions meant that, between 
March 2007 and September 2008, many childcare workers became subject to a 
registration requirement, and those working in registered settings became subject to skill 
requirements.  
We identify the treatment group as those holding jobs classified to SOC(2000) Unit Group 
6121 (Nursery Nurses), 6122 (Childminders and related occupations), 6123 (Playgroup 
leaders and assistants) and 6124 (Education assistants). Clearly the provisions of the 
legislation mean that not all workers in these groups will be subject to regulation and so, 
in common with care workers, one may expect some dilution of the possible effects when 
compared with full licensing. However, the group has the advantage that the relevant 
legislation was in place only a short time before its provisions came into force. We 
therefore expect this group to be relatively free of the long anticipation effects which we 
suspect may be at work among some of the other groups considered above.  
We form a comparison group from all other Unit Groups in SOC(2000) Major Group 6 
(Personal service occupations) which remained unregulated throughout the period 2001-
2010. The sample of childcare workers numbers around 1,000 each year, whilst the 
sample of jobs in the comparison group numbers around 500 each year. 
It is apparent from Figure 6.4 that qualification levels rose among the treatment group in 
the post-treatment period, whereas they remained broadly stable in the comparison 
group. The DiD regression analysis indicates a ‗treatment effect‘ of around six percentage 
points in the percentage of workers qualified to NVQ Level 2 or above. However, since 
chart one in Figure 6.4 indicates that qualifications among childcare workers were on a 
steady upward trend since 2001 (i.e. well before the introduction of the Childcare Act in 
2006), it seems unlikely that this indicates any of the anticipatory effects which we think 
may be present in other groups. The suspicion that the ‗treatment effect‘ indicated by the 
DiD analysis may be spurious is given further weight by the absence of any treatment 
effect on job related training. In summary, we find no effect on qualifications or training 
activity which can be robustly linked to the new regulatory regime for childcare workers. 
The DiD analysis further indicates a negative effect of the treatment on wages, although 
this is only statistically significant in the regression with additional controls. It indicates no 
effect on employment. The overall impression is, therefore, that the registration 
requirements introduced in 2007 and the subsequent skill requirements introduced for 
some workers in 2008 had little or no effect on labour market outcomes among childcare 
workers.  
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Figure 6.4 Labour market outcomes for childcare workers and comparison group, 2001-2010 
 
Base: All employee and self-employed jobs in treatment and comparison groups (except for wages – employee jobs only) 
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Table 6.21 Difference-in-differences estimates for childcare workers  
 Qualification level Job related training 
Job related training for 
qualification 
Gross hourly wages Employment 
 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
Treated 
group 0.137 ** 0.164 ** 0.16 ** 0.102 ** 0.076 ** 0.075 ** 0.068 ** 0.046 ** 0.041 ** -0.106 ** -0.041 ** -0.018  
      
 14.82  13.81  13.41  21.25  11.91  11.63  11.85  6.09  5.28  -8.82  -2.87  -1.29        
Treatment 
period 0.025  0.058 ** 0.058 ** -0.016 ** -0.013 * -0.011  -0.006  -0.005  -0.004  0.16 ** 0.174 ** 0.172 ** -0.023  -0.010  -0.010  
 1.96  4.62  4.65  -2.71  -2.12  -1.91  -0.96  -0.73  -0.62  9.32  11.45  11.51  -0.72  -1.26  -1.36  
Interaction 0.083 ** 0.055 ** 0.055 ** 0  -0.002  -0.004  -0.007  -0.006  -0.005  0.011  -0.033  -0.039 *       
 5.64  3.85  3.85  0.05  -0.32  -0.52  -0.84  -0.68  -0.6  0.56  -1.89  -2.26        
Base                
Notes: t-statistics below coefficients; ** = significant at 1% level, * = significant at 5% level.  
(1) no additional control variables; (2) restricted set of control variables; (3) full set of control variables 
Base: All employee and self-employed jobs in treatment and comparison groups (except for wages – employee jobs only) 
Source: QLFS Apr 2001 - Sept 2010 
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6.6.5 Automotive technicians 
The final group to be considered in this chapter comprises automotive technicians, who 
saw the introduction in June 2006 of an accreditation scheme run by the Institute of the 
Motor Industry. The Automotive Technician Accreditation (ATA) provides routes by which 
a variety of different types of automotive technician may become accredited. The 
requirements are broadly similar across the various roles however (e.g. light vehicle 
technician, paint technician, autoglazing technician), with accreditation requiring the 
applicant to hold either a relevant qualification at NVQ Level 2 or to have a specified 
period of industry experience (typically at least two years), and to successfully pass a 
practical assessment test.  
We identify the treatment group as those holding jobs classified to SOC(2000) Unit 
Groups 5232 (Vehicle body builders and repairers), 5234 (Vehicle spray painters) or 8135 
(Tyre, exhaust and windscreen fitters).59 We expect all job holders in these unit groups to 
be eligible for accreditation, subject to them meeting the criteria set out in the previous 
paragraph. We form a comparison group from all other Unit Groups in SOC(2000) Minor 
Groups 521 (Metal forming, welding and related trades), 522 (Metal machining, fitting and 
instrument making trades) and 523 (Vehicle trades), plus Unit Group 8132 (Assemblers 
of vehicles and metal goods). We thus draw the comparison group more tightly than in 
previous cases, due to the heterogeneous nature of SOC(2000) Major Groups 5 and 8.  
The sample of automotive technicians numbers around 400 each year, whilst the sample 
of jobs in the comparison group numbers around 3,500 each year. 
No effects of the introduction of the accreditation scheme are apparent on either 
qualification levels or the take up of job related training, either in Figure 6.5 or in the DiD 
regressions reported in Table 6.22. The introduction of the accreditation scheme does not 
therefore appear to have raised qualification levels within the affected occupations. This 
may perhaps be a function of the ability to gain accreditation through experience. The 
other possibility is that those workers who wished to become accredited already 
possessed the necessary qualifications.  
The DiD analysis shows no effect of accreditation on wages, although it is clearly 
apparent from the erratic trend in wages within the treatment group in the fourth chart in 
Figure 6.5 that sample sizes are a problem for the wages analysis in this particular 
                                                 
59
 We exclude Unit Group 5231 (motor mechanics and auto engineers) as some of the job holders in this unit group are 
subject to licensing.  
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case.60 The fifth chart in Figure 6.5 accords with the DiD analysis in showing no effect of 
the accreditation scheme on employment.  
 
                                                 
60
 It will be recalled that wages data are only collected from two-fifths of the QLFS sample in a given quarter.  
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Figure 6.5 Labour market outcomes for automotive technicians and comparison group, 2001-2010 
 
Base: All employee and self-employed jobs in treatment and comparison groups (except for wages – employee jobs only) 
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Table 6.22 Difference-in-differences estimates for automotive technicians 
 Qualification level Job related training 
Job related training for 
qualification 
Gross hourly wages Employment 
 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
Treated 
group -0.098 ** -0.101 ** -0.1 ** -0.026 ** -0.029 ** -0.028 
 
-0.010  -0.010  -0.010  -0.179 ** -0.046 * -0.046 * 
      
 -5.24  -4.78  -4.75  -3.59  -3.51  -3.45  -1.11  -1.04  -0.97  -7.82  -2.08  -2.14        
Treatment 
period -0.001  0.003  0.004  -0.004  -0.005  -0.005 
 
-0.009  -0.010 * -0.010 * 0.126 ** 0.132 ** 0.134 ** -0.088  0.004  0.004 
 
 -0.15  0.37  0.42  -0.88  -1.17  -1.22  -1.73  -2.06  -2.03  11.51  13.59  13.88  -1.57  0.52  0.53  
Interaction -0.023  -0.029  -0.028  -0.002  -0.001  0.000  0.006  0.011  0.011  0.020  0.011  0.010        
 -0.78  -0.99  -0.98  -0.21  -0.1  -0.03  0.4  0.77  0.77  0.53  0.3  0.29        
Base                
Notes: t-statistics below coefficients; ** = significant at 1% level, * = significant at 5% level.  
(1) no additional control variables; (2) restricted set of control variables; (3) full set of control variables 
Base: All employee and self-employed jobs in treatment and comparison groups (except for wages – employee jobs only) 
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6.7 Summary and conclusions 
In this chapter of the report, we present the results of a quantitative analysis which 
compares labour market outcomes among groups of employees who are subject to 
different forms of occupational regulation (including those in occupations which are 
unregulated). The analysis is based on data from the Quarterly Labour Force Survey; a 
large, quarterly survey of households, conducted by the Office for National Statistics 
(ONS).  
Theoretical expectations, and the weight of available evidence, form the clearest 
hypotheses in respect of licensing. The introduction of a universal, skills based entry 
requirement can be expected to raise average skill levels in the occupation, since low 
quality workers who cannot meet the new entry requirement are forced out (thereby 
depressing employment levels) whilst other low quality workers must engage in job 
related training in order to increase their human capital to the new minimum standard. If 
the stock of human capital in the occupation rises because of the new entry requirement, 
or if the supply of labour falls, then wages can be expected to rise, as long as consumers 
are willing to pay higher prices. There is ample evidence of wage and employment effects 
arising from licensing in the US. However, there is less evidence of the effects of other 
forms of regulation (and greater uncertainty in the expected outcomes). Moreover, the 
available quantitative evidence for the UK is notably sparse, even in the case of licensing. 
The purpose of the analysis presented in this report is to provide up to date quantitative 
evidence on these issues. 
We first reported cross-sectional analyses in which we examined the extent to which any 
raw differences in wage levels, qualifications and the take up of job related training 
between workers in regulated and unregulated occupations persisted after controlling for 
compositional differences. We found that many differences did persist. This could 
suggest that the various forms of occupational regulation investigated here have some 
causal impact on these labour market outcomes. However, the patterns of results seen in 
the cross-sectional analysis were notable for their inconsistency across occupational 
groups. The most consistent set of results identified a positive association between 
licensing and qualifications, job related training and wages within Professional and 
Associate Professional occupations. However, the negative coefficients seen among 
other groups, and associated with other forms of regulation, make it equally plausible that 
unobservable factors are at work which we have been unable to account for with the data 
available from the QLFS.  
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We employed a difference-in-differences (DiD) approach in an attempt to resolve this 
identification problem. In the absence of the random assignment of occupational 
regulation, we used the extension of occupational regulation to five specific occupations 
over the period 2001-2010 as a form of ‗natural experiment‘. We examined the wage 
differential (say) between the workers in a soon to be regulated occupation (the treatment 
group) and the workers in similar unregulated occupation (the comparison group). We 
then examined whether the magnitude of that differential changed after the treatment 
group became regulated. Any such change would indicate a causal effect of regulation, if 
one were to assume that all other macro trends were common to both treatment and 
comparison groups. Table 6.23 summarises the findings.  
We identified some effects which could plausibly be attributed to the introduction of 
occupational regulation. These included a rise in wages among security guards following 
the introduction of a licensing system in 2003 and a rise in qualification levels and job 
related training among care workers as a result of the introduction of a licensing system 
in 2005. Considerable anticipation effects were apparent in respect of the latter group, 
however, as they were in respect of care managers, who were covered by the same 
provisions which had their origins in legislation passed some five years earlier.  
Elsewhere, in the case of childcare workers and automotive technicians, we found no 
evidence that the introduction of occupational regulation had affected labour market 
outcomes. This may be because the regulations were somewhat weaker in either case, 
placing skill requirements only on a minority of workers (in the case of childcare) or 
comprising only of a voluntary scheme (in the case of vehicle repairers). It is difficult to 
make generalisations from these few cases, but the evidence provided by the DiD 
analysis does suggest, quite plausibly, that the effects of occupational regulation can be 
expected to be stronger when the entry requirements are either higher or are more 
extensively applied.  
An examination of further cases would enable this final proposition to be placed on a 
firmer footing. Further research could usefully investigate the possibility of extending the 
observation period back beyond 2001 in order to examine possible anticipation effects 
more thoroughly. It could also usefully investigate the sensitivity of our results to 
alternative specifications of the comparison group.  
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Table 6.23 Summary of estimated impact of regulation from difference-in-differences analyses 
 Characteristics of regulation Estimated impact of regulation (from DiD analysis) Comments 
 Type of 
regulation 
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7 Summary and conclusions 
7.1 Introduction 
This report uses the term ‗occupational regulation‘ as a broad heading for a set of 
mechanisms – namely licensing, registration, certification and accreditation - through 
which minimum skill standards are applied within occupations. Such mechanisms provide 
incentives for workers and employers to invest in skills by establishing a framework of 
rewards which are contingent upon successful attainment of a specified skill level. The 
use of occupational regulation as a mechanism for increasing the demand for, and supply 
of, skills was considered – alongside other measures such as training levies – as part of 
the UK Commission‘s recent Review of Employers Collective Measures (Stanfield et al., 
2009).61 However, that Review acknowledged that the general topic of occupational 
regulation remains severely under researched in the UK. It went on to recommend that a 
further, more detailed investigation of the issue should be carried out. This report 
presents the findings from that investigation.  
The overall aims of the research were to:  
 map the current pattern of occupational regulation in the UK;  
 review the theory regarding the operation and impact of occupational regulation; 
 examine the existing evidence on the impacts of occupational regulation in the UK 
and abroad; 
 provide initial estimates of the impact of occupational regulation on labour market 
outcomes such as skill levels, wages and employment in the UK. 
In so doing, it was expected that the research would inform the development of policy on 
the specific issue of skills, but would also aid the development of labour market policy 
more generally. 
7.2 Theoretical perspectives on occupational regulation 
Much of the existing theory on the development and impact of occupational regulation is 
focused on occupational licensing. This is the strictest form of occupational regulation 
and refers to situations in which it is unlawful to carry out a specified range of activities for 
pay without first having obtained a licence which confirms that the license holder meets 
prescribed standards of competence.  
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 The Review focused mainly on one form of occupational regulation, namely occupational licensing. 
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A simple theory of licensing indicates that the imposition of a universal, skills based entry 
requirement through licensing can be expected to raise average skill levels in the 
occupation, since low quality workers who cannot meet the new entry requirement are 
forced out whilst other low quality workers must engage in job related training in order to 
increase their human capital to the new minimum standard. If the stock of human capital 
in the occupation rises because of the new entry requirement, then one may also expect 
the quality of the product or service to increase and thus for wages to rise, as long as 
consumers are willing to reward the associated increase in product/service quality by 
paying higher prices. Yet, if prices and wages are free to respond to changes in supply, 
then any restriction of the number of workers in the occupation may also drive prices 
upwards and allow wages to rise. Thus wages may increase as a result of human capital 
effects or monopoly effects. Employment levels within the occupation – and the 
availability of the associated product or service to consumers – may fall in the short term, 
as low quality workers who cannot meet the new minimum standard are barred from 
engaging in the now regulated activity. In the medium to long term, however, any rise in 
average wages in the occupation may attract higher quality workers who now see the 
possibility of a return on their human capital investments. This could increase average 
skill levels further, whilst also depressing any negative employment effect.  
More complex theories provide insights into the detailed operation and effects of 
licensing, however, which further illuminate the possible effects. First, it is clear that the 
incentive for upskilling to meet the new skill standard is likely to be weak if incumbents 
are grandfathered into the new system or if workers can move to alternative (unregulated) 
occupations with little loss of income.62 The propensity to engage in further upskilling 
once licensed will depend upon the usual market mechanisms, unless the licensing 
system intervenes by providing explicit requirements for continued professional 
development. The incentives for workers and firms to invest in human capital before and 
after entry to the occupation will thus vary on a case by case basis.  
Second, the likely availability of monopoly rents provides incentives for individuals and 
firms to invest in newly regulated occupations. However, in the short term at least, this 
can result in higher consumer prices for the products or services provided by that 
occupation. Whether these persist depends, in part, on consumers' preferences for the 
good or service, and whether they can substitute away from that good or service to 
similar alternatives. It also depends upon how the labour market responds to the new 
regulation. An important factor here is the responsiveness of labour supply to the 
regulation and the degree to which entry to the newly regulated occupation is truly limited. 
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 The incentive is also likely to be weak if enforcement is ineffective, as would be the case if the agency which issues 
licences does not check applicants‘ credentials or if the market is not regularly purged of unlicensed operators.  
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Indeed, if monopoly rents are available and there are also entry opportunities, workers 
and firms may migrate away from other activities towards the regulated occupation and 
so the total number of providers of the good or service in the regulated occupation may 
ultimately rise. 
At the same time, it is important to recognise that there is also a 'political' element to 
occupational regulation since those with a vested interest in an occupation being 
regulated may use their political capital to create monopoly rents through regulation. This 
is most likely in cases where the members of the occupation play a pivotal role in 
determining entry standards. Vested interests may manifest themselves, for example, in 
unnecessarily restrictive skill demands to enter the occupation.  
It is also important to recognise the potential for wider labour market adjustments. In the 
initial stages of occupational regulation, and in the absence of constraints, the labour 
market will adjust to the new skill standards set for the occupation. This adjustment may 
involve unemployment for workers who cannot meet the skill standard and who cannot 
find alternative employment. If their numbers are sufficient, their unemployment may drive 
down wages in the wider labour market and, if they enter particular alternative 
occupations, this may drive down wages in those particular jobs due to a supply shock. 
Consequently, there are potentially important spillover effects in the labour market, at 
least in the short term. 
The potential product market effects also need to be recognised. If occupational 
regulation limits the opportunities for workers and firms to produce low quality 
goods/services, it is likely to push up the average quality of what is produced in the 
regulated occupation. Whilst quality standardisation may be prized, low income 
consumers may find the costs charged for the higher standard good/service prohibitive 
and may therefore be forced to seek substitute services. If they are unable to find 
substitutes they may rely on lower quality services provided by illegal or unethical 
providers or choose not to consume at all. In these circumstances overall welfare among 
those previously consuming the unregulated goods/services may fall.  
Finally, it is not simply whether an occupation is regulated or not that may affect labour 
market and product market outcomes, but also the nature of that regulation. For example, 
whilst grandfathering rights can limit the potential extent of upskilling they can also limit 
unemployment effects among incumbents (similarly, 'sunset clauses' can be used to 
remove licensing if regulators feel that regulation has served its purpose in improving 
standards of operation in the occupation63). In addition, periodic reviews of the minimum 
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 Although in practice such clauses are rarely imposed. Furthermore, it is unusual for an occupation, which is subject to 
licensing, to move down the scale of occupational regulation or, indeed, become unregulated.  
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standards required of new entrants can be undertaken to ensure that any standards 
remain fit for purpose. 
Less restrictive forms of regulation such as certification and accreditation offer the 
possibility of ensuring quality for consumers and of providing practitioners with higher 
incomes and labour market status. However, they have the disadvantage of providing 
weaker incentives for upskilling since, in the absence of a universal entry barrier, the 
strength of any incentives for human capital investments will ultimately depend upon the 
degree of demand for certified/accredited workers in the product market.  
The theorised effects of occupational regulation are thus complex and their practical 
realisations, in particular labour and product markets, depend upon their interaction with a 
range of other factors including: price structures in product and labour markets; the 
existing stock of human capital; political processes governing the regulation of 
occupations; and the effects of other labour market institutions. Empirical studies are 
therefore critical in understanding the effects of occupational regulation under different 
scenarios. 
7.3 Existing evidence 
Although many studies have been conducted into occupational licensing in the United 
States, there is a paucity of evidence on the prevalence, operation and impact of 
occupational regulations in most EU countries, including the UK. Nonetheless, the 
available evidence suggests that licensing is less common in the UK than it is in the US. 
The overall conclusions from the US studies on the impact of licensing are that, in 
general, occupational licensing increases the wage of licensed workers, reduces 
employment growth and raises the price of goods or services but without any overall 
improvements in the quality of service or product offered.  
The magnitude of the effects vary, however. For instance, US research suggests that 
those licensed occupations, which benefit most in terms of wages, have certain 
characteristics, such as dealing directly with customers or patients or working 
independently of other licensed occupations (e.g. doctors, dentists and lawyers). But 
there is very limited evidence from the US on the impact on skill levels or the propensity 
to engage in job related training.  
The available evidence on the operation of occupational regulation within countries such 
as Germany, France and Italy is extremely limited. This makes it very difficult to make 
comparative assessments of the efficacy and impact of licensing in different national 
contexts within Europe. However, wage premia do seem lower in some EU countries, 
A Review of Occupational Regulation and its Impact 
146 
such as Germany, than they are in the US. Post entry controls on the level of 
professionals‘ fees and, by implication, earnings have been offered as one potential 
explanation. This serves to indicate the importance of the broader regulatory framework 
applying to labour and product markets (particularly competition law) in shaping the 
effects of occupational licensing.  
The position of the UK, in relation to other countries in the EU in respect of its approach 
to occupational regulation, is not easy to discern. From the available evidence it appears 
that the UK is less restrictive than many EU countries in its approach to regulating some 
professions, but that it is more restrictive than many in its approach to regulating lower 
skilled occupations. However, in contrast to evidence from counterparts within the EU, 
existing research does indicate that licensing is associated with a wage premium in the 
UK and that this is higher for the more skilled and better paid occupations. Furthermore, 
firm evidence on the employment effects of licensing is currently missing, as is evidence 
on the impact of regulation on product markets. 
Nonetheless, within the UK, there is some evidence in the research literature that the 
training requirements recommended or imposed in lower skilled occupations have had 
some effect in increasing the level of training and qualifications (e.g. among care 
workers). In other cases, however, (e.g. the introduction of licensing for private security 
guards) the existing evidence suggests that the new skill standards have been too low (or 
the barriers to access them have been too high) to result in any substantial up skilling of 
the workforce in question.  
7.4 Mapping occupational regulation in the UK  
In order to address the absence of any comprehensive information on the prevalence or 
nature of occupational regulation in the UK, we draw up a map of occupational regulation 
in the UK. The map has been compiled at SOC(2000) Unit Group level and classifies the 
type of occupational regulation that applies within each Unit Group, as well as providing a 
range of details about the characteristics and enforcement of these regulations. Among 
the 353 Unit Groups in the SOC(2000) Classification, some 82 contain jobs that require 
licences to practice. A further 19 contain jobs for which there is a state based certification 
scheme, whilst 20 contain jobs that are subject to registration requirements. A further 67 
Unit Groups contain jobs for which there is no state based regulation but for which there 
exists a recognised, non-governmental accreditation scheme. This leaves 165 Unit 
Groups that are classified as being ‗unregulated‘.  
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The database enables estimates of the prevalence of each form of occupational 
regulation to be compiled and also enables estimates of the impact of occupational 
regulation to be derived. 
7.5 The prevalence of occupational regulation in the UK 
Estimates of the prevalence of occupational regulation are derived using data from the 
UK‘s Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLFS). By matching the mapping spreadsheet to 
the QLFS one is able to classify each job in the economy according to the regulatory 
characteristics of the Unit Group to which it belongs. One can then obtain an estimate of 
the percentage of all jobs that are accounted for by Unit Groups requiring licences to 
practice, for example. The partial coverage of some Unit Groups means that one obtains 
upper and lower bound estimates of the prevalence of regulation.  
The upper bound estimates indicate that: up to 31 per cent of all jobs require licences to 
practice; up to three per cent have the option of state certification; up to six per cent 
require registration; and up to 19 per cent have the option of accreditation. The lower 
bound estimates indicate that: at least 14 per cent of all jobs require licences to practice; 
at least three per cent have the option of state certification; at least two per cent require 
registration; and at least 10 per cent have the option of accreditation. These estimates 
imply that the overall percentage of jobs that are covered by state based regulation of 
some form (whether licensing, certification or registration) lies between 40 per cent and 
19 per cent. The percentage of jobs that are ‗unregulated‘ lies between 40 per cent and 
72 per cent.  
Those Unit Groups which contribute most to the range of uncertainty are ones in which 
only a minority of the jobs are likely to be subject to the regulation. Accordingly, we judge 
that the true incidence of licensing is closer to 14 per cent than 31 per cent and that the 
true incidence of accreditation is closer to 10 per cent than 19 per cent. The percentage 
of unregulated jobs is thus much closer to 72 per cent than 40 per cent.  
Based on the lower bound estimates, we find that the percentage of jobs subject to 
licensing requirements has risen from 12 per cent in 2001 to 14 per cent in 2010, whilst 
the percentage of unregulated jobs has fallen from 77 per cent to 72 per cent. Around half 
of the two percentage point growth in licensing since 2001 on this measure has come 
about because of the extension of licensing requirements to Unit Groups that were 
previously unlicensed; the remaining half can be attributed to a higher rate of employment 
growth among licensed occupations than among non-licensed occupations over the past 
decade. 
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Professional occupations are the most likely to be regulated, and the most likely to be 
subject to licensing. They are followed by Process, plant and machine operatives – a 
group which includes taxi drivers, HGV drivers and others requiring transportation 
licences. A majority of jobs in each of these Major Groups is subject to some form of 
regulation. In contrast, only a small minority of jobs are estimated to be regulated (in any 
form) within those Major Groups which comprise of Sales occupations, Skilled trades, 
Personal service occupations and Elementary occupations.  
Turning to demographic characteristics, regulated jobs are more likely to be held by men 
than by women, with the certification group very strongly biased towards men (87 per 
cent of job holders in this group are male). Those in the licensing and accreditation 
groups tend to be older, on average, than other groups, which may be related to the time 
investment that is sometimes needed in order to gain the qualifications or work 
experience that is required under a licence to practice or an accreditation. Those in the 
licensing group are also less likely to be white than the average, but are a little more likely 
to be disabled than those in the other groups.  
7.6 The impact of occupational regulation on qualification levels, 
training and wages in the UK 
In order to provide new evidence on the labour market outcomes of occupational 
regulation in the UK, new analysis was undertaken which compared qualification levels, 
training receipt and wages among groups of employees who are subject to different forms 
of occupational regulation (including those in occupations which are unregulated). The 
analysis was based on data from the Quarterly Labour Force Survey; a large, quarterly 
survey of households, conducted by the Office for National Statistics (ONS).  
Cross-sectional analysis was used to examine the extent to which any raw differences in 
wage levels, qualifications and the take up of job related training between workers in 
regulated and unregulated occupations persist after controlling for demographic 
characteristics and other job characteristics. Such analyses help us to gain a better 
understanding of the nature of regulated jobs and how they differ (in cross-section) from 
unregulated jobs. In summary, the raw differences in wages and so on between regulated 
and unregulated jobs were not always explained away by other observable worker 
characteristics. In particular, within SOC(2000) Major Groups 2 (Professional 
occupations) and 3 (Associate Professional and Technical occupations), qualification 
levels, job related training and wages were found to be higher among workers in Unit 
Groups that are subject to licensing than among workers in unregulated Unit Groups. 
This was in line with expectations and the limited existing evidence for the UK. However, 
in most other Major Groups there were instances where licensing was associated with 
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lower levels of qualifications, training and wages. This suggests that there are 
unobservable factors at work which we were unable to account for in this cross-sectional 
framework with the data available from the QLFS. Such unobservable factors would 
confound any attempts to identify a causal effect of occupational regulation through 
cross-sectional analysis. Specifically, occupational regulation is not randomly assigned. 
Instead, there are often particular reasons why one occupation is subject to regulation 
and another occupation is not. In such cases, it is difficult for cross-sectional analyses to 
account for any consequent biases.  
A difference-in-differences (DiD) approach was employed in an attempt to identify the 
causal relationship between occupational regulation and labour market outcomes. In the 
absence of the random assignment of occupational regulation, the extension of 
occupational regulation to specific occupations over the period 2001-2010 was used as a 
form of ‗natural experiment‘. The analysis examined the wage differential (say) between 
the workers in a soon to be regulated occupation (the treatment group) and the workers 
in similar unregulated occupation (the comparison group). It then examined whether the 
magnitude of that differential changes after the treatment group becomes regulated. By 
assuming common trends for the treatment and control groups in the absence of the 
intervention (i.e. that the pre-treatment differential would have been maintained if the 
treatment had not occurred), the DiD methodology aims to provide a robust estimate of 
the causal impact of regulation.  
The analysis focused on five occupations which saw either the introduction of regulation 
or a change in the type of regulation over the period 2001-2010, namely:  
 Private security guards, who saw the introduction of a licensing system in April 2003; 
 Social care managers, who switched from certification to licensing in April 2005;  
 Care workers, a quota of whom (at least 50% in each residential care home) were 
required after April 2005 to hold an appropriate NVQ in order for the home to meet a 
set of mandatory National Minimum Standards for care homes;  
 Childcare workers, who switched from certification to licensing in March 2007; 
 Automotive technicians, who saw the introduction of an accreditation scheme in June 
2006. 
The analysis identified some effects which could plausibly be attributed to the introduction 
of occupational regulation. These included a rise in wages among security guards 
following the introduction of a licensing system in 2003 and a rise in qualification levels, 
and job related training, among care workers as a result of the introduction of a set of 
National Minimum Standards for care homes in 2005. Considerable anticipation effects 
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were apparent in respect of the latter group, however, as they were in respect of care 
managers, who were covered by provisions which also had their origins in legislation 
passed some five years earlier.  
Elsewhere, in the case of childcare workers and automotive technicians, we found no 
evidence that the introduction of occupational regulation had affected qualification levels, 
the take up of job related training or the level of wages. This may be because the 
regulations were somewhat weaker in these instances, placing qualifications 
requirements only on a minority of workers (in the case of childcare) or comprising only of 
a voluntary scheme (in the case of vehicle repairers). It is difficult to make generalisations 
from these few cases, but the evidence provided by the DiD analysis does suggest, quite 
plausibly, that the effects of occupational regulation can be expected to be stronger when 
the entry requirements are either higher or are more extensively applied. An examination 
of further cases would enable this proposition to be placed on a firmer footing, although 
data constraints necessarily limit the possibilities. 
7.7 Implications for policy  
Forms of occupational regulation, such as licensing, certification and accreditation, clearly 
have the potential to raise average skill levels in an occupation. They do so by providing 
new incentives for workers or firms to invest in occupation specific human capital. The 
incentives are clearly strongest – and more equally felt by both workers and firms – in the 
case of licensing.  
The limited pre-existing evidence on the impact of occupational regulation in the UK 
indicated that such upskilling has occurred in some specific cases, and our analysis 
found further empirical support for this. However, our analysis also supported the notion 
that the effects on skill levels can also sometimes be limited. We find no widespread and 
consistent effects on skill levels. The effects appear to be heavily contingent upon the 
prevailing circumstances within a particular occupation and its wider labour and product 
market.  
At the heart of any policy on whether or not to regulate an occupation is a trade off 
between the potential benefits of occupational regulation and its potential costs. Those 
benefits can include a more highly skilled labour force, at least in the regulated sector, 
improvements in quality of goods or services provided in the regulated sector, and 
welfare benefits for the regulated sector in terms of wages and profits.  
The potential downsides include possible negative spillovers into the unregulated sector 
of the labour market, such as the depression of wages in adjacent labour markets due to 
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labour supply shocks, and a diminution in the number of providers. With these labour 
market effects come potential costs for consumers in terms of higher prices and thus 
difficulties in accessing services at affordable prices. Of course, if labour markets are 
sufficiently flexible, the downside of regulation may be temporary because, once markets 
have adjusted, a new equilibrium may be reached in which higher skilled workers offer 
higher quality goods and services which customers see as 'value for money' because 
they recognise that they are paying quality adjusted higher prices. On the other hand, 
regulation can drive a wedge into the labour market, resulting in segmentation between 
the regulated and unregulated sectors, creating a 'two-tier' system which may not be 
welfare enhancing in sum. 
Although our research has found some evidence of wage increases among regulated 
occupations, the results were not consistent across all of the occupations that we have 
studied. Furthermore, we found no evidence of negative effects on employment. The 
potential downsides of occupational regulation were thus not prominent in our findings. 
However, we were able to look at employment effects for only a small number of 
occupations and we were unable to look at price/quality effects. The evidence base on 
these issues thus remains relatively limited for the UK.  
If policymakers or employers believe there is a strong prima facie case for regulation of a 
particular occupation, the other issue is how to regulate that occupation. This raises 
questions about the design of the regulation (e.g. whether any skill standard should be 
mandatory or voluntary; at what level the skill standard should be set; whether the 
regulatory scheme should be aimed at employers or individuals; whether the renewal of 
licences should be conditional upon evidence of further training etc.). It also raises 
questions about its governance (e.g. who is empowered to regulate; how and when the 
scheme should be monitored for its fitness for purpose etc.). These major design factors 
can be crucial in determining the actual effects of regulation.  
Two policy considerations emerge from the discussion above. The first is whether there is 
a prima facie case for regulating a particular occupation. The second consideration is 
how to go about creating, enforcing and monitoring the regulation. The latter can be just 
as important as the former in determining ultimate labour market and product market 
outcomes.  
There may be analogies with the policy making considerations which surrounded the 
introduction and enforcement of the statutory national minimum wage. The costs and 
benefits of the regulation of prices for labour were central in that instance, as were 
alternative models for setting a wage and enforcing it. If anything, occupational regulation 
is liable to be more complicated since it must cover a variety of different policy 
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instruments relating to different occupations. The design of such policies therefore 
requires extensive knowledge of labour market and product markets, and of the 
incentives and constraints which apply to the various actors within them. The analysis 
conducted in this research project has identified considerable heterogeneity, both in the 
design of occupational regulations within the UK and in the apparent impact of regulation 
across different occupations. This indicates that the detailed outcomes of regulation – 
and thus the case for regulating – can only be determined on a case by case basis. 
7.8 Avenues for further research 
The work undertaken in the project suggests a number of avenues for further research to 
augment the existing evidence base, which remains limited for the UK in spite of the new 
analysis discussed above.  
1. It would be beneficial to extend the Map of Occupational Regulation so that the 
incidence of voluntary accreditation schemes is mapped in a more comprehensive 
manner. At present, accreditation schemes have only been mapped in a systematic 
fashion within Unit Groups that are not subject to any of the three forms of state 
based regulation; the Map of Occupational Regulation thus provides a partial picture 
of the prevalence of accreditation. If the availability of accreditation schemes was also 
to be mapped within Unit Groups that are subject to licensing, certification or 
registration, this would allow for the production of more complete estimates of the 
availability of accreditation schemes within the UK. It would thus add to the existing 
knowledge on the prevalence and nature of different forms of occupational regulation. 
It would also enable accreditation to be handled separately, alongside state based 
forms of regulation, in any statistical analysis of the impact of regulation, 
acknowledging the fact that accreditation and state based forms of regulation are not 
mutually exclusive.  
2. Fielding survey questions on the incidence of different forms of occupational 
regulation has the potential to address some of the other limitations in the SOC based 
Map of Occupational Regulation. Such an approach offers the potential to obtain 
more precise estimates of: (a) the percentages of jobs covered by different forms of 
regulation; and (b) the percentages of workers who have been successful in their 
applications under the various regulatory schemes. This would not only enable one to 
be more definitive about the coverage of different forms of regulation, it would also 
have benefits when attempting to estimate the effects of licensing on wages and other 
outcomes since, if some regulated jobs are classified as unregulated (or vice versa), 
this is likely to bias any estimates of the effects of regulation. 
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3. There is scope to extend the difference-in-differences analysis to a greater selection 
of occupations. However, there is also scope to build on the analysis which has 
already been done by: (i) exploiting cross country variation within the UK in the timing 
of the introduction of some recent licensing requirements (e.g. for security guards) so 
as to provide closely matched counterfactuals; (ii) extending the period of observation 
back into the 1990s so as to explore anticipation effects. Both would assist with the 
identification of the causal impact of regulation.  
4. There is also scope to extend the analysis of skills impact by matching the Map of 
Occupational Regulation to other datasets which provide information on workers‘ skill 
attainments. One obvious candidate is the UK Skills Survey. This would provide direct 
measures of worker skill, in contrast to the measures of qualifications, job related 
training and skill deficiencies that have been analysed within the current project.  
5. A feasibility study undertaken as part of the broader project indicated that it would be 
possible in some circumstances to conduct analysis of the impacts of occupational 
regulation on product quality and prices in the UK. Such research – which may be 
qualitative or quantitative – would address a clear gap in the available evidence for 
the UK by indicating the circumstances in which the introduction of occupational 
regulation can have positive or negative impacts on product markets. Such research 
could usefully examine the potential for post entry conduct regulations (such as price 
caps) to mitigate some of the potential negative effects of introducing skill related 
entry barriers.  
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Annex A: Options for Improving the Measurement 
of Occupational Regulation 
A.1 Introduction 
The SOC based classification described in Chapter Four of the Report has the notable 
advantage of enabling us to produce the first comprehensive and nationally 
representative estimates of the proportions of jobs which are subject to different types of 
occupational regulation in the UK. However, as discussed in Sections 4.4. and 5.2, there 
are two limitations to this approach.  
Limitation 1: The problem of aggregation in SOC 
There is first the potential for measurement error, if some types of jobs within the Unit 
Group are subject to mandatory licensing or registration requirements, whilst others are 
not, as is the case in Unit Group 6124 (Education assistants). In such cases, one cannot 
obtain a definitive estimate of the percentage of all jobs in the economy that are subject 
to such mandatory requirements. Equally, if some jobs in the Unit Group have the option 
of certification or accreditation but others do not, as is the case in Unit Group 1132 
(Marketing and sales managers), it is not possible to obtain a definitive estimate of the 
percentage of all jobs to which the options of certification or accreditation are available. In 
these cases, one can obtain an upper bound estimate of prevalence (the maximum 
percentage of jobs that are regulated) by assuming that all jobs within partially regulated 
Unit Groups are subject to regulation; and one can obtain a lower bound estimate (the 
minimum percentage of jobs that are regulated) by assuming that none of the jobs in 
such Unit Groups are subject to regulation.  
The range between these upper and lower bound estimates is small in the cases of 
certification and registration, but relatively large in the cases of licensing and 
accreditation (see Table 5.1) Consequently, the range between the upper and lower 
bound estimates of the percentage of jobs that are unregulated is considerable. We have 
used our knowledge of the types of jobs that are regulated in partially covered Unit 
Groups to judge that the true estimates of the prevalence of each type of regulation are 
closer to the lower bounds than to the upper bounds. However, the true estimates are 
themselves unknown.  
Limitation 2: Classifying jobs not workers 
The second limitation of the SOC based approach is that it is based on a classification of 
whether the particular type of job held by a worker is subject to regulation and so it does 
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not indicate the percentage of workers who have been awarded licences, been certified 
or accredited or who have registered to practice. It cannot account for non-compliance 
with mandatory licensing or registration requirements and it can give no estimate of the 
take up of certification or accreditation schemes. The SOC based approach can only 
provide estimates of the percentages of jobs that are subject to different forms of 
regulation; the numbers of workers who have successfully met the regulatory 
requirements is necessarily lower. 
Given these limitations, it would clearly be preferable if one could obtain more precise 
estimates of: (a) the percentages of jobs covered by different forms of regulation; and (b) 
the percentages of workers who have been successful in their applications under the 
various regulatory schemes. This would not only enable one to be more definitive about 
the coverage of different forms of regulation, it would also have benefits when attempting 
to estimate the effects of licensing on wages and other outcomes. If some regulated jobs 
are classified as unregulated (or vice versa) this is likely to bias any estimates of the 
effects of regulation.64 
No other means of classifying the regulatory status of jobs or workers has yet been 
attempted in the UK, other than the SOC based approach which we have adopted in this 
research report. However, the remainder of this Annex goes on to examine three possible 
alternatives.  
A.2  Option 1: Weighting Unit Groups using administrative data 
The first approach that is discussed here is to weight Unit Groups according to the 
percentage of jobs or workers within that Group which are thought to be subject to 
regulation. The upper bound estimates in Table 5.1, in the main body of the report, give 
partially covered groups a weight of 1, whilst the lower bound estimates given them a 
weight of zero. However, in some cases, it would be possible to devise a weight between 
0 and 1 on the basis of administrative data. 
For instance, if one was concerned to estimate the proportion of all jobs that were subject 
to licensing requirements, yet one had Unit Groups in which only some jobs were subject 
to licensure, it would theoretically be possible to use administrative data on the number of 
issued licences to estimate the actual percentage of jobs in that Unit Group which were 
covered by the regulations (subject to an assumption of full compliance). This estimate 
could be used to compute a weight for all jobs in that Unit Group. Taking Unit Group 6124 
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 Specifically, if the measurement error in the regulation status variable is random (i.e. uncorrelated with the outcome of 
interest, say the wage premium from occupational licensing), then the estimated effect of regulation will be biased 
downwards towards zero. If the measurement error is correlated with the outcome, however, then the estimated effect of 
regulation could be biased upwards or downwards, depending on which types of workers were more or less likely to be 
mis-classified.  
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(Education assistants) as an example, only those educational assistant jobs which 
involve contact with children under five years of age are subject to licensing. Suppose 
that the QLFS classifies N1 jobs to this Unit Group. If the regulatory body‘s records 
indicated that current licences were held by N2 education assistants, one would estimate 
that (N2/N1)*100 per cent of all jobs in this Unit Group were subject to licensing. Applying 
a weight of (N2/N1) to each job in Unit Group 6124, in the QLFS, would then produce a 
more accurate overall estimate of the prevalence of licensing which took account of the 
partial coverage of licensure in this Unit Group. The approach could be repeated for all 35 
Unit Groups in which only some job titles are covered by mandatory requirements.    
This approach would not be able to improve the accuracy of any estimates of the 
percentages of jobs to which the options of certification or accreditation were available, 
since administrative data could not indicate which jobs in a partially covered Unit Group 
were actually eligible. But the administrative data could indicate the number of workers 
who had been successfully certified or accredited. Following the approach outlined 
above, one could then use the QLFS to estimate the percentage of workers in any Unit 
Group (and thus in the whole economy) that are certified or accredited. For instance, the 
Register of Exercise Professionals notes that it has around 30,000 individuals on its 
register. If the QLFS were to indicate that there were N3 exercise professionals in 
employment, one could estimate that (N3/30,000)*100 per cent of all exercise 
professionals are currently certified. Applying a weight of (N3/33,000) to each job in Unit 
Group 3443 (Fitness instructors) in the QLFS, and repeating this for other Unit Groups 
subject to certification or accreditation, would then enable one to produce an aggregate 
estimate of the percentage of all workers that are certified or accredited.  
This approach would address the aggregation problem inherent in the SOC based 
classification of licensing and registration, and it would provide worker based estimates of 
the prevalence of certifications and accreditations. However, the problems with this 
approach are numerous. First, it relies on available data from each regulatory body; those 
operating state backed schemes (licensing, registration or certification) may be 
persuaded to provide it, but those operating accreditation schemes are unlikely to feel 
any obligation to do so. Second the data must be of good quality with no double counting, 
yet this will not always be the case: the Security Industry Authority (SIA) can issue more 
than one licence to a single individual if that person‘s work is multi faceted and the SIA 
knows only of the numbers of licences issued, not the number of licensed individuals. 
Third, in order to be comparable with the employment data extracted from the QLFS, the 
data on regulated persons should include only those currently in employment in the 
specified occupation – it should exclude those who are no longer practising in the UK 
(either because they have retired, died or emigrated) and should exclude those who are 
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currently unemployed. There are unlikely to be any enforcement bodies who can supply 
such information, as none are them are likely to have the means to exclude the 
unemployed and they are only likely to remove retirees and so on from their databases if 
those persons cease to pay any annual membership fee that becomes due. Finally, it is 
clear that this approach is also highly labour intensive, requiring significant effort to be 
expended each time it is used.  
A.3 Option 2: More detailed coding of job titles 
A second possible approach is to engage in a more detailed coding of job titles that goes 
beyond the SOC Unit Group level. Any survey, such as the QLFS, which permits 
occupation to be coded to SOC Unit Group level must collect a number of items of data, 
including a verbatim description of the respondent‘s job title and the tasks or activities 
which they engage in as part of their job. Computer assisted structured coding tools, such 
as CASCOT, are then used by coders to assign a Unit Group occupation code.65 
However, the verbatim job titles and descriptions could equally be used to code at a finer 
degree of disaggregation. This approach would, for example, enable one to separately 
identify toymakers (or wigmakers) from among those jobs coded to Unit Group 5499 
(Handcraft occupations not elsewhere specified). Toymakers and wigmakers are the only 
jobs within Unit Group 5499 that have recognised accreditation schemes available to 
them.  
Such fine coding would only be necessary in the 73 Unit Groups where only some job 
titles were covered by regulation (see Table 4.3). If it could be undertaken successfully, it 
could be used in conjunction with the information on protected and regulated job titles in 
the ‗Map of Occupational Regulation‘ to produce more precise estimates of the 
percentage of all jobs that are subject to regulation. It would thereby address the 
aggregation problem inherent in the SOC based approach. The reduction in 
measurement error at the level of the individual job would also improve any estimates of 
the effects of regulation (e.g. on wages). However, the approach would require one to 
have access to the verbatim responses to the occupation questions in a large scale 
survey such as the QLFS or Understanding Society; this may present challenges from a 
data protection point of view.66 The other principle disadvantage of this approach is that it 
would necessarily be labour intensive, as structured coding tools are not typically set up 
in such a way as to enable coding beyond Unit Group level.  
                                                 
65
 Such tools assist the coder in their efforts to assign a numeric code to a verbatim text string by suggesting feasible codes 
based on the appearance of key words within the verbatim text string. They therefore make the process of coding quicker 
and more reliable. For further details on CASCOT, see: http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/ier/publications/software/cascot/  
66
 If the approach were to be implemented in a small-scale survey, then the benefits of fine coding could be minimal 
because of the small numbers of individuals likely to be classified to each of the 73 Unit Groups of interest. A small sample 
would also necessarily imply broad confidence intervals around any resultant estimates.  
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A.4  Option 3: Fielding new survey questions  
The third possible approach considered here is to field new survey questions which seek 
to establish from individual respondents whether their jobs are subject to regulation and 
whether they are themselves licensed/registered/certified/accredited. This approach has 
been applied twice with success in the United States by one member of the project team 
in order to identify individuals whose jobs require licences to practice.   
In the first application in 2006 (discussed in Kleiner and Krueger, 2010), a single question 
was added to a national survey conducted by the Gallup Organisation. The survey asked: 
―Does your job require a licence by a federal, state or local government agency?‖. The 
survey also collected information on respondents‘ demographic characteristics, industry, 
occupation, education and earnings. The survey results could therefore be used not only 
to estimate the percentage of jobs requiring licences to practice, but also to estimate the 
wage premium enjoyed by licensed workers over non-licensed workers.   
In the second application in 2008 (discussed in Kleiner and Krueger, 2009), a series of 
questions were added to a national survey administered by Westat on behalf of Princeton 
University. Again, the survey collected information on respondents‘ employer, job 
activities and demographic characteristics. The questions on occupational licensing 
focused on whether individual workers were themselves licensed and covered the 
following: 
 Whether the respondent has a licence or certification to do their job. 
 If the respondent does have a licence/certification. 
 Which type of agency issued the licence or certificate. 
 Whether someone who does not have a licence or certificate would legally be allowed 
to do the job. 
 Whether everyone who does the job is eventually required to have a licence or 
certification. 
 What type of qualifications are required in order to become licensed or certified. 
 Whether a test of competence was required in order to become licensed or certified. 
 Whether a fee had to be paid to become licensed or certified. 
 Whether continuing professional development has to be undertaken, or a test passed, 
in order to renew the licence or certification. 
If one could field similar questions in a large scale survey in the UK, it would enable one 
to reduce the measurement error in the SOC based estimates of the percentage of all 
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jobs which are subject to regulation. It would also enable one to obtain estimates of the 
percentage of all job holders who hold licences/certifications/accreditations.  
Such questions could not easily be placed on the QLFS without high level support from 
the various stakeholders to that survey. However, it would be possible to administer them 
in the first instance on one of the higher quality omnibus surveys (i.e. ONS Opinions or 
the NatCen Omnibus). This would provide a large scale field test and would also provide 
some survey responses which could be used for analysis purposes. If that were to prove 
successful, the UK Commission would then be in a robust position from which to lobby for 
the inclusion of the questions on a large scale official survey such as the QLFS. There 
are a number of practical considerations, however.  
First, it is necessary to be able to draft questions which accurately measure the 
requirement for, or possession of, licences/registrations/certifications/accreditations. The 
questions fielded by Kleiner and Krueger in the United States could provide one starting 
point; these were tested on focus groups before they were administered in the field. 
However, they would need to be adapted to the UK context, not least because of the 
inconsistent use of terminology across regulated occupations in the UK. ―Licensing‖ 
would be the term in common usage among security guards, publicans, taxi drivers and 
HGV drivers, but it would be unfamiliar to many health professionals, who would typically 
refer to the process of ―applying to be registered‖ with the General Medical Council or 
Health Professions Council. Similarly, certification is referred to as ―registration‖ by the 
regulatory bodies governing architects, engineers and fitness professionals. In either 
case, these forms of regulation are conceptually distinct from the registration of names 
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Possible new questions to identify instances of licensing might be as follows: 
 
Questions to identify instances of certification and accreditation would then need to 
account for the non-mandatory aspect of those regulations. If the new questions were not 
able to accurately distinguish between different forms of regulation, it is possible that they 
may simply introduce new measurement errors.67 Considerable resources would 
therefore need to be devoted to question testing, although such question testing can be 
undertaken as part of the process of adding questions to an omnibus survey. 
Second, one must ensure that any reductions in measurement error that are achieved 
from well tested questions are not counter balanced by increases in other forms of survey 
error when moving away from the QLFS. The ONS Opinions Survey and the NatCen 
Omnibus are the only omnibus surveys based on random probability designs and, 
consequently, are the only ones that can generate estimates with known statistical 
properties; other omnibus surveys should therefore be disregarded. The response rates 
are reasonable (around 60 per cent in the case of the NatCen Omnibus) and the 
achieved samples are weighted back to population characteristics. However, the ONS 
and NatCen Omnibus surveys yield achieved samples of only 1,500-2,000 adults in each 
wave, thereby providing achieved samples of only 800-1,000 workers. Questions would 
therefore need to be fielded over multiple waves in order to obtain the kinds of sample 
sizes (and narrow confidence intervals) for sub groups of workers (e.g. more or less 
                                                 
67
 Kleiner and Krueger (2009, p.9) report the results of post fieldwork validation checks on respondents‘ answers to their 
2008 survey question on licensing. These checks, which sought to identify whether individuals who reported that they held 
licences, could be found on administrative databases listing licence holders, suggested that respondents may have given 
incorrect answers in up to one-third of cases, although at least some of these cases may have been due to poor record 
keeping by enforcement bodies. 
Question: Would someone applying for your job today require a qualification? 
 If YES: Which qualification would that be? 
 If YES: Would someone without that qualification legally be allowed to 
do the job, if an employer were to appoint them to the post? 
 If NO: Would their qualifications need to be formally vetted by a 
professional body, an industry association or some regulatory 
body?  
 If YES: Which body would that be? 
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educated employees) that are available in the QLFS. The ONS Opinions Survey has an 
advantage over the NatCen Omnibus in this respect as it is fielded on a regular monthly 
basis, whereas the frequency of the Natcen Omnibus is less predictable.  
Third, one must ensure that the new survey questions on occupational regulation are 
accompanied by a full range of complementary questions describing the demographic 
characteristics of the respondent and the nature of their job and employer. Many of the 
standard classifications (such as ethnicity, disability, education) are included as a matter 
of course on the ONS and NatCen Omnibus surveys, and are provided free of charge 
with the data from the funder‘s own questions. However, detailed occupation coding is 
not undertaken on the ONS Opinions Survey, whilst detailed industry coding is not 
undertaken on the NatCen Omnibus. These coding exercises would need to be paid for in 
addition.68 Moreover, if one wanted to use the survey data to estimate the effects of 
regulation, one would also require accompanying questions on earnings, receipt of 
training and so on. Such questions are not asked as a matter of course. They might be 
added to an omnibus questionnaire, but their addition would necessarily add to the cost 
of the exercise.69  
A.5  Conclusions 
The SOC based approach has enabled us to produce some estimates of the prevalence 
of occupational regulation across all SOC Major Groups in the UK, where previously 
there were none. However, the approach has two key limitations. First, it provides 
estimates only of the percentage of jobs that are subject to regulation, and does not 
provide estimates of the percentage of workers who have successfully applied for 
licences/registration/certification/accreditation. Second, it provides only upper and lower 
bound estimates of prevalence since it cannot adequately deal with Unit Groups in which 
only some jobs are subject to regulation.  
In this Annex, we have discussed three alternative means of trying to improve on the 
SOC based approach. One is to weight each Unit Group by the percentage of jobs that 
are estimated to be regulated. However, this approach requires the collation of a great 
deal of good quality data from enforcement agencies. Whilst some enforcement bodies 
may be willing and able to provide such data, it is improbable that this will be so in all 
cases. The work involved in producing estimates under this approach is also 
                                                 
68
 Detailed occupation codes would be necessary as one means of validating respondents‘ answers. They could also be 
used to ensure that new classification errors are not introduced among groups where the regulatory status of the job is 
known for certain from the Map of Occupational Regulation.  
69
 We do not provide any indication of cost here. However, indicative costs for fielding a set of questions on occupational 
regulation could be obtained from survey agencies.  
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considerable, and must be repeated each time that a new time point is required. 
Accordingly, we do not recommend this approach.  
A second alternative is to code occupation at a greater level of detail than Unit Group. 
This requires access to the verbatim responses to the occupation questions in a large 
scale survey such as the QLFS or Understanding Society. Acquiring such access is 
unlikely to be easy and, again, the approach is labour intensive at each application. 
Accordingly, this approach is not attractive either.  
The third approach that we have discussed is to field new questions in a survey of 
individuals. The questions require careful development but, once they have been refined, 
they could be valuable, road tested in a good quality Omnibus survey. They could be 
accompanied by questions on attitudes to regulation, if the extension of licensing was one 
policy option under consideration. One is likely to wish to field the questions over multiple 
waves in order to obtain reasonable sample sizes, and one would need to ask additional 
questions over and above the questions on regulation status in order to obtain a good set 
of complementary data items (detailed SOC coding would be one minimum requirement).  
However, if such data could be collected it would provide a valuable addition to the 
current evidence base on occupational regulation in the UK, providing more precise 
estimates of the prevalence of regulation, of the characteristics of regulated workers and 
of the impact of regulation on labour market outcomes, such as earnings. The US is 
currently moving in this direction with prospective surveys to be carried out by the Bureau 
of Labor Statistics. We would therefore recommend that further consideration be given to 
this option, if resources can be found. 
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Annex B: List of SOC(2000) Unit Groups 
experiencing a switch in regulation status since 
2001 
SOC(2000) Unit Group Title of Unit Group Year of switch 
From unregulated to accreditation:  
1134 Advertising and Public Relations Managers 2005 
1226 Travel Agency Managers 2006 
1232 Garage Managers and Proprietors 2010 
1235 Recycling and Refuse Disposal Managers 2002 
2112 Biological Scientists and Biochemists 2009 
3449 Sports and Fitness Occupations NEC 2004 
3531 Estimators, Valuers and Assessors 2010 
3567 Occupational Hygienists and Safety Officers  2005 
4212 Legal Secretaries 2005 
5232 Vehicle Body Builders and Repairers 2006 
5234 Vehicle Spray Painters 2006 
5323 Painters and Decorators 2002   
6212 Travel Agents 2006 
6291 Undertakers and Mortuary Assistants 2002 
8135 Tyre, Exhaust and Windscreen Fitters 2006 
9225 Bar Staff 2005 
   
From unregulated to certification:  
3443 Fitness Instructors 2002 
8114 Chemical and Related Process Operatives 2009 
8115 Rubber Process Operatives 2009 
8116 Plastics Process Operatives 2009 
8118 Electroplaters 2009 
8119 Process Operatives NEC 2009 
   
From certification to licensing:  
1184 Social Services Managers 2005 
1185 Residential and Day Care Managers 2005 
2212 Psychologists 2009 
2442 Social Workers 2005 
3231 Youth and Community Workers 2010 
6121 Nursery Nurses 2008 
6123 Playgroup leaders/Assistants 2008 
   
From unregulated to licensing:  
1174 Security Managers 2003 
6114 Houseparents and Residential Wardens 2009 
6115 Care Assistants and Home Carers 2005 
9241 Security Guards and Related Occupations 2003 
9249 Elementary Security Occupations NEC 2008 
   
From unregulated to registration:  
1225 Leisure and Sports Managers 2007 
1239 Managers and Proprietors in Other Services NEC 2007 
3544 Estate Agents and Auctioneers 2008 
4123 Counter Clerks 2007 
6122 Childminders and Related Occupations 2007 
6124 Education Assistants 2007 
6211 Sports and Leisure Assistants 2007 
9226 Leisure and Theme Park Attendants 2007 
9229 Elementary Personal Services Occupations NEC 2007 
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Annex C: The Prevalence of Occupational 
Regulation (upper bound) 
This annex presents tables indicating the prevalence of occupational regulation in the UK 
using the upper bound measure discussed in Sections 5.2 and 5.3 of the main body of 
the report. These tables are the equivalent of Tables 5.5 to 5.10 in the main body of the 
report, which present estimates of the prevalence of occupational regulation using the 
lower bound measure. The tables below are numbered C.5 to C.10 to aid cross 
referencing. 
Table C.5  Regulation status in 2010 (upper bound), by Employment status 
Employment 
status 
Licensing Certif. Regist. Accred. Unreg. Total Base 
 Row % Row % Row % Row % Row % Row % No. 
Employee 32 3 6 18 42 100 129,530 
Self-employed 28 4 6 31 30 100 22,643 
All 31 3 6 19 40 100 152,173 
Base: All employee and self-employed jobs 
Source: QLFS Jan-Sept 2010 
 
Table C.6  Regulation status in 2010 (upper bound), by SOC(2000) Major Group 
SOC(2000) Major 
Group 
Licensing Certif. Regist. Accred. Unreg. Total Base 
 Row % Row % Row % Row % Row % Row % No. 
Managers and 
senior officials 
20 0 10 24 46 100 23,241 
Professionals 40 13 0 30 16 100 21,102 
Assoc Prof and 
Technical 
33 4 6 17 39 100 22,485 
Admin and 
Secretarial 
0 0 6 19 75 100 17,147 
Skilled trades 28 0 0 47 25 100 15,771 
Personal service 48 6 28 2 15 100 13,831 
Sales and 
customer service 
57 0 3 0 40 100 11,027 
Process, plant and 
machine operatives 
60 6 0 5 29 100 10,054 
Elementary 20 0 0 13 67 100 17,533 
All 31 3 6 19 40 100 152,191 
Base: All employee and self-employed jobs 
Source: QLFS Jan-Sept 2010 
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Table C.7  Regulation status in 2010 (upper bound), by Region of workplace 
Government 
Office Region 
Licensing Certif. Regist. Accred. Unreg. Total Base 
 Row % Row % Row % Row % Row % Row % No. 
North East 34 4 5 16 42 100 6,490 
North West 34 3 5 18 40 100 17,535 
Yorks and The 
Humber 
33 4 5 18 40 100 13,625 
East Midlands 34 4 5 17 41 100 11,066 
West Midlands 32 3 5 18 42 100 12,963 
East of England 30 4 5 21 39 100 13,608 
London 26 3 9 23 39 100 17,255 
South East 29 3 6 22 40 100 19,952 
South West 30 4 6 19 41 100 13,559 
Wales 36 3 5 17 39 100 6,624 
Scotland 35 3 4 18 40 100 13,255 
Northern Ireland 38 3 5 18 35 100 5,593 
All 31 3 6 19 40 100 151,525 
Base: All employee and self-employed jobs 
Source: QLFS Jan-Sept 2010 
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Table C.8  Regulation status in 2010 (upper bound), by LSC area 
LSC area Licensing Certif. Regist. Accred. Unreg. Total Base 
 Row % Row % Row % Row % Row % Row % No. 
County Durham 31 5 3 17 44 100 2,878 
Northumberland 34 3 5 20 38 100 2,152 
Tees Valley 35 4 4 16 40 100 3,756 
Tyne & Wear 31 3 5 17 43 100 6,697 
Cheshire/ 
Warrington 
31 4 5 22 39 100 6,065 
Cumbria 35 5 3 19 38 100 3,297 
Greater 
Manchester 
33 3 5 18 40 100 14,953 
Lancashire 34 4 5 18 40 100 8,882 
Greater Merseyside  33 3 5 17 43 100 7,700 
Humberside 35 5 4 16 40 100 5,598 
North Yorkshire 35 3 5 17 40 100 5,129 
South Yorkshire 33 3 5 17 41 100 7,607 
West Yorkshire 30 3 6 20 41 100 13,861 
Derbyshire 31 4 4 18 43 100 6,383 
Leicestershire 31 3 5 19 42 100 6,151 
Lincolnshire/ 
Rutland 
37 4 4 16 39 100 4,781 
Northampton-shire 31 3 6 19 41 100 4,837 
Nottinghamshire 34 3 5 18 40 100 6,424 
Birmingham & 
Solihull 
33 3 6 18 40 100 6,034 
Coventry & 
Warwickshire 
28 4 5 19 43 100 5,192 
Herefordshire & 
Worcestershire 
32 4 5 19 39 100 4,758 
Shropshire 37 3 4 18 38 100 2,792 
Staffordshire 32 3 4 18 42 100 7,012 
The Black Country 34 3 5 16 43 100 5,154 
Bedfordshire and 
Luton 
29 4 5 21 41 100 3,724 
Cambridgeshire 29 4 5 23 39 100 5,153 
Essex 29 4 8 20 40 100 9,859 
Hertfordshire 24 3 7 25 40 100 6,842 
Norfolk 33 3 6 17 41 100 5,149 
Suffolk 30 4 4 21 41 100 4,836 
Central London 25 2 10 24 39 100 6,917 
East London 28 2 8 21 41 100 9,615 
Continued on next page 
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Table C.8 continued 
LSC area Licensing Certif. Regist. Accred. Unreg. Total Base 
 Row % Row % Row % Row % Row % Row % No. 
North London 30 2 8 21 38 100 4,677 
South London 27 3 8 25 37 100 7,123 
West London 27 3 7 23 40 100 6,328 
Berkshire 26 3 6 25 40 100 5,372 
Sussex 30 3 7 21 39 100 9,477 
Hampshire/  
Isle of Wight/ 
Portsmouth/ 
Southampton 
29 4 6 21 41 100 11,080 
Kent/Medway 29 3 7 20 41 100 9,319 
Oxon/Bucks/Milton 
Keynes 
27 3 6 23 41 100 8,563 
Surrey 27 3 8 24 37 100 6,769 
West of England 30 4 5 20 41 100 6,771 
Bournemouth/ 
Dorset/Poole 
32 3 6 19 40 100 4,338 
Devon & Cornwall 33 3 5 19 41 100 9,403 
Gloucestershire 29 5 5 20 40 100 3,718 
Somerset 32 4 5 19 41 100 3,330 
Wiltshire & 
Swindon 
27 4 5 20 43 100 4,601 
All 30 3 6 20 40 100 301,057 
Base: All employee and self-employed jobs in England 
Source: QLFS Jan 2009 - Sept 2010 
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Table C.9  Regulation status in 2010 (upper bound), by Industry  
SIC(2007) Section Licensing Certif. Regist. Accred. Unreg. Total Base 
 Row % Row % Row % Row % Row % Row % No. 
A: Agriculture, 
forestry and fishing 





B: Mining and 
quarrying 















E; Water supply, 
sewerage, waste 











retail, repair of 
vehicles 
51 0 1 10 37 100 20,645 
H: Transport and 
storage 






and food services 





J Information and 
communication 





K: Financial and 
insurance activities 





L: Real estate 
activities 





M: Prof, scientific, 
technical activ. 





N: Admin and 
support services 





O: Public admin 
and defence 










Q: Health and 
social work 








14 4 6 18 57 100 4,132 
S: Other service 
activities 
8 21 8 17 46 100 3,957 
All 31 3 6 20 40 100 151,052 
Base: All employee and self-employed jobs 
Source: QLFS Jan-Sept 2010 
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Table C.10  Regulation status in 2010 (upper bound), by Sector Skills Council 
SIC(2007) Section Licensing Certif. Regist. Accred. Unreg. Total Base 
 Row % Row % Row % Row % Row % Row % No. 
Asset Skills 4 0 6 12 78 100 3,737 
Cogent 11 19 3 22 46 100 2,769 
ConstructionSkills 4 10 1 63 23 100 10,793 
Creative and 
Cultural Skills 
5 1 1 20 74 100 1,907 
E-skills UK 1 2 2 50 45 100 3,527 
Energy and Utility 
Skills 
15 12 1 22 50 100 1,903 
Financial Services 
Skills Council 
2 0 32 33 33 100 7,094 
GoSkills 57 2 1 8 33 100 3,350 
Government Skills 15 2 4 17 62 100 7,410 
IMI 43 1 1 18 38 100 2,786 
Improve Ltd 54 3 1 10 32 100 2,238 
Lantra 33 2 0 29 36 100 3,613 
Lifelong Learning 
UK 
31 1 8 11 49 100 10,074 
People 1st 41 0 4 20 35 100 8,499 
Proskills UK 9 5 1 21 64 100 2,722 
SEMTA 6 14 1 20 58 100 8,319 
Skills for Care and 
Development 
59 0 9 5 26 100 10,198 
Skills for Health 66 0 4 6 24 100 11,463 
Skills for Justice 63 0 0 7 29 100 3,005 
Skills for Logistics 33 1 2 14 49 100 7,341 
SkillsActive 25 8 1 18 48 100 2,715 
Skillset 7 1 2 24 67 100 3,234 
Skillsmart Retail 56 0 1 7 35 100 14,365 
SummitSkills 28 6 1 35 30 100 2,425 
Unclassified - no 
lead SSC 
30 6 14 17 32 100 16,128 
All 31 3 6 20 40 100 151,615 
Base: All employee and self-employed jobs 
Source: QLFS Jan-Sept 2010 
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Table C.11 Gender of job holder, by Regulation status of Unit Group in 2010 (upper 
bound) 
Regulation status 
of Unit Group 
(upper bound) 
Male Female Total Base 
 Row % Row % Row % No. 
Licensing 47 53 100 48,206 
Certification 75 25 100 5,107 
Registration 34 66 100 8,661 
Accreditation 70 30 100 28,970 
Unregulated 51 49 100 61,247 
All 53 47 100 152,191 
Base: All individuals in employee and self-employed jobs 
Source: QLFS Jan-Sept 2010 
Table C.12 Age of job holder, by Regulation status of Unit Group in 2010 (upper bound) 
Regulation status 
of Unit Group 
(upper bound) 
16-19 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60+ Total Base 






Row % No. 
Licensing 5 21 22 25 19 8 100 48,206 
Certification 3 22 24 25 19 8 100 5,107 
Registration 2 19 24 30 19 7 100 8,661 
Accreditation 2 21 25 26 18 8 100 28,970 
Unregulated 4 19 20 26 21 10 100 61,247 
All 4 20 22 26 20 8 100 152,191 
Base: All individuals in employee and self-employed jobs 
Source: QLFS Jan-Sept 2010 
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Table C.13 Ethnic group of job holder, by Regulation status of Unit Group in 2010 
(upper bound) 
Regulation 










Chinese Other Total Base 
 Row % Row % Row % Row % Row % 
Row 
% 
Row % No. 
Licensing 88 1 6 3 1 2 100 21,847 
Certification 93 1 3 1 1 1 100 4,094 
Registration 90 1 5 2 0 1 100 2,413 
Accreditation 93 1 4 2 0 1 100 14,565 
Unregulated 92 1 4 2 0 1 100 109,182 
All 91 1 5 2 0 1 100 152,101 
Base: All individuals in employee and self-employed jobs 
Source: QLFS Jan-Sept 2010 
 
Table C.14 Disabled status of job holder, by Regulation status of Unit Group in 2010 
(upper bound) 
Regulation 
















 Row % Row % Row % Row % Row % No. 
Licensing 6 6 3 85 100 48,206 
Certification 4 6 2 88 100 5,107 
Registration 6 7 3 85 100 8,661 
Accreditation 5 5 3 87 100 28,970 
Unregulated 6 6 3 85 100 61,247 
All 6 6 3 85 100 152,191 
Base: All individuals in employee and self-employed jobs 
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